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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of three essays, separated into three chapters.
In the first chapter, I estimate the effect of education spending on district-
level student outcomes in 24 states by leveraging changes in revenue driven
by property value variation. I interact state-level changes in property values
with fixed school finance formulas that measure how state aid and local revenue
respond to those changes to create a simulated instrument for school spending.
I measure a leave-one-out mean change in property values for school districts
with administrative data I compiled from individual states on property values
for over 7,000 school districts. The instrument is highly predictive of changes
in revenue and spending. My estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in
spending improves graduation rates by 2.1 to 4.4 percentage points and student
test scores by 0.05 to 0.09 standard deviations. These results suggest that market
variation in property values affects student outcomes through existing school
finance formulas.
The second chapter documents the existence and magnitude of an intergen-
erational effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation, which flows from older
to younger members of the community. We estimate a discrete-time hazard
model with cigarette taxes from before an individual is at risk of beginning
smoking (from birth to age seven). A $0.25 increase in cigarette taxes during
childhood decreases the hazard of later initiating smoking by 12.5 percent. We
find no evidence that contemporaneous cigarette taxes affect smoking initiation.
Prior work understates the effect of cigarette taxes on smoking by not consider-
ing this intergenerational channel.
The final chapter explores whether increased resources for traditional pub-
lic school districts helps stem the flow of students to charter schools in Ohio.
To do this, we separately examine the impact of school resource expansions
for capital projects and those for general purposes (current operating expenses,
instructional expenditures, support services, etc.) on the fraction of potential
traditional public school students attending a charter school, student outcomes,
and housing values. Both types of resource expansion reduce the fraction of po-
tential students attending digital charters but have no effect on students lost to
brick-and-mortar charters or student achievement.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION SPENDING ON STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM PROPERTY VALUES AND
SCHOOL FINANCE RULES
1.1 Introduction
The United States spends roughly 3.7 percent of its GDP on public K-12 education.1
Public schools were historically funded primarily through local revenue, the majority
of which came from local property taxes, as shown in Figure 1.1. Reliance on property
taxes led to large disparities in school spending across districts based on local income
levels and property wealth. In the 1970s and 1980s, state courts started ruling
that these disparities made local funding of school districts unconstitutional. States
responded by enacting funding formulas that reduced the relationship between local
property values and school resources to equalize spending across districts. In many
cases, formulas explicitly take into account property values to provide more funding
for low-property-wealth districts. Recent research leverages the policy variation from
these school finance reforms and finds positive effects of spending on high school
completion and other long run outcomes (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico, 2016), as
well as student test scores (Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2018). Despite
the increased importance of state funds, property values are still a major component
of school district spending in most states. While much effort has been devoted
1In FY2014, GDP was $17.43 trillion (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017) and total spend-
ing on public K-12 was $634 billion (U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education
Statistics, 2016b).
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to estimating the effect of school spending and quality on property values (Oates,
1969; Black, 1999; Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007; Ries and Somerville, 2010),
little is known about how changes in property values affect student achievement by
influencing school district revenues.
I address this gap by estimating the effect of education spending, driven by prop-
erty value fluctuations, on district-level student outcomes in 24 states. Observational
analyses of changes in school spending on student outcomes are biased by changes in
spending driven by other factors that also determine student achievement, such as
the demographic composition of students or parental support of education. To over-
come such sources of endogeneity, I create a simulated instrument for school revenue
by interacting state-level changes in property values with fixed school finance formu-
las that measure how state aid and local property tax revenue respond to changes in
district property wealth. My estimates show that a 10 percent increase in simulated
revenue increases spending by 1 to 2 percent, which suggests that administrators do
not perfectly adjust tax rates and other school finance parameters to offset changes
in revenue driven by changes in property values. Simulated revenue is a valid instru-
ment for district spending as long as changes in unobserved factors that affect both
student outcomes and spending are not systematically related to changes in property
values differentially across districts with different base-year finance policies. I show
that measures of student composition that are likely related to student achievement
(e.g. fraction of students eligible for free lunch, fraction of minority students) trend
similarly for districts with different combinations of high and low initial property tax
rates and property wealth, which provides support for the validity of my instrument.
2
The student outcomes I examine are graduation rates and test scores. Gradua-
tion rates are based on district-level information from the National Center for Edu-
cation Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD) from 1998 to 2010. I use nationally-
comparable math and reading test scores for 4th and 8th graders, aggregated to the
district level, from the Stanford Education Data Archive (SEDA). These test scores
are available from 2009 to 2013.
Using my measure of simulated revenue as an instrument for spending in a two-
stage least squares framework, I find that a 10 percent increase in spending in the
final two years of high school increases graduation rates by 2.1 to 4.4 percentage
points. These estimates are comparable to, but slightly larger than, those found in
recent papers using variation from school finance reforms.2 Two potential reasons my
estimates are larger than those using variation from school finance reforms include
the impact of spending in high income areas and the differential effect of spending
cuts. My estimates suggest that the benefits of increased spending are concentrated
in districts with high incomes. Because school finance reforms predominantly affect
low-income districts, estimates for high-income districts using this variation likely do
not have a strong first stage. My instrument is strong for both low- and high-income
districts, so I am able to reliably estimate the effect of spending in high-income areas.
Also, my estimates are identified off of both expansions and reductions in resources,
while school finance reforms provide only expansions. This means my estimates are
2 Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2016) find that a 10 percent increase in spending from school
finance reforms, across 12 years of school, increases graduation rates by 3.55 percentage points.
Candelaria and Shores (2017) replicate this result and also find an effect size of 5 percentage points
when restricting to the highest poverty districts. Each of these papers uses the number of graduates
per 8th grader (four years prior) as a proxy for graduation rates, which is the measure for which I
get the largest magnitude estimate of 5.1 percentage points.
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less sensitive to bias from secular trends.
For test scores, I find that increased average spending 5 to 8 years prior to the
tests increases 4th and 8th grade math and reading scores. A 10 percent increase in
spending increases 4th grade math scores by about 0.08 standard deviations (SDs),
4th grade reading scores by 0.09 SDs, 8th grade math scores by 0.09 SDs, and 8th
grade reading scores by .05 SDs. Importantly, spending from before students even
enter school improves their future test scores, which suggests that investments in
schooling inputs have a lasting effect. Whether or not increased spending improves
student test scores is not a new question in the literature. Since Coleman et al. (1966)
there have been dozens of studies attempting to estimate the education production
function (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). This debate has been contentious and has not
yet lead to a consensus (Hanushek, 2003; Krueger, 2003). This lack of consensus is
driven by the endogeneity between spending and student outcomes and the difficulty
in identifying a causal relationship. My estimates are consistent with the most recent,
well-identified estimates, which suggest that increasing total school resources does
indeed improve test scores (Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2018).
My primary contribution is new empirical evidence for the effect of spending
on student achievement using more regular, high-frequency variation than in past
studies. My estimates are identified by year-to-year variation in funding within the
existing policy structure rather than large, targeted overhauls of those structures
as in school finance reforms. The findings suggest that large, structural changes in
school finance formulas are not prerequisites for spending to affect student outcomes.
As a result of my novel identification strategy, I make three additional contribu-
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tions. First, I compile a new administrative data set from 24 states that contains
property values for over 7,000 school districts. This information is necessary for
my identification strategy and valuable for other research questions in local public
finance. Second, I simulate expected changes in revenue based solely on changes in
property values by coding up the key features of school finance formulas as of 1999.
Finally, the reduced-form of my estimates provides the first evidence of a causal effect
of market fluctuations in property values on student achievement.3 My first-stage
estimates show that increased property values significantly increase school revenue
through both local sources and state aid. Although school finance reforms decreased
the cross-sectional relationship between local property values and school spending,
there remains a significant time-series relationship that influences student outcomes.
My findings have several implications for policy. First, I find that changes in
property values indirectly affect student outcomes by changing the level of available
resources. This connection means that volatile housing prices can lead to volatile
student outcomes, which is an undesirable outcome for school districts. This suggests
that policymakers can improve student outcomes by allowing school districts oppor-
tunities to smooth spending through borrowing and saving. Loosening the credit
constraints of school districts can help insulate against volatile housing markets and
the harmful effects of spending cuts. Second, a concern with increasing education
spending is that we are already at the “flat of the curve,” meaning, spending is suffi-
ciently high that the marginal effect of each additional dollar is near zero. My results
3Davis and Ferreira (2017) estimate the effect of housing values on school finances, but are
limited in the test score outcomes they are able to investigate due to the timing restriction of their
identification strategy.
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suggest that, even during the 2000s when spending per pupil was historically high,
the United States has not yet reached that theoretical plateau. Finally, increased
spending improves test scores even when the spending occurs prior to when students
enter school. This relationship suggests that there are durable or delayed effects
of investments in school inputs on test scores. This is another reason that simply
comparing the current level of funding with contemporaneous outcomes is not likely
to capture the relationship between spending and student achievement.
The next section provides background information about the prior literature,
property taxes, and school finance programs in the United States. The data is
discussed in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 explains my simulated instrument and empirical
strategy. I present my results in Section 1.5, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Prior Literature
A large literature attempts to apply the framework of production technologies to
the education process. These studies estimate the relative importance of primary
inputs, which include an individual endowment of ability and the influence of families,
peers, and schools (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). The output of the education process
is cognitive and noncognitive skills that culminate in persistence in education and
eventual labor market earnings.
The first study to examine the relative importance of school inputs and family
inputs on student achievement was Coleman et al. (1966). Coleman finds that family
6
characteristics explain the majority of variation in test scores and spending explains
little. At the time, people took these results to mean that schools did not matter
and the variation in student outcomes is a result of family and peer effects. The
methodology used in the analysis were severely criticized at the time (Bowles and
Levin, 1968; Cain and Watts, 1970; Mosteller and Moynihan, 1972). Even so, the
counterintuitive results in Coleman et al. (1966) ignited decades of hotly-debated
research into the relationship between spending and student achievement, which find
contrasting evidence (see Hanushek, 2003; Krueger, 2003). Most of these studies
require strong assumptions to be interpreted as causal because they lack exogenous
variation in spending.
Recently, more well-identified studies leverage experimental or quasi-experimental
variation in school inputs to examine their effect on student outcomes. These inputs
include class size (Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 2000; Krueger
and Whitmore, 2001; Chetty et al., 2011), teacher quality (Chetty et al., 2011), and
capital spending (Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein, 2010; Martorell, Stange, and Mc-
Farlin, 2016; Hong and Zimmer, 2016). Others exploit large changes in spending due
to school finance reforms (SFRs). SFRs increased spending and decreased spending
gaps between high- and low-income school districts by 19 to 34 percent (Murray,
Evans, and Schwab, 1998). Card and Payne (2002) find that increased spending
from SFRs decreased the gap in SAT scores across family background groups. Jack-
son, Johnson, and Persico (2016) find that increased per-pupil spending increased
educational attainment and adult earnings, and Hyman (2017) finds that Michigan’s
SFR improved college-going and completion.
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Most relevant to the present study are those that use variation in spending from
SFRs to examine the relationship between spending and student outcomes such as
graduation rates, test scores, and labor market outcomes. Jackson, Johnson, and
Persico (2016) use individual-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
to link adults to the school district in which they grew up to measure the effect
of court-ordered school finance reforms on long-run outcomes. They find that a
10% increase in spending increased high school graduation rates by 7.1 percentage
points, years of schooling by 0.3 years, and adult earnings by 7 percent. Using
the same district-level graduation data from the CCD as the current study, they
find that a 10% increase in spending increased graduation rates by 3.55 percentage
points. Candelaria and Shores (2017) replicate this finding and also estimate that a
10% increase in spending increased graduation rates by 5 percentage points in the
quartile with the highest fraction of free-lunch eligible students. My estimates are in
the same range as these and come from a completely different source of variation in
school district spending.
Most SFR studies that examine test scores do so in individual states. These
include Clark (2003) who finds no test score gains in Kentucky, and Papke (2005) who
finds increased proficiency scores in Michigan. The one study to use SFRs to examine
the effect of spending on standardized test scores nationwide is Lafortune, Rothstein,
and Schanzenbach (2018). Using restricted-access individual-level information from
the state NAEP, they create state-level measures of test score disparities between low
and high income school districts. They find that after reforms, low-income districts
close the gap between their test scores and those in high-income districts by 0.1
8
standard deviations, which gives an effect size of 0.12 to 0.24 standard deviations
per $1,000 in annual spending per pupil. My paper is the first to estimate the causal
effect of spending on test scores at the district level that are nationally comparable.
1.2.2 Property Taxes
Most school districts are governed by a school board with authority to levy property
taxes for school funding. This taxing authority is limited by statute and the approval
of local voters. Property taxes are ad valorem taxes determined by multiplying the
aggregate taxable value of property in the district by the property tax rate. The
tax rate is often reported in “mills,” or thousandths of a dollar. That is, a property
tax rate of 1 mill corresponds to a fraction of 11000 = 0.001. Nearly all property tax-
imposing jurisdictions tax real estate such as residential and commercial properties.
Other common types of taxable property include motor vehicles, agricultural land,
mineral wealth, and certain types of property used in business such as machinery.
States impose a number of restrictions, known as tax and expenditure limits
(TELs), on the property taxing behavior of local governments. These restrictions
determine the taxable value of property and restrict the allowable level and growth
of property tax revenue. TELs were mostly enacted in reaction to the property tax
revolts of the 1970s and 1980s as a way of codifying the de facto tax breaks that
homeowners were already receiving prior to the institution of rigorous assessment
practices. States determine the fraction of property that is subject to taxation –
called the assessment rate – for each type of property. Historical or religious buildings
are exempt from taxation and their assessment rate is zero. Other properties are
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partially exempt and given a lower assessment rate such as homesteads and homes
owned by low-income seniors or veterans. Other TELs restrict taxing behavior to
reduce the tax burden and limit volatility in property tax payments. To reduce the
tax burden, state impose fixed tax limits, such as maximum or minimum millage rate
requirements. Some states also limit the annual change in assessed value, revenue,
or tax payments.
Previous studies find that introducing TELs decreased school inputs and weak-
ened student outcomes. Student-teacher ratios increased significantly as a result of
Oregon’s tax limitation (Figlio, 1998). Figlio and Rueben (2001) also find that TELs
reduce the test scores of education majors, and presumably their effectiveness as
teachers. Downes, Dye, and McGuire (1998) find that the introduction of TELs in
Illinois led to a small reduction in 3rd grade math scores, but found no effect for
reading scores. Rather than estimate the effect of moving to a new set of TELs, I
include the dynamic limits in my simulated instrument since they are predetermined
responses to large fluctuations in property values. District fixed effects account for
the fixed limits. These rules represent important differences across states in how and
when increased property values translate into revenue. As of 1999, 19 states had
some sort of dynamic limit on the growth of property tax revenue.4
1.2.3 School Finance
School districts receive about 45 percent of their funding from local sources, 46
percent from state sources, and the remaining 9 percent from federal sources (U.S.
4Table A.1 lists each of the dynamic TELs as of 1999.
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Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics, 2016a). Eighty
percent of local revenue is generated through property taxes. The majority of state
revenue for education comes from income and sales taxes.5 State funds are dis-
tributed to local school districts based on a formula set by the state legislature,
usually on a per-pupil basis. In addition to the student counts, state finance formu-
las depend on the ability of school districts to raise local revenue, usually measured
by property wealth. Other supplementary funds are distributed based on program
offerings through categorical grants or special circumstances like geographically large
districts that need additional funding for transportation.
Funds are available to school districts based on the following relationship:
Rdt = Lt(τ dt ×W dt ) + St(τ dt ,W dt ,Γdt ) + Fedt(Λdt ), (1.1)
where Rdt is the sum of revenue from all sources for district d and year t. Local
revenue, Lt(·), is a function of the revenue generated by applying the school property
tax rate to the property wealth within a district along with any tax and expenditure
limits.6 Thus, W dt is the market value of property, τ dt is the millage rate, and Lt(·)
accounts for non-linearities imposed by TELs. The effective tax rate is the fraction
of market value of property that is received as property tax revenue, which differs
from the statutory property tax rate for several reasons. It is also useful to define
`dt such that τ dt × `dtW dt = Ldt (τ dt ×W dt ) for interior values (where the non-linearities
are not binding). The state revenue function, St(·), depends on local tax effort –
5In some states property tax revenue for schools is treated more like a state revenue source
because states either directly collect the property tax, or receive funds from local districts that
they then redistribute.
6Although TELs are imposed by the state, they directly affect the collection of local revenue.
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measured by τ dt – and tax capacity – measured by W dt – as well as characteristics
of the district, Γdt , such as student counts and participation in certain educational
programs like special education or free or reduced-price lunch. Transfers between
state and local governments are captured in St, so if states redistribute revenue from
high-wealth to low-wealth areas, then St can be negative. Federal revenue, Fedt(·),
is a function of district characteristics, Λdt , that may or may not also be included in
Γdt , depending on the state.
As shown in Equation 1.1, there are several sources of potential variation in
total revenue. For example, states can make legislative adjustments to the funding
formula (changes to St(·)) or districts can adjust the property tax rate (changes to
τ dt ). School finance reforms constitute a fundamental change in the form of St that
is above and beyond small adjustments to the parameters of the existing system.
Hoxby (2001) uses the term inverted tax price to denote “the dollars that a district
gets to spend if it raises one dollar in local revenue” regardless of whether that dollar
is generated by a change in the tax rate or the tax base. Here, I separate these two










, or the marginal change in revenue given a unit increase in property
wealth. The wealth price depends on how W dt interacts with each revenue source.

























Thus, the wealth price and the tax price reflect both changes in local property tax
revenue and direct responses in state aid. Districts choose their tax rate based on
the tax price, but are unlikely to consider the dynamic effect feeding back through
the wealth price in the future.
Nearly every state uses a foundation program, district power equalization, or a
combination of the two.7 The most common school finance policy is the foundation
program, which is used in over 40 states. The goal of a foundation plan is to provide
adequate funding by guaranteeing an amount of funding per pupil. The guaranteed
amount of spending per pupil is called the foundation level. To qualify for state
aid, districts are responsible for contributing a local share defined by applying the
foundation tax rate, τ f , to their taxable property value. Foundation programs do
not preclude districts from raising additional funds by taxing above the foundation
tax rate. Generally, foundation programs provide state aid based on
Sdt = max{0,Foundationt × ADMdt − Ldt (τ ft ×W dt )}, (1.4)
where the guaranteed amount of funding is the product of Foundationt (the statewide
foundation level; dollars per student), and ADMdt (average daily membership; the






















7Table A.2 summarizes the type of school finance programs used in each state. Hawaii’s single
school district is entirely funded by the state and does not receive property tax revenue. North
Carolina provides flat grants to districts, which can be supplemented by local property tax revenue.
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and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt , τ dt 6= τ ft . (1.6)
The relationship between revenue and property wealth and between revenue and the
tax rate are shown in panel A of Figure 1.2. The dashed line shows revenue with no
state aid, so the distance between the dashed and solid line represents the amount of
state aid. For a district with no property wealth, revenue is exactly the foundation
guarantee, F dt . As wealth increases, revenue increases by (τ dt − τ ft ) × `dt , or how far







, at which point state aid is zero. Districts with a tax rate below the
foundation tax rate receive no state aid and districts with a tax rate above receive
aid in the amount F dt − τ ft `dtW dt , or the guaranteed amount minus the amount of
local revenue generated by taxing the foundation rate. Note that there is no upper
limit to the local tax rate at which districts receive state aid.
The second most common set of school finance policies are district power equal-
ization programs. To help subsidize funding for low-wealth districts, equalization
programs guarantee an amount of revenue per mill regardless of district property





max{W dt ,W ∗t } −W dt
))
, (1.7)
where W ∗t is the guaranteed wealth level. The state tops local revenue up to what
a district with the guaranteed wealth level would get by levying the same tax rate.
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and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= max{`dtW ∗t , `dtW dt }. (1.9)
Panel B of Figure 1.2 the relationship between revenue and wealth and between
revenue and the tax rate for a general district power equalization plan. Districts
with property wealth less than the guaranteed level receive τ dt `dtW ∗t in revenue. As
property wealth increases, the amount of revenue does not change, but the fraction
of revenue from state aid decreases until wealth reaches the guaranteed wealth level
and state aid becomes zero. Revenue increases by max{`dtW ∗t , `dtW dt } as the tax rate
increases.
Below, I provide examples from New Mexico and Georgia to explain how I calcu-
late the wealth and tax price.8 I use the term wADMdt to refer to weighted average
daily membership or the weighted number of students.9 These examples also help
show why the wealth price varies between districts within states as well as across
states. To emphasize this point, Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of wealth price
for each of the states in my analysis. The within state variation comes from differ-
ences in property tax rates and property wealth across districts. Variation across
states also depends on these factors but is additionally driven by differences in the
8The school finance formulas for other states in my sample are described in detail in Appendix
A.3.
9I use the same notation for districts across states, but in constructing the state finance formula
I take into account the substantial differences in how states weight students in different grades or
programs.
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state’s funding formulas. This variation is not obvious based on the finance formu-
las and may not even be apparent to districts themselves. Nevertheless, there is a
large amount of both within- and between-state variation in the wealth price, which
I exploit in my identification strategy.
Foundation Example: New Mexico
New Mexico has a simple foundation program established by the New Mexico Public
School Finance Act of 1974. The foundation tax rate is 0.5 mills, so local revenue is
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt and state revenue is
Sdt = Foundationt × wADMdt − 0.0005× `dtW dt . (1.10)
Although there is no limitation in the law that requires Sdt to be positive, the finance
rules and characteristics of districts are such that this is not negative in practice.
Total revenue is then given by
Rdt = Foundationt × wADMdt + (τ dt − 0.0005)× `dtW dt + Feddt . (1.11)
This gives a wealth price of
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.0005)× `dt . (1.12)
Thus, without any action by the school district, revenue increases by a set fraction
of any additional property wealth and depends directly on the local tax rate and the
foundation tax rate. Similarly, the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt (1.13)
which depends on the level of property wealth.
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Foundation + Equalization Example: Georgia
Georgia’s Quality Basic Education Act provides funds per weighted pupil based on
a foundation program with an optional equalization component. The foundation
tax rate is 5 mills. The equalization component provides the difference between the
revenue generated from 5 to 8.25 mills and what would have been generated by a
district with that same millage rate and property wealth as a district at the 90th
percentile of wealth in the state. Local revenue is Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt and state revenue
is





W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and τ dt > 8.251000
(τ dt − 0.005)×
(
W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000
0 if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t
,
(1.14)
where W 90t is the 90th percentile of wealth across districts in the state. There is no
statutory limitation on Sdt that keeps this value from being negative, but the total
state aid given to all districts is restricted by limiting the local share to less than
25 percent of the total foundation guarantee aggregated across all districts. Total
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revenue is then given by





W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and τ dt > 8.251000
(τ dt − 0.005)×
(
W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000
0 if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t .
.
(1.15)





(τ dt − 0.00825)× `dt if `dtW dt < W 90t and τ dt > 8.251000
0 if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000(
τ dt − 0.005
)
× `dt if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t
(1.16)












W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000
`dtW
d
t if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t .
(1.17)
For districts with property wealth below the 90th percentile, state aid decreases and
local revenue increases from each additional dollar of property wealth. If they levy
between 5 and 8.25 mills the change in state and local funds cancel each other out
and total revenue does not change. Once they levy above 8.25 mills the increase in
local funds is enough to compensate for the decrease in state aid and total revenue
increases. Districts at or above the 90th percentile of wealth are not affected by the
18
equalization component and only experience the foundation portion of the plan, so
they get a fraction of each additional dollar of property wealth as revenue.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Sources
This project draws data from several sources. My primary source of data is the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD). I supplement
the CCD with additional district-level information including a database of district
property values collected from individual states, school finance formulas coded from
legal records, test scores, and median household income.
NCES Common Core of Data
The CCD is a comprehensive, national database of all public schools and school dis-
tricts in the United States. Fiscal information is available annually back to 1995 and
non-fiscal characteristics are available back to 1987. The variables I use from the
CCD include expenditures, revenues, and the number of students in several race cat-
egories and in certain educational programs. Expenditures are reported in a number
of categories including instructional spending, capital outlays, and administrative
spending.10 Revenues are reported in several fine categories and aggregated to lo-
cal, state, and federal sources. One subcategory I use to construct my instrument
10I consider both log spending and spending per pupil in my analysis. Results are consistent
between the two measures, but I primarily discuss the log spending measures.
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is property tax revenue, which I divide by district property wealth to calculate the
effective tax rate. The endogenous variable of interest that I instrument for in my
identification strategy is total expenditures. I use student count data to create con-
trols for total student enrollment, the fraction of students who are black or Hispanic,
have an individualized education plan (IEP)/are in special education, or are eligible
for free or reduced price lunch.
School District Property Wealth Database
The CCD does not include a measure of district property wealth, which is crucial
for my estimation strategy. Most states have an agency (usually a Department of
Revenue or Department of Taxation) that oversees local auditors who assess values
for property tax purposes. Due to this responsibility, summaries of property values at
each geographic level of taxation (e.g. county, municipality, school district) are often
available from these state agencies. I collected this information individually from
states and created the first school district-level database of property values covering
years 1999-2014.11 This database includes information for 24 states.12 The data
necessary to perform my analysis is not currently available for other states. Measures
of property wealth are predominantly made up of residential and commercial real
property but may also include other types of property (e.g. automobiles or mineral
resources).
11Property wealth data is not available in each state and year. See Appendix A.2 for a description
of data sources and availability for each state.
12The states in the database are Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and
Washington.
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I digitized the raw data based on state records and converted the property wealth
measures to total market value of property within the district, wherever possible.13
I then merged these state records with school district information from the CCD. I
most frequently matched on district name, but in some cases I used unique identi-
fiers consistent between the state and CCD records when they were available. See
Appendix A.2 for a full description of data sources and steps taken to create the
database.
School Finance Formulas
I compile information about school finance formulas from multiple sources. U.S.
Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics (2001) provides
an overview of each state’s funding formula as of the 1998-1999 school year, which
provides a useful starting point. I supplement these descriptions with additional
information from laws and statutes as well as documentation from state Departments
of Education.
I do not attempt to capture every factor that influences state funding. Instead,
I focus on the bulk of funding that comes from foundation entitlements and parts
of state funding that depend on property wealth. The main feature that needs to
be reflected in the school finance formulas is the wealth price. This means that
the response to a change in property wealth will be correct in terms of direction and
relative magnitude, but the scaling will be off to the extent that I have not accounted
for all other categorical grants or other components that are unrelated to property
13Some states provide enough information for me to match assessment rates for different types
of property with the relevant assessed values to back out market values.
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wealth. These differences may weaken the power of my simulated instrument but do
not invalidate my instrumental variables estimates.
Student Achievement Data
Graduation rate data come from the CCD and test score measures come from the
Stanford Education Data Archive (SEDA). Each data source has its own strength
and limitations.
Graduation data comes from the CCD completion information at the district
level for most years from 1992 to 2010. I calculate graduation rates by taking the
number of diplomas awarded in a given year and dividing by the number of students
in the cohort expected to graduate that year based on lagged student counts. Thus,
the completion rate can be calculated using a number of cohorts such as the number
of students in 11th grade the previous year, number of students in 10th grade two





where Gradgt is the gth grade cohort graduation rate in year t, Diplomast is the num-
ber of diplomas awarded, and Studentsgt−(12−g) is the number of students in gth grade
12−g years prior to t. There is some year-to-year variation in district coverage. One
important example is years 2003 to 2005, when completion information was only
recorded for school districts serving more than 1000 students.14 My preferred esti-
mates only include districts with data from 2003 to 2005, but results are not sensitive
14The number of diplomas awarded was not reported from 2003 to 2005. For these years, I use
the reported dropout rate and the base number of students to calculate a measure of diplomas
awarded that is consistent with the other years.
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to this restriction. It is important to note that this measure is only a proxy for the
graduation rate. This measure will also pick up changes in student composition that
occur between the year the cohort is measured and when the number of diplomas is
measured. It also does not account for students who receive a GED or transfer to a
different school district.
The SEDA is a collection of academic achievement, achievement gaps, and school
and neighborhood economic and racial composition at various levels of aggrega-
tion. The SEDA includes a comprehensive database of district-level test scores for
school years 2009 to 2013. The basis for these measures are state standardized tests,
which are then adjusted based on comparing the distributions of those tests with the
NAEP.15 For a subset of large, diverse districts, there are also measures of the aver-
age gap between white students and black students. These test score measures are
reported on the scale of NAEP scores, but I standardize these at the grade-subject
level based on the mean and standard deviation in 2009. After 2009 I allow the mean
and standard deviation to evolve as the distribution of achievement shifts over time.
One of the strengths of the SEDA test score measure is that it covers over 80 per-
cent of districts in the United States. The second key strength is that the measures
are comparable across time and geography, which allows me to do this district-level,
nationwide analysis. The primary limitation of these data is that they are currently
only available for a limited number of years.
15See Reardon and Kalogrides (2017) for a full discussion of how these measures are constructed.
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Other State and District Controls
Other data used in my analysis include median household income and additional
measures used in school finance formulas. The median household income for each
school district comes from the 2000 Census and the American Community Survey
(ACS) 5-year estimates. These sources provide an estimate of district income for 1999
and then 2009 onward. To account for district-level changes in income, particularly
during the great recession, I impute values linearly between the district value in 1999
and the value in 2009. This captures the potential drop in incomes in areas most
deeply affected by the recession. Some school finance formulas include a measure of
the cost of living to adjust for within state differences in the cost of teacher salaries.16
1.3.2 Creating a Balanced Panel of School Districts
Over time, new school districts are formed, old districts are absorbed into existing
districts, and some local districts are consolidated into regional districts that serve
a larger geographic area. This regional consolidation is especially apparent in the
Midwest, where small, rural districts have been combining with greater frequency
(Gordon and Knight, 2009). To create a balanced panel of school districts, I combine
all districts that are ever associated with each other. For example, Figure A.1 shows
the boundaries of two school districts in Minnesota, Brewster and Round Lake.
These two districts consolidated into Brewster-Round Lake Public Schools in 2014.
Therefore, I treat these two school districts as a single district across the entire
analysis period. I sum the property values and student counts in these two districts
16These additional variables are outlined in Appendix A.2.
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and average the median income and test scores.
I aggregate school districts for two additional reasons: regional district overlap
and availability of property value data. Some states have municipality-level elemen-
tary districts and regional high school districts that serve multiple municipalities.
Even if I have the property values for each municipality, it is not possible to dis-
tinguish how the change in property values for a municipality affects each district
separately. Figure A.2 illustrates this issue with three municipalities in New Jersey.
Bellmawr, Runnemede, and Gloucester municipalities each provide for their own ele-
mentary services, and Black Horse Regional High provides secondary services for all
three. In both situations, I combine school districts to the lowest level for which I
have data and use the aggregated school district in my analysis. While most property
value data is reported at the school district level, in some states the data are at the
municipality or county level and it is not possible to perfectly map property values
to school districts. In these cases, I aggregate districts to the level at which property
values are available.
The number of school districts in my sample of 24 states starts at 8,061 in 1999
and falls to 7,649 by 2014 due to actual consolidations. After making my additional
district consolidations due to data limitations, my balanced panel consists of 6,500
districts.17 I also make several exclusions to reduce noise and volatility in my per-
pupil measures, which are similar to the exclusions in Lafortune, Rothstein, and
Schanzenbach (2018). Specifically, I remove districts with fewer than 100 students
at any time and district-year observations with enrollment: more than double the
17I perform additional analyses to show my results are robust to dropping all consolidated dis-
tricts. These results are available in Appendix Table A.20.
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district’s mean enrollment, more than 15 percent different from enrollment in either
adjacent year, or more than 10 percentage points above or below the district’s av-
erage growth in enrollment. I also remove district-year observations with per-pupil
expenditure or simulated revenue more than 5 times larger or smaller than the state
average. Together, these restrictions affect roughly 19.5% of district-year observa-
tions, but many of these districts are also dropped due to other missing data. My
main conclusions are not sensitive to these restrictions.18
1.3.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for my main estimation samples for graduation rates or SEDA
test scores are presented in Table 1.1. The table highlights the fact that each outcome
is available for distinct subsets of the data. The first two columns present means and
standard deviations for the graduation rate sample, where spending information is
either available for at least 1 year prior to cohort graduation and for at least 4 years
prior. The last column reports statistics for the sample with SEDA test scores. The
graduation rate samples cover just under 3,000 school districts, while the test score
sample has just under 6,000 school districts. The average graduation rate is about
80 percent for the 10th grade cohort.
My sample consists of districts from 24 states. Table 1.2 compares the character-
istics of districts in states including in my sample and those that are not included,
to speak to the external validity of my estimates. These differences are calculated
as of 2009. The first column shows statistics for the districts in states in my sample,
18Estimates without these sample restrictions are available in Appendix Table A.20.
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column (2) provides statistics for districts in states not in my sample, column (3)
displays the p-value of the difference between column (1) and (2), and the final col-
umn is statistics for all districts. The 24 states in my sample account for 55 percent
of all students and 56 percent of districts. Districts are similar in their average num-
ber of students and teachers, and in income. There are some differences in property
tax revenue per student and fractions of students eligible for free or reduced price
lunch, in special education or who are a racial minority. However, these differences
are small and provide suggestive evidence that my estimates for the relationship be-
tween spending and student outcomes would generalize to other states not in my
sample.
1.4 Method
The central challenge in estimating the causal effect of total spending on student
achievement is endogeneity between expenditures and student outcomes. For ex-
ample, districts with a higher number or percentage of children who come from
low-income families receive additional funding through programs such as Title I.
This negatively biases cross-sectional estimates. On the other hand, districts with a
higher fraction of parents that are high income or are more engaged in education also
receive greater resources through a higher willingness to pay taxes for education and
potentially donations to the district. This situation instead causes a positive bias
in a cross-section. These are just two examples of the bias that comes from factors
related to both educational outcomes and levels of spending. It is unclear which type
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of bias dominates in any given sample, so cross-sectional OLS estimates are difficult
to interpret in a causal manner. Controlling for fixed differences between districts
accounts for many of these cross-sectional biases, but changes in student or family
characteristics also introduce bias.
1.4.1 Simulated Instrument
To address these endogeneity concerns, I construct an instrument that captures the
mechanical response in revenue to changes in property values through fixed school
funding formulas. States regularly change the funding level per student to address
student needs and changing costs of education. Districts also frequently change their
tax rates based on their budgetary needs and the current level of property wealth.
Both of these policy decisions are likely to be endogenously related to changes in
student performance. In my instrument, I fix both state funding formulas and district
property tax rates in a base year. The only determinant of funding left to vary is
property wealth. With fixed tax rules, increased property wealth leads to increased
property tax revenue and, often, decreased state transfers.







where Property Tax Revenued0 is the total revenue from property taxes in the base
year and W d0 is the total market value of property in the base year.19 Previous
19Due to data limitations, I am unable to recover market values from assessed values for all
districts. The instrument exhibits the same variation for districts with assessed, rather than market,
values but the magnitude of the first stage will be scaled by the portion of `d0 for which I am not
able to account.
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research finds that property values are determined, in part, by the quality of schools
in the area (Oates, 1969; Black, 1999; Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007; Ries and
Somerville, 2010). Thus, student achievement may directly affect property values in
the district. To avoid this simultaneity issue, I calculate simulated property wealth
in year t as
W˜ dt =
W st −W s0
W s0
×W d0 , (1.20)
where W st and W s0 are state-level property wealth in year t and the base year, respec-
tively. I use state-level changes that omit the focal district to remove any potential
impact of district-level changes on the aggregate. This can also be done at other
levels of aggregation (e.g. CBSA or national). The higher the level of aggregation,
the less concern about characteristics of the district impacting property values.20 My
measure of simulated property wealth is a Bartik-style shift-share measure, where
the share is the baseline level of property wealth and the shift is changes at the
state-level (Bartik, 1991).
Simulated local revenue, L˜dt is then the base year effective tax rate times simulated
wealth, or
L˜dt = ETRd0 × `dt W˜ dt . (1.21)
The effective tax rate absorbs most of the Ldt function by accounting for assessment
rates, delinquency rates, and exemptions. Simulated state revenue, S˜dt , is calculated
by substituting a combination of the base year statutory tax rate, τ d0 , base year effec-
tive tax rate, ETRd0, base year student counts, and current year simulated property
20I perform additional analyses with simulated revenue calculated using national changes in
wealth. These analyses are available in Table A.20 and provide similar results to my leave-one-
out measure for graduation rates, but the first stage becomes weak for the test score samples.
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wealth into the base year state funding formula. That is,
S˜dt = S0(τ d0 , W˜ dt , wADMd0 , L˜dt ). (1.22)
Here, S0 captures important characteristics of funding formulas in the base year that
determine the response in state revenue to changes in property values. The set of
variables included in simulated state revenue depend on the particular state funding
formula. To explain how I construct simulated state revenue, consider the examples
of New Mexico and Georgia. In New Mexico, the foundation amount was $2,344.09
per weighted pupil in 1999 and the only other variables state funding depends on are
student counts and property wealth. Thus, simulated state revenue for New Mexico
is calculated as
S˜dt = $2, 344.09× wADMd0 − `dt × 0.0005× W˜ dt , (1.23)
and it follows that simulated revenue is:
R˜dt = $2, 344.09× wADMd0 + (ETRd0 − `d0 × 0.0005)× W˜ dt . (1.24)
For Georgia, the foundation amount in 1999 was $2,038.74 per weighted pupil, so
simulated state revenue is





W 900 − `d0W˜ dt
)
if `d0W˜ dt < W 900 and τ d0 > 8.251000
(τ d0 − 0.005)×
(
W 900 − `d0W˜ dt
)
if `d0W˜ dt < W 900 and 51000 ≤ τ d0 ≤ 8.251000
0 if `d0W˜ dt ≥ W 900
(1.25)
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and simulated revenue is





W 900 − `d0W˜ dt
)
if `d0W˜ dt < W 900 and τ d0 > 8.251000
(τ d0 − 0.005)×
(
W 900 − `d0W˜ dt
)
if `d0W˜ dt < W 900 and 51000 ≤ τ d0 ≤ 8.251000
0 if `d0W˜ dt ≥ W 900
.
(1.26)
This same procedure is carried out for each district in my sample.
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy
I estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) models relating student achievement to
spending, using simulated revenue as an instrument for actual spending. The first
stage equation is:
Spendingd,t−τ = α0 + α1R˜d,t−τ + α2Wd,t +Xd,tα3 + γd + γs,t + ηd,t (1.27)
where Spendingd,t−τ is observed log spending in district d in the τ years before
calendar year t. This can either be the values of simulated revenue and spending
τ years ago or the average over the past τ years. Wd,t is the value of property
in the district, Xd,t is a vector of district characteristics including log number of
students, median household income, fraction of students with an IEP, fraction of
student eligible for free or reduced price lunch, fraction of black student, and fraction
of Hispanic students. District fixed effects are given by γd and state-by-year fixed
effects are given by γs,t, where s indicates the state in which district d is located.
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The second stage is:
Ad,t = β0 + β1 ̂Spendingd,t−τ + β2Wd,t +Xd,tβ3 + δd + δs,t + εd,t, (1.28)
where Ad,t is district-level student achievement, ̂Spendingd,t−τ is predicted spending
over the past τ years from the first stage, and other measures are as described in the
first stage. In both equations, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Education is a cumulative process, so even if student achievement responds di-
rectly to education spending, it is unlikely to do so in the same year. Instead of
measuring the immediate effect of spending on contemporaneous test scores, I con-
sider current and lagged district spending individually and on average. Ideally, I
would examine the effect of spending over the past four years on fourth grade test
scores and spending over the past eight years on eighth grade test scores. In prac-
tice, my instrument is stronger nearer to the base year, so I restrict my attention
to the lags with a strong first stage. Since graduation rates are available in earlier
years (1999-2010) my first stage is strong in closer relative years, lower values of τ .
Thus, for models of the graduation rate I focus on spending between the current year
(τ = 0) and four years prior (τ = 4). Test score measures are only available for later
years (2009-2013) and therefore have a strong first stage with longer lags, higher val-
ues of τ . For test score outcomes I focus on spending in the five to eight years prior
to the year the outcomes are measured. These are due to my empirical approach and
do not necessarily reflect an underlying aspect of the education production function.
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1.4.3 Identification
Including observed district property values in my regressions makes clear that my
model is not identified by within-district variation in property wealth. Instead, iden-
tifying variation comes from the interaction of property wealth and the fixed tax
rules. In this case, the exclusion restriction is that simulated revenue is only re-
lated to student achievement through its affect on spending. Since the simulated
instrument is determined only by base-year tax rules and adjustments to base-year
property wealth, the exclusion restriction is violated if changes in unobserved factors
related to changes in student outcomes (such as demographic shifts) are also related
to the interaction of base-year tax rates and base-year property wealth. Thus, simu-
lated revenue should not be related to large changes in demographics. The exclusion
restriction would also be violated if demographic trends were determined by the
combination of initial tax rates and property wealth.
In order to assess the validity of my empirical strategy, I propose several exer-
cises that show whether the data is consistent with the assumptions necessary for
my estimates to reflect a causal effect. First, in Figure 1.4, I explore whether the
data support the exclusion restriction by plotting trends in district characteristics
separately for four subgroups. The subgroups are created by splitting the sample by
districts above and below the median for initial property wealth and effective tax
price. The exclusion restriction would be violated if changes in district characteristics
related to student achievement are related to baseline tax rates and property wealth.
To provide context, the top two figures show the trends in property values and simu-
lated revenue per pupil across the four subgroups. Property values exhibit the same
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upward trend for each group until 2009, when values in districts with high initial
wealth decreased and values in districts with low initial property wealth stopped
increasing. The trends in simulated revenue are similar until about 2003 when dis-
tricts with low initial wealth have the largest increases. These lines are expected to
diverge to the extent that there is variation in baseline tax rates and property wealth
that are relevant for differences in revenue. The fraction of students eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch trends up similarly for all four subgroups, which suggests no
differential trends in district poverty. Finally, the fraction of students who are black
increases in districts with high initial property wealth and remains relatively stable
for districts with low initial property wealth. This suggests that my estimates may
be attenuated because the districts with the largest growth in fraction black are also
the districts with the largest increase in simulated revenue per student. Taken to-
gether, these provide evidence that my estimates are not being driven by trends in
student characteristics.
In the next section I show two additional checks for the validity of my research
design. First, I estimate the effect of simulated revenue on various measures of stu-
dent composition. A strong relationship between student composition and simulated
revenue could mean my estimates are biased. I will show that effects are small and
the relationships that are significant would work in the opposite direct of the results
I find. Second, I do a placebo test of whether future future simulated revenue is
related to current outcomes. If my estimates are driven by endogeneity between my
measure of revenue and student outcomes then the order of spending and outcomes
would not matter. I will show that current and past spending matter, but future
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spending does not, which provides further evidence in support of my identification
strategy.
1.5 Results
I show the first-stage effect of log simulated revenue on log total expenditures for the
graduation rate samples and SEDA test score samples in figures, with corresponding
tables available in the appendix. The y-axis of the figures are the estimated first-
stage coefficient given a 10 percent increase in spending and the x-axis is number of
years relative to when the cohort is set to graduate. Coefficients are shown as dots,
95% confidence intervals are shown as whiskers, and F statistics for each estimate
are in brackets. Each column of the table correspond to one of the relative years on
the x-axis and each panel is one of the samples.
First-stage estimates for the graduation rate samples are shown in Figure 1.5,
with corresponding results in Table A.4. The coefficients are mostly between 0.01 and
0.02, which means that a 10 percent increase in simulated revenue increases spending
by 1 to 2 percent. This suggests that school districts and state governments respond
to the mechanical change in revenue from changes in property values, but not enough
to fully counteract the increase in revenue. However, as I previously mentioned, the
scaling of simulated revenue makes these an underestimate of the true magnitude.
The figures also show a pattern wherein estimates with a short lag (4 years or less)
have a strong first stage, while estimates with a longer lag have smaller coefficients
that either are not statistically different from zero or have F statistics less than 10.
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This is consistent with there being a strong first stage near the base year of 1999
that becomes weaker the further away the measure is from the base year.
Similar estimates for the SEDA test score samples are reported in Figure 1.6 and
Table A.5. The coefficients are centered around 0.02 for the later lags and decline
to be around 0.01 for the earlier lags. These effects are similar to the magnitude
of those in the graduation rate samples, but show a pattern that is opposite of the
graduation rate samples, with stronger estimates for the longer lags and estimates
that are attenuated and have F statistics below 10 for lags fewer than 3 years.
Simulated revenue is a strong instrument near the base year of 1999, but becomes
weak farther away from the base year. This pattern is not due to actual heterogeneity
in the lag structure, but is driven by the calculation of the instrument. Graduation
rates are measured from the base year until 2010, but test scores are measured from
2009 to 2013. Thus, the short lags in the graduation sample and the long lags in the
SEDA test score sample are strong because they come from the years in which the
simulated instrument is strong. Since my 2SLS results are only reliable when the
first stage is strong, I focus on spending in the 1 and 4 years before graduation rates
are measured and spending 5 to 8 years prior to when test scores are measured.
Table 1.3 reports estimates with various averages of the prior years of simulated
revenue and spending. Column (1) is the average of the current year and the previous
year, column (2) is the average of the current year and the previous 4 years, estimates
with the average of this year and the past 8 years are shown in column (3), and the
last column has estimates averaged from 5 to 8 years prior to when the outcome is
measured. Panels A through D present estimates for the graduation rate samples and
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panel E shows results for the SEDA test score sample. The estimates using average
lags are consistent with the individual lags in the pattern of first-stage strength. The
first stage is strong for averages of 1, 4, and 8 lags for graduation sample, but not
for the average of 5 to 8 years prior. The SEDA test score sample has a strong first
stage for the 8-year lag and the 5-8 year average, but not for the 1 and 4 year lags.
The results of my 2SLS analysis are reported in individual lags as both figures
and tables and average lags in a table similar to the first stage results. Instead of
showing all the individual lags, I only report the results for the lags that have a strong
first stage. Figure 1.7 shows the individual lag results for graduation rates, with
corresponding estimates in Table A.4.21 The coefficients are positive and significant
in the year of and before graduation, but smaller and not statistically significant 2
to 4 year prior. The estimates in Table 1.4 suggest that the average effect of a 10
percent increase in spending on graduation rates ranges from 2.1 to 4.4 percentage
points. These results suggest that increased spending is most effective at improving
graduation rates for those near graduation.
Figure 1.8 and Table A.7 report the 2SLS results of spending on SEDA test scores.
The coefficients are generally positive, significant, and around 0.1 standard deviations
in magnitude. The exception is for 8th grade math scores, which are similar in
magnitude but vary from a point estimate near zero for 8 years prior up to 0.2 for
4 years prior. The average lag results in Table 1.5 suggest that increasing spending
by 10 percent in the 5 to 8 years prior to the test increase 4th grade math scores
by 0.078 standard deviations, 4th grade reading scores by 0.088 standard deviations,
21The coefficients for other individual lags with a weak first stage are imprecisely estimated and
generally not informative, but are available upon request.
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8th grade math scores by 0.048 standard deviations, and 8th grade reading scores
by 0.093 standard deviations. It is important to note that increased spending has a
lasting impact on test scores, and improvements made before students enter school
have a significant effect several years later.
These estimates are consistent with the most recent, well-identified estimates
for the effect of spending on test scores. In particular, Lafortune, Rothstein, and
Schanzenbach (2018) find that after 10 years of increased spending by $1,000 per
pupil, due to school finance reforms, test scores increased between 0.12 and 0.24
standard deviations. Other studies find positive effects of spending on test scores
in single-state case studies (Guryan, 2001; Papke, 2005). My estimates suggest that
a thousand dollar increase in spending per pupil results in a 0.051 to 0.066 stan-
dard deviation increase in test scores (In my sample, average spending per pupil
is $13,719.24, so $1,000 is a 7.29 percent increase. Scaling my estimates by 0.729
gives 0.09× 0.729 = 0.066 for 4th grade test scores and 0.07× 0.729 = 0.051 for 8th
grade reading scores.), which is smaller than Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzen-
bach (2018). However, the parameter I estimate is the effect of increased spending
5 to 8 years before the test is taken, while Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach
(2018) report the effect of a persistent increase in spending over the previous 10
years. If there is a cumulative effect of being in a district with more resources, then




If my measure of spending is correlated with changes in the types of students in the
district, then the estimates could reflect changes in student composition rather than
changes in student achievement. I explore whether this is the case in Table 1.6, which
shows the effect of spending in the current and previous year in the graduation rate
sample in the first 5 columns and average spending 5 to 8 years prior in the test score
sample in the last 5 columns. The first column shows estimates for the log number of
students and columns (2) through (5) show estimates for the fraction of students in
different categories including fraction black, fraction Hispanic, fraction with an IEP
(special education), and fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch. A 10 percent
increase in spending increases the number of students by 232 in the graduation rate
sample and 210 in the test score sample, which amounts to a 4.5 percent increase. In
the graduation rate sample, the fraction of students who are black increased by 0.22
percentage points, fraction Hispanic increased by 1.28 percentage points, fraction of
students with an IEP increased by 0.23 percentage points, and fraction of students
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch decreased by 0.64 percentage points. However,
the decrease in free or reduced-price lunch eligibility is not statistically significant.
The SEDA test score sample shows a similar increase in the fraction Hispanic, but
the estimates for fraction black, fraction with an IEP, and fraction eligible for free
or reduced price lunch are smaller in magnitude and not statistically different from
zero. While several of these coefficients are statistically significant, they are relatively
small in magnitude and rule out large changes in student composition driving my
results. In fact, the small changes are generally in the direction that would work
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against finding an effect if they were true shifts in the district population. These
changes are also consistent with retaining more students that are most in danger of
dropping out.
As a falsification test, I also estimate the effect of spending over several following
years on outcomes in the current year. Table 1.7 shows the relationship between
average spending over the following four years on graduation rates in the current
year. The first stage is strong, but the 2SLS estimate is small, negative, and not
statistically significant, which provides additional evidence that my estimates reflect
a causal effect of spending on student achievement. I am unable to do a similar
falsification test for test scores because I do not have a strong first stage for spending
in any years following a test-score measure.
1.5.2 Exploring Mechanisms and Heterogeneity
Although my instrument only allows me to estimate the causal effect of total re-
sources, it is instructive to examine the categories in which districts choose to spend
their extra funds. Table 1.8 shows 2SLS estimates for the relationship between ex-
penditures and local, state, and federal revenue. All measures are in thousands of
real 2013 dollars per pupil. The first three columns show results for the 10th grade
cohort graduation sample with average lags over the current and 1 previous year,
while the last three columns present estimates for the SEDA test score sample with
average lags 5 to 8 years prior to the test. The majority of increased revenue comes
through local sources. State aid also increases, but the estimate for the SEDA test
score sample is negative and less precisely estimated. Table 1.9 and Table 1.10 report
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2SLS estimates of total expenditures on mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive subcategories of spending for the graduate rate sample and test score sample,
respectively. These estimates suggest that the majority of increased spending was
devoted to current expenditures, capital outlay, and payments to other organizations.
The larger than average payments to the state, other schools, and private schools
are consistent with districts bearing a portion of the responsibility of students who
would otherwise attend but are attending other schools. Table 1.11 breaks up cur-
rent expenditure into instructional, support service, and other categories. This shows
that the majority of current expenditures are instructional expenditures, but support
services also receive a significant portion of the funds.22 The difference between the
samples in the fraction of each dollar going to current expenditures is driven by less
support service spending in the test score sample.
I also explore heterogeneity in the effect of spending on graduation rates. In
Table 1.12 I show results for models fully interacted with an indicator that equals
1 in periods that simulated revenue decreased from the previous period in panel A.
The coefficients on log spending represent the effect of increased spending and the
coefficient on loss interacted with log spending shows how much larger or smaller
the effect of spending is when spending decreases. In these models I instrument for
the two spending variables with simulated revenue and simulated revenue interacted
with the indicator for a loss. Because I have more than one instrument, I report an
F statistic suggested by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) as a test for the strength of the
22Additional tables with estimates for each subcategory of spending are available in Online Ap-
pendix A.
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instruments and find they are reasonably strong.23 The coefficients on log spending
for graduation rates are similar in magnitude to the non-interacted coefficients in
Table 1.4 and the coefficients on the interaction term are small and only statistically
different from zero for the 11th grade graduation cohort. This estimate suggests that
a 10 percent increase in spending increases the number of diplomas per 11th-graders
(1 year ago) 0.31 percentage more when spending decreases than when spending
increases. That represents is a 15.7 percent larger magnitude effect when budgets
are cut than when they expand. I consider this merely suggestive because gains are
only significantly different from losses for the 11th grade cohort measure, and the
direction of the effect is not consistent nor significantly different from zero for test
scores.
Panel B shows the results of similar analyses with models fully interacted with an
indicator equal to 1 if the district has median household income below the median
in their state. The estimates for graduation rates are larger in magnitude for high-
income districts than the average across all districts from the baseline model in
Table 1.4. My estimates suggest that increasing spending by 10 percent increases
graduation rates by 4.32 to 7.1 percentage points in high income districts and 0.3 to
1.45 percentage points in low income districts. The difference between high and low
income districts is statistically significant for all cohorts.
23The Kleibergin-Paap statistic is a generalization of the statistic suggested by Cragg and Donald
(1993) for cases with non-i.i.d. standard errors.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether money spent on education affects grad-
uation rates and test scores using the interaction of market changes in property values
with fixed school finance rules as an instrument for spending. I find that a 10 percent
increase in spending increases graduation rates by 2.1 to 4.4 percentage points. A
10 percent increase in spending also increases 4th and 8th grade math and reading
scores by between 0.05 and 0.09 standard deviations. Increased spending primarily
goes to current expenditures, new construction, and payments to other organizations
such as the state government and local private schools. The improvement in gradua-
tion rates is observed almost entirely in high-income districts. Spending has lasting
effects on test scores, so that students benefit from investments made before they
even begin school.
In sum, the answer to the question of whether money matters in education is yes.
Further understanding the way in which money matters will also help shape efficient
policies. For example, the reduced form relationship I find between property values
and student outcomes is important to consider when crafting school finance plans. If
formulas provide additional funding to districts with low levels of property wealth,
but reinforce this relationship, it could increase spending volatility enough to offset
the benefits of increased funds. Another implication of my finding is that we have
not yet reached the flat of the curve and marginal increases in spending still result in
meaningful improvements in the quality and quantity of education. Also, because I
find that increased spending before a student even enters school significantly improves
their test scores, estimates that relate contemporaneous expenditures and test scores
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will likely miss the true impact of the spending.
The relationship between property values and local revenue is not unique to school
finance. Thus, my approach can be applied directly to other locally-financed public
programs. This is especially useful in other cases where it is difficult to measure
the effect of resources on outcomes because of the relationship between the outcome
and the level of investment, such as the number of police officers and the level of
crime. While other contexts do not have the same type of equalization schemes as
seen in school finance, other state-level limitations on local taxing behavior provide
between-state variation in wealth prices.
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1.7 Figures & Tables
Figure 1.1: Historical Sources of School District Revenue
Notes: Data from U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics, Biennial Survey of Education in the United States, 1919-20 through 1949-
50; Statistics of State School Systems, 1959-60 and 1969-70; Revenues and Expendi-
tures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education, 1979-80; and Common Core
of Data (CCD), “National Public Education Financial Survey,” 1989-90 through
2013-14.
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Notes: Panel A shows the relationship between revenue and property wealth (left)
and revenue and the tax rate (right) for a foundation plan with foundation tax rate
τ ft and guaranteed foundation amount F dt . Panel B shows the relationship between
revenue and property wealth (left) and revenue and the tax rate (right) for a district
power equalization plan with guaranteed yield of W ∗t . Dotted lines represent local
revenue with no state aid.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of estimated wealth price in 1999
Notes: The wealth price is the fraction of each additional dollar of property wealth
that districts take in as revenue. Calculations of the wealth price based on policies
in 1999 can be found in Online Appendix B.
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Figure 1.4: Change in district characteristics relative to 1999, by base-year wealth
and effective tax rate
Property Values Simulated Revenue
Free/Reduced-Price Lunch Fraction Black
Notes: Figure 1.4 plots the mean change in property values, simulated revenue per
pupil, fraction of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and fraction of
students who are black, relative to 1999, for 4 groups: (1) districts with below
median effective tax rate and below median property wealth, (2) districts with above
median effective tax rate and above median property wealth, (3) districts with below
median effective tax rate and above median property wealth, and (4) districts with
above median effective tax rate and below median property wealth. Effective tax
rates and property wealth are calculated as of 1999 and medians are calculated at
the state level.
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Figure 1.5: First-stage effect of a 10% increase in simulated revenue on total expen-
diture for graduate rate samples – individual year lags
8th Grade Cohort Sample 9th Grade Cohort Sample
10th Grade Cohort Sample 11th Grade Cohort Sample
Notes: Figure 1.5 presents point estimates (divided by 10), 95 percent confidence
intervals, and F statistics in brackets, from individual regressions of lagged total
expenditures on simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-missing
graduation rates. Models also include controls for district property wealth, median
household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction
special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects,
and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 1.6: First-stage effect of a 10% increase in simulated revenue on log expendi-
ture for SEDA test score samples – individual year lags
4th Grade Math Sample 4th Grade Reading Sample
8th Grade Math Sample 8th Grade Reading Sample
Notes: Figure 1.6 presents point estimates (divided by 10) and 95 percent confidence
intervals, and F statistics in brackets, from individual regressions of lagged total
expenditures on simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-missing
test scores. Models also include controls for district property wealth, median house-
hold income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special
education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and
state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
50
Figure 1.7: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on graduation rates
8th Grade Cohort 9th Grade Cohort
10th Grade Cohort 11th Grade Cohort
Notes: Figure 1.7 presents point estimates (divided by 10), 95 percent confidence
intervals, and F statistics in brackets, from individual 2SLS regressions of graduation
rates on lagged log total expenditures instrumented by lagged log simulated revenue.
Models also include controls for district property wealth, median household income,
fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education,
fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 1.8: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on SEDA test scores
4th Grade Math 4th Grade Reading
8th Grade Math 8th Grade Reading
Notes: Figure 1.8 presents point estimates (divided by 10), 95 percent confidence in-
tervals, and F statistics in brackets, from individual 2SLS regressions of test scores on
lagged log total expenditures instrumented by lagged log simulated revenue. Models
also include controls for district property wealth, median household income, fraction
of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction el-
igible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for main estimation samples
(1) (2) (3)
10th Grade Cohort SEDA Test
1-year 4-year Lag Score Sample
Graduation Rate 0.81 0.81
(0.17) (0.19)
Average Lagged Spending ($1,000 PP) 12.57 12.37 12.63
(4.29) (3.94) (4.32)
Average Lagged Simulated Revenue ($1,000 PP) 7.22 7.08 7.05
(3.91) (3.70) (3.83)
Fraction Special Education 0.13 0.13 0.14
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Fraction Black 0.11 0.10 0.08
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
Fraction Hispanic 0.11 0.12 0.13
(0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Fraction Free-Reduced Price Lunch 0.38 0.39 0.43
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Number of Students 5,265 5,330 4,493
(24,308) (22,954) (24,533)
Median Household Income 56,495 55,852 57,034
(21,955) (21,470) (22,895)
Property Wealth ($100,000s) 22,588 24,630 20,729
(127,459) (133,268) (112,742)
Districts 2,825 2,824 5,857
N 23,082 18,061 27,160
Notes: Means are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Statistics are
calculated for three estimation samples. The 10th grade cohort graduation rates
with 1 lag are available from 2000-2010 and with 4 lags are available from 2003-2010.
SEDA test scores are available for 2009-2013 so the spending variables lagged 5 to 8
years cover years 2001-2008. All monetary variables are in real 2013 dollars.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for characteristics of districts in and out of the sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not P-value of (2)-(1)
In Sample In Sample or Fraction All
I. District-level Averages
Number of Students 3,703 3,754 0.848 3,725
Number of Teachers 255 220 0.042 239
Student-Teacher Ratio 13.5 14.8 0.000 14.1
Spending Per Student 15,169 14,719 0.481 14,970
Property Tax Revenue Per Student 5,742 4,925 0.002 5,381
Median Household Income 56,328 53,546 0.000 55,111
Fraction with an IEP 0.131 0.136 0.000 0.133
Fraction FRPL Eligible 0.405 0.407 0.632 0.406
Fraction Black 0.077 0.063 0.000 0.071
Fraction Hispanic 0.116 0.105 0.001 0.111
Fraction White 0.743 0.751 0.092 0.747
II. Observation Counts
Students 26,592,100 21,418,996 0.55 48,011,096
Districts 7,182 5,706 0.56 12,888
States 24 26 0.48 50
Notes: Panel I displays averages for the variables indicated and panel II displays
counts. Columns (1), (2), and (4) report averages of the indicated variables. Column
(3) reports the p-value of the difference between column (2) and column (1) for panel
I and the fraction in the sample for panel II. Values are based on 2009.
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Table 1.3: First stage estimates of log simulated revenue on log spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 year 1-4 years 1-8 years 5-8 years
A. 8th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Log Sim. Rev. 0.157∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.041
(0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.047)
F 29.63 43.02 39.61 0.77
Districts 2,724 2,720 2,667 2,668
N 17,467 15,676 9,146 9,147
B. 9th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Log Sim. Rev. 0.145∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.042)
F 35.82 60.26 65.31 6.36
Districts 2,825 2,825 2,815 2,816
N 22,130 18,641 10,009 10,011
C. 10th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Log Sim. Rev. 0.147∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.042)
F 44.42 51.74 60.09 6.21
Districts 2,825 2,824 2,816 2,817
N 23,082 18,061 9,967 9,969
D. 11th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Log Sim. Rev. 0.150∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.042)
F 44.62 42.54 66.31 7.82
Districts 2,823 2,815 2,797 2,798
N 20,606 15,355 9,538 9,540
E. SEDA Test Score Sample
Log Sim. Rev. 0.057+ 0.037 0.221∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.032) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022)
F 3.19 2.29 144.38 92.76
Districts 5,649 5,648 5,644 5,650
N 24,116 24,102 24,087 24,114
Notes: This table reports the results of first stage regressions of total expenditures
on simulated revenue averaged over various previous years. Column (1) is the current
and previous year, column (2) is the current through past 4 years, column (3) is the
past 8 years, and column (4) is from 5 to 8 years prior to the measured outcome.
Models also include controls for property wealth, median household income, frac-
tion black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: + p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on graduation rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
8th Grade Cohort 9th Grade Cohort 10th Grade Cohort 11th Grade Cohort
1 year 1-4 years 1 year 1-4 years 1 year 1-4 years 1 year 1-4 years
Log Spending 0.437∗∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.307∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.382∗∗
(0.118) (0.102) (0.094) (0.097) (0.069) (0.098) (0.066) (0.114)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.85
First-stage F 71.92 101.64 86.32 113.12 97.83 101.85 96.56 92.90
Districts 2,676 2,660 2,823 2,817 2,824 2,821 2,819 2,802
N 17,419 15,616 22,128 18,633 23,081 18,058 20,602 15,342
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of gradua-
tion rates on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with average lagged
log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth, me-
dian household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction
special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed ef-
fects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Table 1.5: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on test scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4th Grade 8th Grade
Math Reading Math Reading
Log Spending, 5-8 years prior 0.775∗ 0.879∗∗ 0.929∗ 0.477+
(0.338) (0.304) (0.401) (0.277)
First-stage F 183.01 184.92 98.73 180.67
Districts 5,662 5,659 5,640 5,671
N 26,371 26,380 24,582 26,457
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of test
scores on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with average lagged
log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on student composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Graduate Rates SEDA Test Scores
Total Black Hispanic IEP FRPL Total Black Hispanic IEP FRPL
Log Spending 2323.970∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.023∗∗ -0.064 2095.343∗∗ 0.009 0.159∗∗ 0.001 0.007
(424.656) (0.010) (0.015) (0.008) (0.040) (621.043) (0.008) (0.019) (0.014) (0.040)
Dep. Var. Mean 5265.24 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.38 4613.16 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.42
First-stage F 195.99 195.99 195.99 195.99 195.99 124.47 124.47 124.47 124.47 124.47
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 5,524 5,524 5,524 5,524 5,524
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,988 23,988 23,988 23,988 23,988
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of student
composition outcomes on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with
average lagged log simulated revenue. The outcome for the first column is total
number of students, while the outcome for columns (2) through (5) are the fraction
of students in the given category. Models also include controls for district property
wealth, median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction His-
panic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch,
district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Two-stage least squares estimates of future log spending on graduation
rates
(1)





Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of gradu-
ation rates on average log total expenditures over the next four years instrumented
with log simulated revenue averaged over the same years. Models also include con-
trols for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who
are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.8: Two-stage least squares estimates of spending on source of revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Graduation Rate SEDA Test Score
Local State Federal Local State Federal
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.707∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.005 1.314∗∗ -0.119 -0.080∗∗
(0.068) (0.042) (0.011) (0.253) (0.083) (0.023)
Dependent Variable Mean ($1,000s PP) 5.57 5.93 0.94 5.95 5.88 0.87
Baseline Fraction 0.42 0.50 0.09 0.45 0.47 0.09
F 83.60 83.60 83.60 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of vari-
ous sources of revenue on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with
log simulated revenue averaged over the same years. Models also include controls
for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who are
black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or re-
duced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
59
Table 1.9: Two-stage least squares estimates of spending on total expenditure sub-
categories – graduation rate sample, 10th grade cohort, one-year lag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current Non-Elementary Capital Payments to: Interest
Expenditure or Secondary Outlay State Other Schools Private Charter Payments
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.515∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.002 0.036∗∗
(0.051) (0.009) (0.061) (0.028) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Dep. Var. Mean 10.67 0.07 1.24 0.06 0.12 0.064 0.021 0.24
Baseline Fraction 0.87 0.01 0.09 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.002 0.02
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of various
expenditure categories on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with
log simulated revenue averaged over the same years. Models also include controls
for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who
are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Table 1.10: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on total expenditure
sub-categories – SEDA sample, five to eight year lag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Current Non-Elementary Capital Payments to: Interest
Expenditure or Secondary Outlay State Other Schools Private Charter Payments
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.571∗∗ -0.005 0.229+ 0.083∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.011∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.118) (0.005) (0.121) (0.024) (0.028) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013)
Dep. Var. Mean 10.75 0.06 1.26 0.05 0.24 0.067 0.018 0.24
Baseline Fraction 0.86 0.00 0.08 0.004 0.02 0.005 0.003 0.02
First-stage F 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of various
expenditure categories on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with
log simulated revenue averaged over the same years. Models also include controls
for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who
are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on current expenditure
sub-categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Graduate Rates SEDA Test Score
Instructional Support Services Other Instructional Support Services Other
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.292∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.159∗∗ -0.008+
(0.032) (0.024) (0.003 (0.086) (0.042) (0.004
Dep. Var. Mean 6.55 3.69 0.44 6.57 3.74 0.44
Baseline Fraction 0.53 0.30 0.04 0.52 0.30 0.04
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of various
current expenditure categories on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented
with log simulated revenue averaged over the same years. Models also include controls
for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who
are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on graduation rates
A. Gains versus Losses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
8th Grade 9th Grade 10th Grade 11th Grade
Log Spending 0.413∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.225∗∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.110) (0.088) (0.065) (0.063
Loss*Log Spending -0.006 0.009 0.009 0.031∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.85
Kleibergen-Paap F 38.67 44.33 48.64 45.76
Districts 2,676 2,823 2,824 2,819
N 17,419 22,128 23,081 20,602
B. High- versus Low-Income Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
8th Grade 9th Grade 10th Grade 11th Grade
Log Spending 0.706∗∗ 0.594∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.432∗∗
(0.255) (0.215) (0.148) (0.145
Low Income*Log Spending -0.561∗ -0.557∗∗ -0.370∗ -0.401∗∗
(0.270) (0.229) (0.159) (0.155)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.85
Kleibergen-Paap F 12.06 12.87 15.55 15.14
Districts 2,676 2,823 2,824 2,819
N 17,419 22,128 23,081 20,602
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of gradua-
tion rates (panel A) and test scores (panel B) on average lagged log total expenditures
instrumented with log simulated revenue, averaged over the same years. Models also
include controls for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of
students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible
for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects.
All covariates are interacted with an indicator equal to 1 if the change in simulated
revenue from the previous year is negative. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INTERGENERATIONAL IMPACT OF CIGARETTE TAXES
ON SMOKING INITIATION
2.1 Introduction
Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in the United States and
generates enormous individual and social costs. Indeed, estimated external costs of
cigarette smoking are over $300 billion per year.1 Policymakers often use cigarette
taxes to reduce smoking and its associated costs. Over the last four decades, real
cigarette taxes have increased from an average of $0.51 per pack in 1976 to $1.53
in 2014 (Orzechowski and Walker, 2014). Although cigarette taxes are shown to
reduce the total demand for cigarettes (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000), it is unclear
whether they help convince young people to not start smoking. The act of preventing
people from starting to smoke is likely more efficient than encouraging them to quit
because smoking is addictive (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2014).
Nevertheless, in a recent review, Guindon (2014) concludes that empirical evidence
is “too limited to make any conclusive statements about the impact of tobacco prices
or taxes on smoking onset.” This lack of consistent evidence has led many to argue
that cigarette taxes are an ineffective policy tool for reducing smoking initiation.
Though the methods and results of previous studies vary, they all focus exclu-
sively on the direct effect of cigarette taxes on individuals’ own smoking behavior.
1This figure includes around $170 billion in direct medical costs (Xu et al., 2015), the majority
of which are payed for by public programs, and over $156 billion in productivity lost to decreased
health and premature death (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2014).
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There is little evidence that contemporaneous cigarette taxes reduce youth initia-
tion in particular. This focus on the immediate impact may overlook an important
indirect effect that flows through the smoking behavior of other individuals in the
community. Older friends and family members may play an especially large role in
a youth’s decision to begin smoking. This paper is the first to identify the existence
and magnitude of an intergenerational effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initia-
tion.2 Specifically, we link changes in cigarette taxes during early childhood to later
initiation decisions. This linkage is formed by a two-stage process. First, many stud-
ies find a negative effect of cigarette taxes on adult smoking behavior (Chaloupka
and Warner, 2000). Then, we propose that the smoking behavior of socially con-
nected adults during an individual’s childhood influences his or her decision to begin
smoking as a youth.3 Evidence relating smoking initiation to cigarette taxes in early
childhood through the smoking behavior of older people in the community provides
important new insight to the discussion of the efficacy of cigarette taxes.
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Young Adults
(NLSCYA) to estimate a hazard model of smoking initiation that allows for an in-
direct, intergenerational effect of taxes. Cigarette taxes from childhood might also
affect smoking through serial correlation with contemporaneous cigarette taxes and
their direct effect on smoking initiation. Thus, we estimate the effect of tax changes in
2We use the term intergenerational in the broad sense of a connection between an older and
younger person and not solely between parents and their offspring.
3There is a strong correlation between the smoking behavior of parents, friends, and other close
connections and youth smoking initiation (Jackson and Henriksen, 1997; Avenevoli and Merikangas,
2003; Hill et al., 2005; Bricker et al., 2007; Gilman et al., 2009; Go¨hlmann, Schmidt, and Tauch-
mann, 2010). This relationship reflects an intergenerational correlation in smoking behavior to the
extent that the two compared people are different ages. There is no clear evidence of whether this
correlation is driven by a causal relationship.
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early childhood (before smoking onset decisions) while also controlling for contem-
poraneous cigarette taxes, which isolates the relationship between cigarette taxes
during childhood and later smoking initiation through an intergenerational channel.
Our estimates show that a real cigarette tax increase of $0.25 during childhood de-
creases the hazard of later initiating smoking by 12.5 percent. This intergenerational
effect is several times larger than the direct effect estimated in prior work.4 A back-
of-the-envelope calculation suggests that a current $0.25 increase in cigarette taxes
will save $68 billion in lifetime external costs by reducing the number of children who
later begin smoking. This gives perspective to the benefits of cigarette taxes missed
by prior work by not considering this intergenerational channel.
This paper provides four contributions to the literature. We are the first to
estimate the indirect effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation through an in-
tergenerational channel. Our second contribution is evidence for the existence of
an intergenerational social transmission of smoking behavior. This evidence is con-
sistent with peer effects in smoking decisions, but uses a potentially more robust
research design than regressing smoking initiation on peer smoking decisions which
can suffer from reflection and endogeneity bias due to “common shocks” (Angrist,
2014). Third, we are the first to use the NLSCYA to replicate the finding that
4Most studies report a range of estimates based on several models and variable definitions. If
we focus on the largest magnitude price/tax elasticity from each study that finds a negative effect
(Douglas and Hariharan, 1994; Forster and Jones, 2001; Tauras, O’Malley, and Johnston, 2001;
DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios, 2002, 2008; Glied, 2002; Cawley, Markowitz, and Tauras, 2004,
2006; Coppejans et al., 2007; Nonnemaker and Farrelly, 2011; Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas, 2013),
the average is -0.62 with the largest magnitude being -1.52. This includes the estimated elasticities
for models without state fixed effects in papers that also estimate models with state fixed effects
and find no effect. By comparison, the intergenerational tax elasticity of initiation implied by our
results is -5.39.
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contemporaneous taxes do not have a significant direct effect on smoking initiation.
Our final contribution is a method that uses full information from multiple reports
to measure the age of smoking initiation.5 Our estimates are unchanged by the ap-
plication of this method, possibly because the recall window is rather short in the
NLSCYA data. Nevertheless, our approach is useful in contexts that combine panel
data and retrospective information.
Our findings suggest that past studies understate the effect of cigarette taxes on
smoking initiation. The intergenerational effect we document is several times larger
than any other estimates of the direct effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation.
While the measure of a policy’s efficacy ultimately does not depend on the channel
through which it operates, understanding exactly how policies affect behavior helps
to craft more targeted interventions in the future. Furthermore, the existence of an
intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior suggests that the effect of other
tobacco control policies is similarly multiplied through their impact on the next
generation.
In the next section, we relate our results to the current policy environment, re-
view previous studies of cigarette taxes and smoking initiation, and discuss potential
mechanisms for an intergenerational effect of cigarette taxes. We discuss our empir-
ical strategy in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we discuss the data and our method for
dealing with multiple retrospective reports. We present and discuss our results in
5Studies that rely solely on retrospective smoking information either take a single response from
a cross-section (Douglas and Hariharan, 1994; Hammar and Martinsson, 2001; Lo´pez Nicola´s, 2002;
Kidd and Hopkins, 2004; Peretti-Watel, 2005; Madden, 2007) or use the response from a single year
of a panel (Forster and Jones, 2001; Boudarbat and Malhotra, 2009; Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas,
2013). These approaches make an ad hoc decision about which response to use and throw out the
remaining information and are more sensitive to mismeasurement in a given year.
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Section 2.5 and provide concluding remarks in Section 2.6.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Policy Environment
Over the past several decades, the magnitude of each change in cigarette taxes in-
creased while youth smoking decreased. This pattern is reflected in Figure 2.1, which
shows the average magnitude of cigarette tax increases and the smoking participa-
tion rate of 12th graders from 1976 to 2014.6 The negative time-series relationship
between tax increases and youth smoking participation is also confirmed by for-
mal analyses (Carpenter and Cook, 2008; Hansen, Sabia, and Rees, 2017). Despite
this evidence on youth smoking participation, the literature remains undecided on
whether cigarette taxes deter smoking initiation.
Currently, state excise taxes on a pack of 20 cigarettes range from a low of $0.17
in Missouri to a high of $4.35 in New York (Orzechowski and Walker, 2014). Many
states are also considering additional cigarette taxes. For example, four states voted
on significant cigarette tax increases in 2016, the average size of which was $1.59.7
6The rate of smoking participation among youth has been measured more consistently over time
than initiation behavior, so we discuss the trends in youth smoking in terms of the participation
rate.
7California Proposition 56 (approved): raised per pack tax from $0.87 to $2.87; Colorado Amend-
ment 72 (defeated): would have raised per pack tax from $0.84 to $2.59; Missouri Proposition A
and Constitutional Amendment 3 (defeated): would have raised per pack tax from $0.17 to $1.00
(combined); and North Dakota Measure 4 (defeated): would have increased per pack tax from $0.44
to $2.20.
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2.2.2 Lessons from Literature on Cigarette Taxes and Smok-
ing Initiation
Empirical evidence on the effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation is inconsis-
tent. For example, some studies find no effect of cigarette taxes on smoking initiation
(Douglas and Hariharan, 1994; DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios, 2002; Madden, 2007;
DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios, 2008), while others find that cigarette taxes are
negatively related to initiation in Spain (Lo´pez Nicola´s, 2002) and among certain
demographic subgroups in the United States (Cawley, Markowitz, and Tauras, 2004;
Nonnemaker and Farrelly, 2011). Guindon (2014) reviews 27 papers, most with im-
portant limitations, and concludes that the current literature is insufficient to form
a consensus about whether or not cigarette taxes or prices affect smoking initiation.
One potential reason for the inconsistency of findings is the inconsistency of methods
used between studies.
Many of these studies do not include state fixed effects. This omission is often due
to a lack of sufficient within-state variation in cigarette taxes. Those studies that
are unable to include state fixed effects still discuss the importance of controlling
for unobserved state characteristics and attempt to do so with other observed state
characteristics (e.g. indicators for tobacco producing states in Cawley, Markowitz,
and Tauras, 2004). However, the inclusion or exclusion of state fixed effects does
not fully explain the inconsistent findings in the literature. For instance, DeCicca,
Kenkel, and Mathios (2002, 2008) find a negative effect of cigarette taxes on smoking
initiation in specifications without state fixed effects, but when fixed effects are
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included the coefficient on taxes is slightly positive and not statistically significant.
Also, Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas (2013) include state fixed effects in all their models
but find a negative effect that is not statistically significant in all specifications. We
find a small, negative effect of contemporaneous cigarette taxes on initiation that is
not robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects, which is consistent with DeCicca,
Kenkel, and Mathios (2002, 2008). By comparison, the indirect effect of taxes from
childhood is robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects or state time trends.
Many studies are also unable to accurately determine exposure to cigarette taxes
over time due to limited geographic information. For example, many studies use state
of birth or state at the time of data collection to calculate the taxes an individual
faces at the time of initiation. This method assumes the individual has not moved
states either between birth and initiation or between the time of initiation and data
collection. We require fewer assumptions about mobility because the NLSCYA gives
the actual state of residence for most years since birth.8
Previous studies also differ in the way they measure initiation. Most studies either
compare smoking status between waves in a longitudinal dataset or use retrospective
reports on the age of smoking initiation. The approach using the change in smoking
status between waves neglects individuals who begin smoking prior to entering the
survey9 and suffers from measurement error when follow ups are infrequent. The
8In alternative analyses, we find that our results hold even if we assume people remain in their
state of birth or were born in the state they lived when we first observe their smoking behavior. This
suggests the intergenerational effect we detect would also be observed using other, more limited
data sources.
9One exception is Nonnemaker and Farrelly (2011), who supplement their longitudinal data with
retrospective information to measure the timing of initiation before respondents are observed in the
data.
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two primary drawbacks of the retrospective approach are misreported age of initia-
tion and lack of demographic characteristics from the time of the initiation decision.
Measurement error in the age of smoking initiation becomes more of a concern as
recall bias increases due to asking individuals about events farther in the past. In
addition, later-in-life demographic characteristics, such as eventual educational at-
tainment and family income, are endogenous to earlier smoking behavior (Kenkel,
Lillard, and Mathios, 2006). We use the retrospective method, but are able to reduce
the impact of these common problems. Individuals in our data are asked the age they
started smoking beginning at ten years old, so recall bias is minimized. Also, because
our data originally focused on the parents of our respondents, we are able to control
for family demographic information contemporaneous to the initiation decision no
matter how young respondents started smoking.
2.2.3 Potential Mechanisms of Smoking Transmission
Correlational studies find that youth are more likely to begin smoking if their parents,
friends, or other close connections smoke (Jackson and Henriksen, 1997; Avenevoli
and Merikangas, 2003; Hill et al., 2005; Bricker et al., 2007; Gilman et al., 2009;
Go¨hlmann, Schmidt, and Tauchmann, 2010). Although these correlations may be
driven by unobserved factors, there is reason to believe that relationships with smok-
ers have a causal impact on smoking initiation. Potential causal mechanisms include
social pathways such as role-model effects, transmission of social norms, or increased
access to cigarettes, and physiological pathways such as nicotine addiction from sec-
ondhand smoke or in-utero exposure.
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We directly test whether the documented correlations are causal by estimating the
effect of cigarette taxes from childhood on smoking initiation. If the intergenerational
correlation does not reflect any causal link, then ceteris paribus changes in cigarette
taxes faced exclusively by an older cohort should have no effect on the smoking habits
of the younger cohort. A significant effect of cigarette taxes during childhood, then,
is evidence for a causal mechanism connecting smoking habits between generations.
Although our estimation strategy does not require that we specify a particular
causal mechanism, the policy implications of our results depend on whether the
intergenerational effect occurs exclusively via parents or includes other adults in the
community as well. Children interact socially with many adults, but parents may be
the adults they interact with the most. Thus, while we expect that adults other than
parents influence a youth’s smoking initiation (e.g. other adults can be role models
or provide access to cigarettes), the transmission of smoking behavior may be more
concentrated within families. Cigarette taxes are unlikely to affect non-smokers, so if
taxes from childhood affect smoking initiation even when parents have never smoked
then we take this as evidence that other non-parent adults influence youth initiation.
Additionally, a mother’s behavior while pregnant has a unique effect on her children.
Simon (2016) finds that increased cigarette taxes cause pregnant mothers to smoke
less, which improves the health of their children. We can isolate the effect of these
changes to health by considering the effect of taxes while in utero separately from
the rest of childhood. If smoking initiation is driven by the physiological effects of
in-utero exposure as opposed to the social influence of changes in the behavior of
parents or other adults, we would expect the effect to be concentrated on taxes while
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in utero. Our analyses suggest that the intergenerational transmission of smoking
behavior is not fully explained by parent-child interactions.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Our primary strategy estimates the effect of cigarette taxes from birth to age seven on
later smoking initiation.10 We control for other factors that may influence smoking
initiation, including contemporaneous cigarette taxes. Specifically, we estimate a
discrete-time hazard model of the following form:
λist(age) = λ0(age)g
(
β1Tax0−7i + β2Taxst + Xit ·α+ γs + γt
)
(2.1)
where λist is the hazard of smoking initiation as a function of age for person i living
in state s in year t, λ0(age) is the baseline hazard (i.e. the hazard at each age given
average characteristics), g(·) is the inverse complementary log-log function (y =
1− exp(− exp(x))),11 Tax0−7i is the time-invariant mean cigarette tax from birth to
age seven for individual i,12 Taxst is the state-level cigarette tax corresponding to the
current state of residence, and Xit is a vector of controls for sex, race/ethnicity, family
income, mother’s age when individual i was born, birth order, parent smoking history,
10Our main strategy assumes individuals are not at risk of smoking until age eight but results are
robust when we allow the hazard to begin at other ages. Estimates with start ages ranging from
six to ten are available in Appendix Table B.1.
11We explore various functional forms for g(·) in Appendix Table B.2. The results are larger in
magnitude with logit or probit specifications, so the complementary log-log specification provides
a conservative estimate as well as having the useful property that exponentiated coefficients return
hazard ratios.
12When we assume the age an individual is first at risk of initiation is something other than 8,
this variable is defined as the average cigarette tax from birth until one year before individuals are
assumed to be at risk.
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and parents’ highest educational attainment. The baseline hazard is estimated by
individual indicators for each age with the constant term omitted. We also include
γs and γt, which are state and year fixed effects, respectively. We account for within-
state correlation in factors that influence smoking initiation by clustering standard
errors at the state level.
State fixed effects account for time-invariant smoking behaviors and/or attitudes
at the state-level (such as being a tobacco producing-state or a state with high
levels of anti-smoking sentiment). Year fixed effects account for differences in the
underlying smoking initiation hazard across cohorts.13 Demographic controls are
motivated by previous research, which suggests race, sex, parent characteristics, and
socioeconomic status (including income and education) are important determinants
of smoking behavior (e.g. Chaloupka and Pacula, 1999; Powell and Chaloupka, 2005;
Nonnemaker and Farrelly, 2011).
The main coefficient of interest is β1, which is the effect of cigarette taxes during
early childhood on the hazard of initiation. This coefficient is identified by within-
state changes in cigarette taxes over time and differences across states in the size
and timing of tax increases. Policy endogeneity is a primary concern in this type
of estimation strategy. Nevertheless, the assumption that changes to state cigarette
taxes are exogenous to individual smoking decisions is ubiquitous in the literature.
Legislatures increasing cigarette taxes in response to either increases in youth smok-
ing rates (as seen in the 1990s) or rising anti-smoking sentiment threatens a causal
interpretation of β2, or the coefficient on the contemporaneous tax. However, one
13Due to the age fixed effects, the year fixed effect is equivalent to including birth year fixed
effects.
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strength of considering lagged cigarette taxes is that legislators are unlikely to base
policy on future trends in smoking rates of infants or young children. Another po-
tential threat to identification is if movement between states is related to unobserved
smoking preferences. To address this concern, we estimate Equation 2.1 separately
for those who ever moved states and those who never moved and we find similar
results for both groups.14 Further, our results are similar if we measure the average
tax during childhood using a fixed measure for state of residence in all years (e.g.
state of birth or state of residence at age 8) regardless of actual interstate mobility,
or simply the tax in the state and year of birth.15
Our main effect is slightly larger in magnitude when we estimate a version
of Equation 2.1 with state-specific linear time trends.16 However, isolating pre-
treatment trends for many overlapping tax increases is problematic, so we are un-
able to evaluate the expected effect of these trends on our estimates (see Wolfers,
2006). Our preferred specification does not include these trends, which provides a
more conservative estimate that also uses fewer degrees of freedom.
Equation 2.1 is our preferred specification, but we present results for various
subsamples and additional specifications. To distinguish between familial and other
social influences, we estimate Equation 2.1 separately for subsamples split by parent
smoking history. We also explore the importance of in-utero exposure by adding
a measure of cigarette taxes in the year before birth to the model. This helps
14The difference in the intergenerational effect between these two subsamples is not statistically
significant (p = 0.609) in a fully interacted model. The results for separate subsamples are available
in columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table B.3 and the results of the fully interacted model are
available upon request.
15These results are available in columns (2) through (4) of Appendix Table B.4.
16These results are available in column (1) of Appendix Table B.4.
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distinguish between the physiological effects of mother’s smoking while pregnant,
such as those seen in Simon (2016), and social transmissions of smoking behavior.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 NLSCYA
The National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) is a nationally representa-
tive sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were
first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and
are currently interviewed on a biennial basis by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In
1986, the NLSY began surveying the biological children of female participants bien-
nially from birth to age 14 in the Child (C) survey. Beginning in 1994, the NLSY
also includes a Young Adult (YA) survey for these children who are age 15 and
older. We use information from all three of these surveys, which we refer to as the
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Young Adults (NLSCYA). This sam-
pling pattern results in a sample that is not nationally representative of children in
these cohorts, rather the sample is representative of children born to mothers in the
original NLSY79 sampling frame.
Our outcome of interest is smoking initiation. Participants answer questions
about their tobacco use from age 10 to 14 in the C survey and for all ages in the
YA survey. While some questions differ between the surveys, all individuals in our
sample gave the age at which they first smoked cigarettes.17 We describe how we
17The exact wording in the C sample is “How old were you when you first smoked a cigarette?”
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use the answers to these questions to create our measure of smoking initiation in
Section 2.4.2. Information about parent smoking behavior comes from the NLSY79
and is only available for mothers. We therefore measure parent smoking history as
whether an individual’s mother has smoked at least 100 cigarettes in her life. The
demographic controls in our model include sex, race, family income, and the highest
educational attainment of either parent.18 We include additional controls to account
for the selection of birth-year cohorts into our sample. Because our sample is made
up of children from a fixed cohort of mothers, those born in earlier years are born to
a mother that is younger and generally more disadvantaged. To account for this, we
include measures for mother’s age at the focal child’s birth and birth order.
Our independent variable of interest is the cigarette excise tax levels to which
children are exposed. In the restricted-access version of the NLSCYA, we observe
the state of residence for each child since birth.19 This lets us match cigarette tax
information from the Tax Burden on Tobacco Historical Compilation (Orzechowski
and Walker, 2014) to our sample. Taxes are adjusted for inflation and reported in
2014 dollars.
Our data is formatted as person-age observations. Therefore, each person con-
tributes one observation for each age beginning at age 8 until age 25 or until that
and the wording is “How old were you the first time you smoked cigarettes” in the YA sample.
18The race categories given in the NLSCYA are Hispanic, Non-Hispanic black, and Non-
black/Non-Hispanic. We categorize total family income by quartile. Specifically, we create a
categorical variable for the quartile family income falls into for each year, then assign each in-
dividual to the average quartile their family’s income falls into for the majority of their life. Parent
education is categorized as less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, and
BA or higher.
19This is available every year from 1979 to 1994, then biennially thereafter. We carry forward
the most recent state of residence to fill in these gaps.
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person reports having initiated smoking, after which they are dropped from the sam-
ple. Only 2 percent of our sample initiates before age 8 and we only observe 11
initiations past the age of 25, which amounts to 0.12 percent of our sample.20 This
pattern is consistent with a 2014 report of the U.S. Surgeon General indicating that
99 percent of smokers begin smoking before age 26 (U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, 2014). We use survey weights provided with the NLSCYA to ad-
just for the probability of mothers being sampled in the original 1979 survey in all
summary statistics and analyses. These weights primarily adjust for the original
oversampling of minority groups, and results are robust to whether or not we include
these weights.21
Although we observe many individuals in each state, initiation is a relatively
rare event. It is therefore not surprising that we do not observe anyone initiate
smoking in some less-populous states. If we do not observe an initiation for a state,
then the predicted probability of initiating is 0 within that state, which in turn
causes the fixed effect for that state to be estimated as −∞. In practice, both the
fixed effect and any observations from these states are dropped from the analysis.
This problem is exacerbated when we stratify our sample and the number of states
with no initiations increases. To balance our panel and allow comparisons between
subsamples, we remove individuals from our data who ever report living in a state
for which we do not observe an initiation event. These restrictions do not change the
results enough to alter our conclusions, but the coefficients are smaller in magnitude
20Our results are not changed if we do not impose a right censor (available upon request).
21Unweighted summary statistics are available in Appendix Table B.5, and results are provided
in Appendix Table B.6 and Appendix Table B.7.
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after the restrictions. We therefore view our reported results as conservative in this
regard. Ultimately, we restrict our sample to individuals with no missing information,
who are born after 1976, who enter the sample prior to age 8, and never report living
in Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Utah, Vermont, or Wyoming. Most of these restrictions
amount to trimming out low-density areas of our data.22 Our resulting estimation
sample consists of 8,228 individuals from 45 states.
2.4.2 Measuring Smoking Initiation
Due to the longitudinal nature of the data, respondents report their age of smoking
initiation up to six separate times. Approximately 12 percent of respondents (972
out of 8,228 individuals in the estimation sample) have a discrepancy in reported age
of initiation. This could be due to measurement error at the time of data collection,
misremembering the true age, intentionally providing an inaccurate report due to
social desirability bias, or misunderstanding the intention of the question. However,
for most people (91 percent), all reported ages are within one year so this does not
constitute significant measurement error.
Most smoking initiation studies that rely solely on retrospective smoking informa-
tion take a single response from a cross section (Douglas and Hariharan, 1994; Ham-
mar and Martinsson, 2001; Lo´pez Nicola´s, 2002; Kidd and Hopkins, 2004; Peretti-
Watel, 2005; Madden, 2007) or a single year of a panel (Forster and Jones, 2001;
22Only 2,680 of the 11,506 children and young adults in the NLSCYA have valid tobacco-use
information. By comparison, only 103 (less than 1 percent) are removed because of our state
limitations. Appendix Table B.8 reports summary statistics for the group included in our estimation
sample compared to those omitted.
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Boudarbat and Malhotra, 2009; Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas, 2013). Strategies include
using the first response recorded, the last response recorded, the modal response, the
minimum response, or the maximum response. These approaches make an ad hoc
decision about which response to use and throw out the remaining information. Us-
ing the modal response is attractive, but unless there is a single mode one must still
make a decision about which mode to choose. Without additional information about
the underlying reason for conflicting reports, each of these methods discards some of
the information provided.
To retain as much information as possible, we average the smoking initiation age
across multiple reports. Specifically, we code the smoking status at each age as the
fraction of times an individual reports having started smoking by that age. This
creates a variable that ranges from 0 to 1, with the possibility of values in between.23
An example illustrates this procedure. Assume a respondent answers the smoking
questions in 5 different waves. In two waves, she reports having initiated smoking at
age 15, in one wave she reports 16, and in two waves she reports 17. The initiation
status variable is then 0 for ages 14 and younger, 0.4 for age 15, 0.6 for 16, and 1
for ages 17 and older. We report results using the value of 0.5 as the cutoff to define
age of smoking initiation, therefore our example respondent is coded as initiating at
age 16. Results are robust to the choice of cutoff between 0 and 1 and to removing
all individuals with a discrepancy from the analysis.24 The robustness of our results
in this regard is potentially due to the short retrospective window in the NLSCYA
23We remove responses if the reported starting age is larger than the person’s age at the time
the question was asked. We also remove responses of zero, as these appear to be a reporting error
in the data.
24These additional analyses are available in Appendix Figure B.1 and Appendix Table B.9.
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(children are asked about their smoking behavior as early as age 10).
2.4.3 Summary Statistics and Baseline Hazards
The distribution of birth-year cohorts and sample years are shown in Figure 2.2. Our
sample includes individuals born between 1976 and 2004 who were at risk of smoking
initiation between 1984 and 2014. Figure 2.2 also plots the number of states with tax
increases for each year. This highlights the variation in cigarette tax faced both in
childhood (all changes in the seven years following birth) and in adolescence, which
identifies our coefficients of interest.
Our outcome of interest is the hazard of smoking initiation, which is the probabil-
ity that an individual smokes at age a conditional on not having smoked prior to age
a. We estimate the baseline hazard rate at each age by the number of initiations at
the age divided by the number of individuals remaining in the sample. The fraction
initiated is calculated as the fraction of individuals originally observed at age 8 who
have initiated by a given age. The baseline hazard of smoking initiation and fraction
initiated for each age in the estimation sample are graphed in Figure 2.3 Panels A
and B, respectively. The average smoking initiation hazard across all ages is 0.054.
The hazard gradually increases from about zero at age 8 to a peak of 0.14 at age 18
and then decreases rapidly. This pattern is also apparent in the fraction initiated in
panel B, in which the curve increases steeply after age 10 and then quickly flattens
out after age 20. Table 2.1 catalogues the calculation of the hazard rate at each age
and shows the prevalence of right censoring in our estimation sample. The number
of initiations outweighs the number censored (i.e. left the sample without initiating)
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until age 20, when censoring becomes more prevalent.25 Of the original 8,228 indi-
viduals in our estimation sample, 1,691 are still in the sample and did not initiate
by age 25.
Summary statistics for the rest of the variables used in our estimation sample are
reported in column (1) of Table 2.2. Panel A reports time-invariant measures and
Panel B reports measures that vary over time. Our sample includes 8,228 individuals
which amounts to 89,289 individual-age level observations. People are removed from
the sample after they initiate, so the individual-age level statistics are weighted
toward people who never start smoking or who initiate at older ages. About 58
percent of people initiate within the sample, with the other 42 percent leaving the
sample without initiating. The average cigarette excise tax faced from birth to age
seven is $0.45 and $0.87 from age eight onward. The sample is evenly split between
male and female respondents.
The summary statistics for the sample split by mother’s smoking history are
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.2. The proportion of the sample with a
parent who ever smoked cigarettes is 59 percent. Mothers who smoke are on average
less educated and make less money, and individuals whose mother ever smoked are
50 percent more likely to initiate smoking than those whose parents never smoked
(6.5 percent vs. 4.1 percent).
Before turning to the results of our parametric models, we provide graphical
evidence and non-parametric tests of the effect of cigarette taxes in childhood on
25To determine the importance of censoring for our results, we estimate our model on the sample
of those observed until at least age 25 in Appendix Table B.10. The percentage point effect is the
same as our main results.
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smoking initiation. Figure 2.4 presents the graphs of the hazard function and the
fraction initiated for those with a cigarette tax during childhood above and below the
mean. 64.1 percent of those with an above-average cigarette tax in childhood ever
initiate smoking compared to 52.9 of those who experienced a below-average tax. A
non-parametric Wilcoxon test rejects the null hypothesis that the functions are the
same with p < 0.001. This difference is driven by the lower hazard of initiation up
to age 18, after which there is no difference in the hazard.
2.5 Results
We begin the discussion of our results with a note on interpreting coefficients from a
hazard model. Exponentiated coefficients from a complementary log-log regression
are interpreted as hazard ratios. For example, the exponentiated coefficient on the
cigarette tax during childhood (eβ1) represents how many times more likely someone
with a one dollar higher tax during childhood is to initiate at any given age rela-
tive to someone who faces an average cigarette tax level. Values between 0 and 1
suggest a negative relationship between the variable of interest and the probability
of smoking initiation; values greater than 1 suggest a positive relationship. Thus,
statistical significance for hazard ratios is measured against the null hypothesis that
the coefficient is equal to 1. Subtracting 1 from the hazard ratio gives the marginal
effect of a $1.00 tax increase on the initiation probability. However, as we discuss
in Section 2.2.1, the average tax increase in our study period is only $0.30, signif-
icantly less than the $1.00 increase implied by the hazard ratio. To interpret our
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estimates in a way that reflects the relevant policy variation, we report marginal ef-
fects of cigarette taxes relative to a $0.25 increase in addition to the standard hazard
ratios.26 Mathematically, the reported marginal effect is given by:
Marginal Effect = (exp(β)− 1)× 0.25,
where β is the coefficient on the variable of interest.
We display the main results of our preferred specification in column (1) of Ta-
ble 2.3.27 Panel A shows standard hazard ratios and panel B reports the marginal
effect of a $0.25 increase. The hazard ratio for cigarette taxes during childhood is
0.498 with a corresponding marginal effect of -0.125 ((0.498 − 1) × 0.25 ≈ −0.125).
Thus, a $0.25 increase in the average cigarette tax during childhood reduces the
hazard of later initiation by 12.5 percent (0.68 percentage points off a base of 5.4
percent). This estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coeffi-
cient on the current cigarette tax is small, positive, and not statistically significant.
Panel B of Figure 2.5 shows the baseline hazard of smoking initiation as well as the
hazard given a $0.25 increase in cigarette taxes during childhood. Our model in-
cludes a proportional hazards assumption,28 so the percent effect is the same across
ages, but the percentage point effect is largest at ages people are most likely to begin
smoking (evidenced by a larger gap between the baseline and treated hazard graphs).
The average effect of a $0.25 increase in cigarette taxes across all ages is -0.7 percent-
age points (−0.125 × 0.054 ≈ −0.007). Similarly, panel A of Figure 2.5 shows that
26We choose $0.25 as a benchmark because it lies between the average tax increase ($0.30) and
the standard deviation of taxes during the childhood of our respondents ($0.21).
27The results for the full set of demographic controls is available in Appendix Table B.11.
28We find no evidence to contradict the validity of this assumption in alternative specifications
where it is relaxed. These results are available upon request.
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increasing cigarette taxes during childhood by $1.00 decreases the hazard of smoking
initiation by 50.2 percent (2.7 percentage points off a base of 5.4 percent).
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.3 report results for those whose mother ever
smoked at least 100 cigarettes and for those whose mothers did not, respectively.
The hazard ratio for cigarette taxes from childhood is 0.449 for those with a parent
who smoked cigarettes and is 0.566 for those with never-smoking parents. Though
the difference between these two estimates is not statistically significant (p = 0.398
in a fully interacted model), a closer evaluation of the differences between the two
groups is informative. The marginal effects reveal the importance of considering the
baseline hazard when interpreting the effect size. Those with a parent who ever
smoked have a higher hazard of starting to smoke, on average (6.5 percent compared
to 4.1 percent). Thus, the percentage-point effect of a $0.25 increase in cigarette
taxes during childhood is twice as large for those with a smoking parent than for
those without (-0.897 percentage points compared to -0.447 percentage points), while
the percent change is roughly the same for both groups (-13.8 percent for those with
a smoking parent and -10.9 percent for those without). The difference in the percent
and percentage point effects is further evident in Figure 2.6, which shows the baseline
hazards and the hazards with a $0.25 higher cigarette tax in childhood for each group.
Those whose mother ever smoked have a higher baseline hazard (predominantly in
the teenage years) and experience a larger intergenerational tax effect as evidenced by
both the distance between baseline and treated hazard rates and the distance between
average hazard lines. One implication of these results are that those with a higher
baseline risk of initiation are potentially more responsive to policy intervention. Also,
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the fact that the intergenerational effect for those whose mother never smoked is
nearly as large suggests that the causal link between generations is not solely driven
by a familial mechanism.
Table 2.4 reports the effect of the contemporaneous cigarette tax separately from
the effect of cigarette taxes in childhood. Controlling only for age and year effects, a
$0.25 higher cigarette tax is associated with a 0.9 percent lower initiation hazard. The
magnitude of this relationship increases to -1.6 when we include demographic con-
trols, but the effect disappears entirely with the inclusion of state fixed effects. This
replicates the previous finding of a modest negative effect of cigarette taxes, which is
not robust to the inclusion of state fixed effects (DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios, 2002,
2008). This supports the argument that the current price of cigarettes plays, at most,
a small role in youth smoking initiation. By comparison, the final column shows that
a $0.25 increase in cigarette taxes from childhood decreases the initiation hazard by
12 percent. We also note that the standard errors on the tax variables only increase
slightly when both are estimated simultaneously as in Table 2.3. This suggests that
the estimates and their statistical significance are not driven by collinearity between
the two measures of cigarette taxes.
Finally, the results for the model that separately considers cigarette taxes while
in utero and taxes during childhood are reported in Table 2.5. The tax effects
are not statistically significant in this specification. The hazard ratios for taxes
in utero and taxes in childhood are similar at 0.692 and 0.788, respectively. In-
utero exposure may play a role, but does not appear to be the dominant factor in
intergenerational transmission of smoking behavior. This provides further support
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that the intergenerational effect constitutes a broader social phenomenon than just
the biological connection between parents and children.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper poses a novel question: what is the indirect effect of cigarette taxes on
youth smoking initiation via changes in the smoking behavior of older generations?
We answer this by estimating the effect of cigarette taxes from before a person is at
risk of initiating on their later smoking initiation. We find that a $0.25 increase in
the average cigarette tax during childhood decreases the risk of initiating smoking at
any given age by 12.5 percent (0.68 percentage points off of a base of 5.4 percent).
This effect is robust to multiple specifications and independent of any direct effect of
contemporaneous taxes. Youth are less likely to initiate smoking when older cohorts
are exposed to higher cigarette taxes regardless of parent smoking history or whether
the taxes are in utero versus early childhood. This provides evidence that the whole
social environment, and not just families, is an important factor in the decision to
begin smoking.
Figure 2.7 shows that a $0.25 cigarette tax during childhood decreases the fraction
of people who ever initiate by 7.4 percentage points (0.588-0.514=0.074). A back of
the envelope calculation indicates that a current federal tax increase of $0.25 will
deter 2,380,592 children who are currently under 8-years-old from smoking in the
future. Given that the average lifetime external cost of smoking is $28,500 (Sloan
et al., 2004) this amounts to about $68 billion in savings. This rough calculation
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provides perspective for the magnitude of what is missed in previous research focused
only on the direct effect of cigarette taxes. Other tobacco control policies may have
similar intergenerational effects, so current estimates of their effects would also be
understated.
The intergenerational effect we document provides additional evidence that neigh-
bors can amplify the direct effect of policies on individual behavior. Other studies
find this “social multiplier” effect in areas such as program participation and labor
force decisions (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 2003; Duflo and Saez, 2003;
Maurin and Moschion, 2009). In our context, there is no direct effect of taxes in
childhood and what we measure is essentially the indirect social effect via older
individuals.
Our ability to distinguish the causal mechanisms at play is limited by the data
available. More comprehensive information about smoking attitudes and behaviors
within families and communities is needed to disentangle the effect of different types
of relationships. Once the most important mechanisms are identified, the structural
relationship between cigarette taxes early in life and later smoking initiation can be
estimated to gauge the magnitude of transmission from each relationship. Another
data limitation is that our sample is based on a fixed cohort of mothers. This sample
selection means that the birth year of our respondents is directly related to their
mother’s age at birth. Thus, we cannot disentangle differences in the intergenera-
tional effect over time and differences between those whose mothers had children at
different ages. Other data with a more representative distribution of parent charac-
teristics across time will be able to overcome this limitation.
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2.7 Figures & Tables
Figure 2.1: Cigarette Tax Increases and the 12th Grade Smoking Rate
Notes: The mean tax increase is based on data from the Tax Burden on Tobacco by
Orzechowski and Walker (2014) and represents the average across all states that had
any non-zero tax change in a given year. A value of zero corresponds to no cigarette
tax increase in any state in that year. The 12th grade smoking rates are based on the
Monitoring the Future national survey results on drug use (Johnston et al., 2017).
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Figure 2.2: Sample Years and Timing of Cigarette Tax Increases
Notes: The y-axis on the left refers to the histograms of year born and year of
analysis. The y-axis on the right corresponds to the scatter plot of states with tax
increases in that year.
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Figure 2.3: Baseline Smoking Initiation Hazard
A. Hazard Rate
B. Fraction Initiated Smoking
Notes: The hazard rate is the number of initiations at the given age divided by the
number of individuals remaining in the sample. Panel B shows the fraction of of
individuals we originally observe at age 8 who have initiated by a given age. The
numbers on the graph are the number of individuals still at risk of initiating. The
fraction of individuals that initiate by age 25 is 58 percent.
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Table 2.1: Description of Smoking Initiation Hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age # At Risk # Failed # Censored Hazard Rate Failure Function
8 8,228 79 0 0.010 0.010
9 8,149 95 0 0.012 0.021
10 8,054 219 0 0.027 0.048
11 7,816 248 19 0.032 0.078
12 7,546 442 22 0.059 0.132
13 7,073 554 31 0.078 0.199
14 6,460 538 59 0.083 0.264
15 5,847 586 75 0.100 0.336
16 5,162 542 99 0.105 0.401
17 4,510 459 110 0.102 0.457
18 3,901 548 150 0.140 0.524
19 3,209 230 144 0.072 0.552
20 2,823 110 156 0.039 0.565
21 2,565 81 148 0.032 0.575
22 2,314 61 170 0.026 0.582
23 2,058 20 195 0.010 0.585
24 1,872 11 166 0.006 0.586
25 1,702 11 1,691 0.006 0.588
Notes: Column (1) represents the number of individuals who are still in the sample
and did not initiate by the given age. Column (2) reports the number of individuals
who began smoking at the given age. Column (3) shows the number of individuals
who left the sample before initiating. Column (4) is the hazard rate, which is calcu-
lated by dividing column (2) by column (1). Column (5) is the the fraction initiated,
or the running sum of initiations divided by the original number at risk (8,228).
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Initiated in Sample 0.58 0.66 0.48
Left Sample Without Initiating 0.42 0.34 0.52
Average Cigarette Tax ($): Birth to Age 7 0.45 0.45 0.46
Hispanic 0.08 0.07 0.09
Black 0.17 0.16 0.18
Other Race (Including White) 0.75 0.77 0.73
Male 0.51 0.51 0.51
Mother’s Age at Birth 26.48 26.02 27.22
Birth Order 1.95 1.96 1.93
Mother Ever Smoked 0.59 1.00 0.00
Parent Education: Less Than High School 0.03 0.04 0.02
Parent Education: High School 0.27 0.31 0.20
Parent Education: Some College 0.49 0.48 0.49
Parent Education: BA or More 0.21 0.17 0.28
Family Income: 1st Quartile 0.18 0.23 0.11
Family Income: 2nd Quartile 0.23 0.26 0.19
Family Income: 3rd Quartile 0.32 0.30 0.35
Family Income: 4th Quartile 0.27 0.21 0.35
Individuals 8,228 4,642 3,537
B. Individual-Age Level
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 0.87 0.86 0.89
Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.054 0.065 0.041
Observations 89,289 47,330 41,910
Notes: Means of each variable are reported. Data from the NLSCYA and weighted
using NLSY79 weights for the mothers of those in our sample. Years of analysis
range from 1984 to 2014. Income quartiles are the average quartile of total family
income across sample years. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars.
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Figure 2.4: Smoking Initiation Hazard Above and Below Mean Cigarette Tax in
Childhood
A. Hazard Rate
B. Fraction Initiated Smoking
Notes: The hazard rate is the number of initiations at the given age divided by the
number of individuals remaining in the sample. Panel B shows the fraction of of
individuals we originally observe at age 8 who have initiated by a given age.
93





A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Average Cigarette Tax ($): Birth to Age 7 0.498∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.566∗∗
(0.080) (0.087) (0.122)
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 1.062 1.023 1.139
(0.053) (0.060) (0.103)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Average Cigarette Tax ($): Birth to Age 7 -0.125∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.031)
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 0.015 0.006 0.035
(0.013) (0.015) (0.026)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.054 0.065 0.041
Individuals 8,228 4,642 3,537
Observations 89,289 47,330 41,910
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. Coefficients are estimated with a complementary log-log regression. All
models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls for sex, race,
parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking history, and
family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of initiation is the
age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that age. Standard
errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of Cigarette Tax in Childhood on Smoking Initiation Hazard
A. $1.00 Increase
B. $0.25 Increase
Notes: Results based on data from the NLSY Children and Young Adults (NLSCYA)
in a discrete-time hazard model controlling for age, state, and year fixed effects as
well as sex, race, parent education, family income, mother’s age at birth, birth order,
and whether mother ever smoked. A 12.5 percent decrease in the hazard of smoking

















































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Discrete-time Hazard Model of Smoking Initiation, Current Tax and Tax
in Childhood Separately
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood 0.519∗∗
(0.152)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.966 0.935∗∗ 1.014
(0.039) (0.027) (0.044)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood -0.120∗∗
(0.020)
Current Cigarette Tax -0.009 -0.016∗∗ 0.004
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011)
Demographics X X X
State Fixed Effects X X
Individuals 8,229 8,228 8,228 8,228
Observations 89,305 89,299 89,299 89,358
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. Demographic controls include sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at
birth, birth order, mother smoking history, family income, and age and year fixed
effects. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of initiation is the age at
least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that age. Standard errors for
the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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Figure 2.7: Baseline and Treated Fraction Initiated
Notes: The solid blue line is evaluated with variables at their mean value and the
red dashed line is evaluated with a $0.25 higher cigarette tax during childhood and
all other variables at their means.
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A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Utero 0.692
(0.275)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood 0.788
(0.235)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.078
(0.056)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Utero -0.077
(0.069)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood -0.053
(0.059)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.019
(0.014)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.053
Individuals 7,610
Observations 82,862
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT RESOURCES AND
CHARTER SCHOOL COMPETITION
3.1 Introduction
Starting in the early 1990s, some states allow a private education firm to make
an agreement (called a charter) with the state government to provide education
services separate from the traditional public school (TPS) system. The number
of public school pupils attending charter schools nearly quadrupled from 2000 to
2013, and roughly 5 percent of students in the United States attend a charter school
(Epple, Romano, and Zimmer, 2016). Charter school quality, in terms of outcomes
of charter school attendees, has been the subject of heated debate and studies find
heterogeneous effects (Zimmer et al., 2009; Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2013). If
the presence of charter schools impacts the funding or quality of TPSs, then this
indirect effect may have a larger impact on public school students in the United
States, given the relatively small share of students attending charters.
When a student leaves a TPS to attend a charter school often the funding in-
tended for that student follows them. This provides a competitive framework where
schools are competing over students and the resources that come with them. A
growing body of literature explores the effect of charter school expansion on TPS
district finances and student achievement (Arsen and Ni, 2012; Cordes, 2017; Ter-
rier and Ridley, 2018). Studies show that charter schools impact the composition
of students attending TPSs (Booker, Zimmer, and Buddin, 2005) and house prices
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(Andreyeva and Patrick, 2017; Brehm, Imberman, and Naretta, 2017; Cook, 2018).
One topic that has recieved less attention is how changes in TPS spending influences
their competition with charter schools. For example, Sullivan, Campbell, and Kisida
(2008) provide qualitiative evidence that, in Washington D.C., “most of the changes
that schools are making in order to attract more students have more to do with
services for parents and the image of the school than with improving the educational
attainment of students.” Cook (2018) also finds that TPS districts allocate away
from instructional and other spending in favor of new construction in the face of
increased charter competition. Little is known about whether these behaviors are
effective in attracting more students to remain in TPSs.
We address this gap by exploring whether increased resources for TPS districts
helps stem the flow of students to charter schools in Ohio. To do this, we separately
examine the impact of school resource expansions for capital projects and those for
general purposes (current operating expenses, instructional expenditures, support
services, etc.) on the fraction of potential TPS students attending a charter school,
district outcomes, and home values. Our empirical strategy compares districts that
narrowly pass a property tax levy to those that narrowly fail in a regression discon-
tinuity framework that allows us to estimate the causal effect of increasing school
resources. The primary assumption is that the only thing that changes at the 50 per-
cent vote threshold is the amount of resources from the levy and not any other district
characteristics. We find that districts that pass capital levies subsequently increase
capital spending and districts that pass general purpose levies increase spending
across all categories. Both type of resource expansions protect TPS districts from
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losing students to digital charters, but we find no effect for students lost to brick-
and-mortar charters. Specifically, passing a capital levy decreases the fraction of
potential students who attend a digital charter school by 0.20 percentage points (20
percent from a base of 0.1) and passing a general purpose levy decreases this fraction
by 0.15 percentage points (12.5 percent from a base of 0.12). We do not find any
evidence that increased resources improves student test scores, but we are unable
to rule out reasonably large effects. Since both capital and general levies lead to
increased capital spending the key difference between them is spending on current
expenses such as teachers. General purpose levies are used in part to hire additional
teachers, which decreases the student-teacher ratio by about 27 percentage points
(1.5 percent from a base of 17.52). This investment in teachers is partially capital-
ized and increases home values by 0.48 to 0.79 percent, although these estimates are
imprecise. In contrast, capital levies crowd out spending on teachers such that the
student-teacher ratio increases and home values subsequently decrease. Specifically,
we find that passing a capital levy decreases home values between 1.5 and 1.75 per-
cent. This could be in response to the increase in the student-teacher ratio but may
also be related to the disruption from increased construction activity. In all, this
suggests that although either type of investment makes TPS districts more compet-
itive with digital charters, increasing the general operating budget improves school
quality in a way that is valued by residents in the districts, while capital investments
may be a more superficial way to attract would-be transfers to charter schools.
This paper makes important contributions to several strands of literature. Our
main contribution is to the literature that assesses the effect of TPS district behavior
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on their competition with charter schools. It is important to consider how districts
respond to charter competition to understand the general equilibrium effects of char-
ter school expansion. Cook (2018) finds that TPS districts spend less on instructional
expenditures and more on new construction capital outlays in response to charter
competition. We find a larger impact of capital levies on retaining students than
general purpose levies. However, general purpose levies also improve other measures
of school inputs and quality. This suggests that the strategy observed in Cook (2018)
where districts spend more on capital projects may be effective at keeping students
from transferring to digital charter schools but not brick-and-mortar charter schools.
Digital charters are available to all students in the state, while competition from
brick-and-mortar charters is more limited to schools in the same local geographic
area. This may explain why we detect effects for students lost to digital charters
because their competition with TPS districts is uniform across the state while the
degree of brick-and-mortar competition varies.
Second, we contribute to the literature estimating the effect of school spending
on education production. There is growing evidence that increased school spend-
ing improves student outcomes in terms of labor market participation and earnings
(Jackson, Johnson, and Persico, 2016), test scores in low-income districts relative to
high-income districts (Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2018), and average
test scores and graduation rates (Miller, 2018). There is also evidence from Cal-
ifornia and Texas that increased capital spending from approving bond levies has
no meaningful effect on test scores (Martorell, Stange, and McFarlin, 2016) but is
capitalized into house prices (Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein, 2010). Our work is
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most closely related to the concurrent work of Enami (2018), who estimates the ef-
fect of passing various types of levies in Ohio on student achievement. Enami (2018)
finds a small positive effect of increased operating expenditures on math proficiency
rates among those subject to Ohio graduation tests. We find no significant effect
of increases school resources on student achievement, but we are unable to rule out
positive effects of up to 0.06 standard deviations, which would allow for the size of
effects found in Enami (2018), but would rule out some of the larger estimates in the
literature. Our results underscore the importance of considering not just the amount
of resources but how they are allocated in estimating the effect of school spending
on student achievement.
Third, we contribute to the literature on how district expenditures are capitalized
into housing values. An extensive literature finds that school quality is reflected in
local housing prices (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, 2011). A smaller literature assesses
whether school spending is capitalized into housing values regardless of the impact
on school quality.1 Recently, Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) used property
tax levy referenda in California and find that capital investments have a large causal
impact on home prices. We provide separate estimates of capital investment and
other school spending on residential property values in Ohio. We find that increasing
instructional spending by hiring more teachers leads to increased home prices, while
crowding out instructional spending by investing more in capital leads to decreased
home values. This differs from what previous work finds for capital spending. One
1Hilber and Mayer (2009), Mathur (2008), Brasington and Haurin (2006), Crone (2006), Barrow
and Rouse (2004), Beron, Murdoch, and Thayer (2001), Downes and Zabel (2002), Black (1999),
and Brasington (1999) all measure school quality (for at least some of their analysis) based solely
on per-pupil expenditures.
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key difference in our context that can reconcile these results is that capital levies
crowd out can crowd out general purpose levies in Ohio, but California’s funding for
instructional spending is from an entirely separate system that is insulated from this
crowd out.
Finally, we contribute to the literature assessing the value parents place on vari-
ous measures of school quality. The literature is mixed, with some finding that test
scores dominate satisfaction with the learning environment or student happiness at
school (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Gibbons and Silva, 2011) while others show
that parents request teachers that promote student satisfaction and put less weight
on the teacher’s ability to increase standardized testing outcomes (Jacob, 2007). Im-
berman and Lovenheim (2016) show that the release of value-added measures has no
impact on house prices, suggesting that parents do not value value-added. We add to
this literature by testing whether various types of expenditures affect education pro-
duction through test scores or student/parent satisfaction through student transfers
to charter schools. We find that increased spending from passing levies increases the
competitiveness of TPS districts with digital charter schools, but find no evidence
that test scores improve. This supports the argument that parents respond to the
environment of the school more than test scores, which may be due to salience or
reflect parent preferences.
Our findings also have several important implications for policy. First, TPS dis-
tricts become more competitive with digital charter schools by investing in capital
even without improving test scores or other measures of school quality. This sug-
gests that the strategy documented in Cook (2018), where districts divert resources
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from instruction to capital spending in response to increased charter competition,
is effective at retaining students. However, it is not clear whether keeping students
in the TPS makes students better or worse off without knowing the relative quality
of the digital charter and the TPS. Additionally, it seems that investing in capital
at the expense of instructional spending decreases home values, which may reflect
other dimensions of how parents and others in the community value different types
of spending. Second, districts are less likely to pass additional future levies after
a successful referendum so if administrators choose to increase spending on non-
productive inputs to please parents, then it likely crowds out spending on more
productive inputs in the future.
The next section provides background information on Ohio elections, school fi-
nance, and charter schools with Section 3.2.2 detailing the process of proposing
capital bond referenda and Section 3.2.3 discussing charter schools in Ohio. Section
3.3 details the sources of data for this project and discusses each variable used in the
analysis. Section 3.4 discusses our empirical strategy. Section 3.5 reports our results
and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background Information
3.2.1 Property Tax Levy Referendum
We consider local referenda for property tax increases in Ohio. The Constitution
of Ohio requires that property taxes in excess of 10 mills (a mill is one thousandth
of a dollar) be approved via local referendum (Ohio Const. Article XII §2). In
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1976, the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 920, which automatically adjusts the
millage rate when housing valuations increase to maintain the original dollar value
approved or value implied by the original millage rate. This “inflation adjustment
factor” results in Ohio school districts proposing around two to three hundred levies
per year, a relatively high number compared with other states. School districts
are permitted to propose levies in November general elections, primary elections in
March or May, or special elections held in February or August, up to four elections
per year. The majority of levies are proposed in general elections. Districts can also
propose multiple levies for distinct purposes in each election.
Nearly half of the revenue for Ohio public schools comes from local sources, which
is predominately property tax revenue. The permissible uses for property tax levies
include current operating expenses such as teacher and administrator salaries, general
ongoing improvements, specific permanent improvements, purchase of educational
technology, or debt service for bonds issued for school construction. Districts that
seek to propose a levy follow a set script given by the Secretary of State where they
fill in the information for their levy. For example:
An additional tax for the benefit of the Delphos City School District for
the purpose of CURRENT EXPENSES at a rate not exceeding 1.46
mills for each one dollar of valuation, which amounts to $0.146 for each
one hundred dollars of valuation, for a period of 5 years, commencing in
2009, first due in calendar year 2010?
The purposes, which include current expenses, emergency requirements, permanent
improvements, the avoid and operating deficit, and others are displayed in bold on
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the ballots.
3.2.2 Capital Bond Referendum
Bond authorization for new construction projects and capital improvements is a two-
stage process. First, prior to proposing a new capital bond through local referendum,
districts must be issued approval from the Ohio School Facilities Commission (Ohio
Revised Code 3318.06 Section A).2 Approval depends on the amount of state aid that
would be required as well as the amount of need in the district. A key measure used
by the facilities commission is the adjusted valuation per-pupil (see Ohio Revised
Code 3318.011), calculated by taking the total valuation of all district property and
dividing by fall enrollment counts. Districts with the lowest adjusted valuation per-
pupil are most likely to receive approval.
Second, upon receiving state approval, districts must pass a ballot measure in a
local election to authorize the district to take out a capital bond. Proposals require
a simple majority to pass. On average, Ohio has around one to two hundred new
capital proposals in a given year,3 about half of which are approved. Passage of a
bond proposal authorizes an increase in the millage rate estimated by the county
auditor to pay off the principal and interest within the proposed time frame.
2Arizona is the only other state requiring state approval prior to proposing a capital bond
through local referendum.




In the United States, charter schools are independently run educational organizations
that declare and sign a “charter” containing their structure and outlining detailed
plans for achieving student success. The Ohio Legislature approved Ohio’s charter
school law in 1997. In Ohio, while students are only permitted to attend a TPS
based on the geographic location of their residence, students across the state are
able to attend any charter school they desire.4 When a student transfers to a charter
from a public school, the public funding follows the child. Thus, charters embrace
the essence of a competitive market where the students are the customers. Any
charter failing to attract the number of students needed to fund operating costs
must eventually shut down.
Charters also differ from public schools in that they may be shut down if the
Ohio Department of Education (ODE) deems that they are not following the goals
and requirements of their charter. Another important difference unique to Ohio is
that charter schools lack a sports team and public schools prohibit charter student
athletic participation. Anecdotal conversations with Ohio administrators pointed
to this as one of the largest factors deterring families from sending their child to a
charter school.
Ohio charter schools are categorized as either a traditional “brick-and-mortar” or
“digital” charter. The main difference between these two types of charter schools is
that digital charters provide all instruction online and are required to provide each
4Local school districts are required to provide transportation to any student living more than
two miles away from their desired charter school as long as the charter is no further than 30 minutes
away from the school of residence.
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student with a laptop. Around 78,500 out of the 1,682,031 public school students
(about 4.7 percent) in Ohio attend a brick-and-mortar charter school as of 2017.
Ohio has the second-largest (after Arizona) online charter presence with over 30,000
students enrolled, or around 2 percent of public school students, in a digital charter.
While some digital charter schools limit enrollment to district residents only, a vast
majority of digital charters allow students from across the state to enroll.
3.3 Data
We combine data on Ohio school districts from multiple sources. Table 3.1 lists each
of these sources, the relevant variables, and the years for which data is available.
Election data is available from the Office of the Ohio Secretary of State. Data on Ohio
school district characteristics is available from the the National Center for Education
Statistics’ Common Core of Data (CCD), the Ohio Department of Education (ODE),
and the Ohio Department of Taxation (DOT).
3.3.1 Property Tax Referenda
The Office of the Ohio Secretary of State collects and stores data about all local,
state, and federal elections from the Board of Elections in each county. We obtained
information for all local referenda from 1996 to 2012. For each election, we observe
the election date, the number of votes in favor of the proposition, the number of
votes against, the dollar amount or millage rate of the proposed property tax5, and
5Ballots for tax levies reflect the proposed millage rate and those for bond levies reflect the
dollar amount of the capital project.
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the purpose of the tax.
We separate levies into six categories based on the text of their stated purpose.
These categories include: current expenses, emergency, permanent improvements,
construction, facilities, and to avoid an operating deficit. Figure 3.1 shows the fre-
quency of the different types of levies in our data and differentiates between what we
are calling capital levies and general levies. The most common purposes are for cur-
rent expenses and emergency requirements, followed by permanent improvements.
Construction levies are often paired with other purposes. Levies for construction,
facilities, or permanent improvements, as well as all capital bonds, are considered
capital levies. Levies are considered “general levies” if they are categorized as current
expenses, emergency purposes, or to avoid an operating deficit.
The results of local property tax referenda are summarized by year in Table 3.2,
separately for capital and general levies. This table reports the number of measures,
average proposed levy amount per pupil, and the fraction approved. The dollar
amount of capital levies tends to be larger than for general levies and the fraction
approved is generally between 50 and 70. Figure 3.2 describes the distribution of vote
share for capital and general levies. General levies are slightly more common than
capital levies and the vote share for both types of levies are more or less normally
distributed with some excess mass to the right of 50 percent in favor. This excess
mass reflects selection into introducing levies. That is, districts might not put a levy
on the ballot if they think it will fail, so the set of levies proposed will be more likely
to pass. We will show that this bunching is minor and satisfies standard density tests
that show districts can influence, but not perfectly control, the final vote share for
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their levies.
Passing a levy also impacts the likelihood of passing levies in the future. To shed
light on the expected values for pih weights used to convert ITT estimates to TOT, we
display the change in the probability of passing a capital or general levy after a levy
is passed in Figure 3.3. Panel A shows what happens after a general levy is passed
and Panel B is after a capital levy is passed. Passing a general levy decreases the
probability of passing another general levy for the 3 years following the election. The
probability becomes positive in the 4 to 6 years after with a notable bump at 5 years.
This is indicative of a 5-year term for many general purpose levies. Capital levies
are slightly less likely to be passed in years that general levies are passed, then the
probability is near zero in the following years. Passing a capital levy decreases the
probability of passing other capital levies for up to four years following the election,
then there is a 5-year bump that is smaller than for general levies.
Figure 3.4 shows similar probabilities after a levy is defeated. Notice that the
predicted probabilities are not exactly zero in the year the levy is defeated because
districts can proposed additional levies in that year. So a coefficient of 0.05 suggests
that 5 percent of districts that propose a levy that fails will pass another levy in
one of the later elections that year. Notably, there is a 20 to 25 percent chance of
passing a general levy the year after one is defeated and a 15 to 20 percent chance of
passing a capital levy the year after a capital levy fails. This suggests that districts
that narrowly fail to pass a levy will likely “catch up” in the years following, which
would make the ITT effects an underestimate of the effect of increased spending after
levy passage. Overall, there are clear dynamics in the timing of passing levies that
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underscore the importance of the dynamic regression discontinuity method we use.
3.3.2 District Finances and Student Characteristics
The CCD includes district revenue, expenditures, teacher counts, and student counts
by subgroups, which include race, free or reduced price lunch eligibility, and special
education. We add student outcomes from the ODE that includes district value-
added, a performance index, and the number of students who transfer to a charter
school. We also include assessed property values for each school district from the
DOT.
Summary statistics for these measures at the district-year level are reported in
Table 3.3 for Ohio’s 613 school districts. The first column shows means for all district-
years, means for districts in the year prior to a levy win are in the second column,
and the third column provides means for districts in the year prior to a levy loss. The
final column shows the difference between columns 2 and 3 and provides a p-value for
the difference. Districts in Ohio spend over $10,000 per pupil. This is divided into
per pupil expenditures of about $1,200 on capital outlays, $5,000 on instruction, and
$3,000 on support services. About 1.7 percent of potential TPS students attend a
charter school with 1.1 percent attending a digital charter and 0.8 percent attending
brick-and-mortar charter. The average number of students per district is about 3,000
and the average number of teachers is 760. The only significant differences between
districts that fail and those that pass a levy the year before an election are small
differences in capital spending per pupil and students lost to digital charters. We
show later that these pre-treatment differences disappear once we add basic controls.
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The lack of pre-treatment differences supports our identification assumptions.
One difficulty in combining information from multiple sources is lining up the
years of observation. That is, district information is measured by school year or
fiscal year which runs from July 1 of year t to June 30 of t + 1 in the ODE and
CCD data. Alternatively, election results and DOT data relate to the tax year or
calendar year. This becomes important for interpreting the timing of results. We
therefore treat the year of election is a half-treated year. Specifically, the indicator
for a passed levy is set to 0 if the levy failed and in the time prior to the passage of
the levy, it is set to 1/2 in the year the levy was passed, and set to 1 in subsequent
years.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
We use a dynamic regression discontinuity design developed by Cellini, Ferreira, and
Rothstein (2010), which allows for both the possibility of repeated treatments and
lagged outcomes. This design addresses the fact that although each election is a
sharp RD, districts can propose additional levies after the outcome and the impact
of passing a levy may not be felt for several years. They distinguish between two
types of treatment effects. The intent-to-treat (ITT) effects are the effect of passing a
levy including any post-election behavior of districts, including proposing additional
levies. The treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects isolate the effect of a single levy
regardless of all other referenda including other proposed levies and their outcomes.
Both effects are policy relevant but contain slightly different information. The ITT
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effects are how much better off a district that narrowly passes a levy is than a district
that narrowly fails to pass a levy, while the TOT is the causal effect of the increased
spending.
3.4.1 Intent-to-Treat Effects (ITT)
We estimate the ITT effects with
yjtτ = θITTτ bjt + Pg(νjt, γτ ) + ατ + κt + λjt + εjtτ (3.1)
where yjtτ is a district j outcome occurring τ years since a focal election in year t,
bjt is an indicator for the passage of a levy by district j in year t, Pg(·) is a cubic
in vote-share νjt with coefficients γτ . ατ , κt, and λjt are relative-year, focal-year,
and election fixed effects, respectively. We estimate outcome dynamics using 2 lag
years and 6 lead years for each focal election6 and cluster standard errors at the
district level. We estimate this equation with data generated by taking each focal
election in year t for district j and expanding the explanatory variables from (3.1)
so that there is one observation for each year relative to the focal election.7 Then
we match the leads and lags of each outcome variable in relation to the given focal
election. As a result, if a district proposes levies in quick succession, a given district-
year outcome may appear as both a lead observation for the earlier focal election
as well as a lag observation in the later focal election. This method is similar to
simultaneously running a standard regression discontinuity for a focal election in
6Both γτ and θITTτ are allowed to vary freely for τ ≥ 0 but are constrained to be 0 for τ < 0.
7Because we use 2 lags and 6 leads, we expand the dataset so that each focal election has 9
observations.
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year t on outcomes in year t + τ . However, stacking each of these regressions and
then clustering by district allows the researcher to obtain more efficient estimates
that account for autocorrelation across effect dynamics within a district.
3.4.2 Treatment-on-the-Treated Effects (TOT)
We estimate TOT effects using a recursive strategy from Cellini, Ferreira, and Roth-
stein (2010). The recursive strategy aggregates weighted ITT effects. Specifically,






where pit ≡ ∂bj,t−τ+h∂bj,t−τ is the effect of authorizing a levy on the probability of authorizing
another levy h years later. Also, note that θITT0 = θTOT0 . Standard errors are
calculated using the delta method.8
3.4.3 Total Effects
In addition to the dynamic ITT and TOT estimates outlined in Equation 3.1 and
Equation 3.2, we estimate the total effect of passing a levy over the 6 years following
the election. To do this, we sum the individual θτ coefficients for τ ≥ 0 and calculate
standard errors via the delta method. These estimates provide a clear summary of
policy effects of the levy passage that are more easily compared to estimates using
other identification strategies.
8Equation 3.2 becomes imprecise with long lags, so Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) pro-
pose another estimator that improves efficiency and precision when the lags are long. Since we are




The sufficient conditions for identification in a regression discontinuity design are
continuity of the conditional expectation of counterfactual outcomes in the running
variable. This condition is generally violated when (1) the treatment assignment rule
(cutoff) is public knowledge and (2) the running variable (vote share) is manipulable.
The first condition is certainly true in our context, but the second may or may not
be a threat to identification. McCrary (2008) distinguishes between “complete” and
“partial” manipulation. Manipulation is “complete” when an agent can perfectly
determine the value of their running variable. Manipulation is “partial” when agents
can impact the value of the running variable by their behavior, but there still remains
an idiosyncratic element. “Complete” manipulation usually poses a problem for
identification whereas “partial” manipulation does not.
Districts clearly influence the vote share a proposed levies receives by setting the
characteristics of the levy. For example, Figure 3.5 shows a negative relationship
between vote share and the dollar amount of the levy above the cutoff. There is no
relationship between levy size and vote share below the cutoff. This suggests that
districts choose a levy with the highest dollar amount that will still pass. However,
this is only a threat to our identification strategy if districts are able to perfectly
determine the vote share. We claim that even if districts influence the votes they
cannot directly manipulate the vote share.
We perform the test suggested by McCrary (2008) for detecting manipulation
of the running variable. The results of this test are reported graphically in Figure
3.6 with estimates for the discontinuity in the density at the threshold reported in
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Table 3.4. We fail to reject continuity in the distribution of the vote share across
the cut off for both capital and general levy elections. There may be concern that
some of the elections throughout the year, especially the special elections that are
not held in conjunction with the primary or general election schedule may be easier
for districts to manipulate. We perform additional McCrary tests for subsamples
based on the month of the election or proposed length of the levy and still fail to
reject the null hypothesis of continuity in the distribution of the vote share, which
provides additional evidence that districts are unable to perfectly manipulate the
vote share.
We also plot averages by vote share in the periods preceding and following elec-
tions for an exhaustive list of district characteristics to visually check that predeter-
mined variables are not effected by the treatment assignment. Figure 3.7 displays
the average fraction of students lost to digital charter schools by vote share in the
year before, year of, and year following an election. Panel A shows the averages for
capital levy elections and panel B shows averages for general levies. Also plotted is a
quadratic fit to the averages and 95 percent confidence bands. There is no difference
at the threshold in the year before either type of election. In the year of the election,
the average is slightly lower to the right of the threshold for general purpose levies
but not capital levies. In the year after the election the drop to the right of the
threshold is larger for general levies and small for capital levies. This suggests that
any difference in the fraction of students lost to digital charter schools observed is
not due to pre-election differences in the outcome on either side of the threshold,
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which supports our identification assumptions. 9
We verify the visual inspection of these trends with formal estimates and hypoth-
esis tests in Table 3.5. Columns 1 and 2 are differences in characteristics in the year
before an election for capital levies and general purpose levies, respectively. The es-
timates in column 3 and 4 are the difference from two years prior to one year prior to
the election. There are no significant differences in any of these characteristics. There
is a marginally significant difference in the fraction of students that are black from
two to one year prior to the election, but the estimate is small in magnitude. This
provides further evidence that districts above and below the 50 percent vote share
threshold are not systematically different, which supports the assumptions necessary
for interpreting our results as causal.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 School Finances
We begin with estimates of how levy passage affects district spending following an
election. Figure 3.8 presents graphical analysis of district spending by vote share
relative to the 50 percent threshold in the year before and three years after the
election. The averages are shown in bins of two percentage points and are net of
calendar year effects and are relative to the first bin to the left of the threshold. The
9Similar balance graphs are available for other district characteristics in Figure C.3 through Fig-
ure C.15 and show no difference at the threshold prior to the election for instructional expenditures,
support service expenditures, fraction of students lost to a charter school, residential values, the
performance index, district value-added, fraction meeting annual yearly progress, student-teacher
ratio, number of students, fraction of black students, or fraction of students eligible for free lunch.
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left side of panel A shows no discontinuity across the threshold for capital spending
in the year before a capital levy election, but there is a jump of about 2,000 dollars
per pupil in capital spending at the 50 percent threshold three years after a capital
levy election. On the right side of panel A, average capital spending is slightly
less to the right of the threshold for general purpose levy elections. Rather than a
jump, this appears to be the continuation of a negative relationship between vote
share and spending, which suggests that voters are less likely to approve a general
levy in districts that are already spending more on capital. Three years following a
general levy election, capital spending is flat across all vote shares, which suggests
that initially lower capital-spending districts catch up after passing a general levy
although there is no visible discontinuity. Graphs for instructional spending in panel
B are slightly more noisy, but also exhibit no discontinuity at the 50 percent vote
share threshold in the year prior to the election for either capital (on the left) or
general levies (on the right). Average instructional spending to the right of the
threshold is consistently higher three years after a general levy election but not for
capital elections. Taken together, these graphs confirm no pre-election discontinuity
at the 50 percent threshold. Also, capital spending increases after passing a capital
levy and instructional spending increases after passing a general purpose levy.10
Figure 3.9 shows the effect of each type of levy on capital and instructional
spending using the ITT method described in Equation 3.1 in panel A and the TOT
method described in Equation 3.2 in panel B. Panel A shows that passing a capital
levy increases capital spending a modest amount in the year of and following the
10In the appendix, Figure C.1 shows a similar relationship between vote share and support service
spending, but the relationship is even noisier than for instructional spending.
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election then by about $1,000 per pupil in the second year and up to about $1,500
per pupil in the third year. After the third year, spending drops down close to zero
and is significantly negative in the fifth year for the ITT. This is consistent with
the timeline of most capital projects. Projects are implemented in the few years
following the passage of the levy, then spending returns to lower levels once the
project is finished. Additionally, “control” districts, whose levy failed previously,
catch up as they propose and pass new levies. Passing a general levy also provides
a modest boost to capital spending, with significant ITT effects in the year of and
immediately following the election and consistently positive TOT effects between
about $500 and $1,000 per pupil. Panel B shows that capital levies do not increase
instructional spending, but there is a persistent increase in instructional spending
between $100 and $200 per pupil after passage of a general purpose levy.
These relationships are summarized as total effects in Table 3.6. The ITT effects
are smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated than the TOT effects. Because
the TOT effects are a more closely related to the actual changes in spending that
occur after passing a levy we focus on those magnitudes. In the 6.5 years following
capital levy passage, districts spend $3,668 per pupil more on capital and slightly
less on instruction and support services. By dividing by 6.5, we get that the av-
erage yearly increase in capital spending is $564 per pupil or a 39 percent increase
in spending. Following a successful general levy referendum, per-pupil spending in-
creases by $3,553 for capital, $766 for instruction, and $232 for support services.
These correspond to annual effects of $546, $188, and $36; or 48%, 2.2%, and 1%,
respectively. In sum, a given levy election has a significant and meaningful impact
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on school district finances, especially in capital spending.
3.5.2 Charter Competition
Figure 3.10 displays the average fraction of students lost to charter schools, by vote
share. These estimates are noisy, but show no systematic jump in the average at the
50 percent threshold. Figure 3.11 shows the effect of passing a levy on the fraction
of students lost to charter schools, with estimates for digital charters in panel A
and estimates for brick-and-mortar charters in panel B. For digital charters, the ITT
estimates on the left are imprecise and negative after passing either type of levy,
although slightly larger magnitude for capital levies. The estimates are nearer to
zero in the fifth and sixth year following the election. The TOT estimates on the
right show a consistent downward trend for both general and capital levies, with
a more pronounced effect for capital levies. Similar estimates for the fraction of
students lost to brick-and-mortar charters in panel B show that the effects are near
zero and imprecisely estimated.
These effects are summarized in Table 3.7 as the total effect of passing a levy on
the fraction of potential students attending charters over the following 6.5 years (the
year of the election is a half-treated year). The effect for brick-and-mortar charters
is slightly positive and not statistically significant. The effect for digital charters
is negative for both the ITT and TOT estimates with larger effects in the TOT
estimates, which is consistent with the dynamic estimates. The total TOT effect of
passing a capital levy is 1.3 percentage points fewer students lost to digital charters.
The total TOT effect for general levies is 1 percentage point. These estimates are
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based on all elections, including districts with multiple elections in a year, but are
robust to limiting attention to the first election of each year.11
We estimate the average yearly decrease in the fraction of potential students
attending digital charters by dividing these estimates by 6.5 to get 0.2 percent points
and 0.15 percentage points for capital and general levies, respectively. Taking into
account the average fraction of students lost, these constitute decreases of 20 percent
for capital levies and 12.5 percent for general levies. On average, TPS districts in
Ohio lose around 40 students to digital charters, which amounts to about $232,650
in funding. Thus, passing a levy decreases the number of students lost to digital
charters by about 2 for every thousand students. The amount of money saved for
the average TPS district would be about $3,024.
3.5.3 Student and Teacher Counts
Next, we examine the effect of passing levies on student and teacher counts to see
whether keeping students from attending digital charters increased the total number
of students and whether districts used their expanded resources to increase the num-
ber of teachers. Figure 3.12 shows the raw average student and teacher counts by
vote share. There is no discontinuity at the threshold for student or teacher counts
before either a capital or general levy is passed. The other averages are noisy with
a lot of movement across vote share, but no clear pattern emerges from this graph-
ical evidence. To provide a clearer picture of what happens to student and teacher
counts following levy passage, we show the annual DRD effects in Figure 3.13. Panel
11Estimates using just the first election of each year are available in Table C.4.
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A shows the estimates for the number of students in the district. The ITT and
TOT estimates for capital levies are all negative, but imprecisely estimated. The
estimates for general levies are larger in magnitude, positive, and more precisely es-
timated with some effects significant at the 95 percent level. In panel B, the pattern
for number of teachers following a capital levy is less consistent than for student
counts with some positive estimates and some negative. Teacher counts increased
following a general election with estimates between 5 and 10 additional teachers,
many of which are statistically significant. Since both the number of students and
teachers increase significantly following a general levy we also show what happens
to the number of students per teacher in panel C. This shows that the number of
students per teacher decreased significantly after passage of a general levy while the
ratio may have increased following a capital levy although the estimates are not
statistically significant.
To summarize, we show total effects of levy passage on student and teacher counts
in Table 3.8. Our estimates suggest that following the passage of a capital levy, and
consistent with the graphical evidence, the number of students and teachers both de-
creased and the student-to-teacher ratio increased. These estimates are quite small
compared to the size of the standard errors, so we are also do not rule out that
there was no effect on student or teacher counts. The estimates for general levies
are more compelling and since the ITT and TOT estimates are quite similar we will
focus on discussion on the TOT estimates. In the 6.5 years after passing a general
purpose levy, districts have 403 additional students and 51 additional teachers, which
decreased the student-to-teacher ratio by 1.74 students. By dividing by 6.5, these
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effects translate into 62 additional students each year being served by an additional
7.9 teachers. This amounts to an annual decrease in the number of students per
teacher by 0.27. This suggests that passing general levies leads to investing in teach-
ers while passing capital levies may crowd out resources that might have otherwise
gone to teachers.
3.5.4 Residential Home Values
We next explore whether passing a levy is capitalized into residential values. Prop-
erty values by vote share are graphed in Figure 3.14. These graphs do not show a
consistent pattern at the threshold, but do suggest that property values are lower
three years following a successful capital levy than the year prior. Figure 3.15 shows
the effect of passing capital or general levies on log residential values in panel A
and residential values in tens of thousands of dollars in panel B. For log residential
values, the ITT estimates are slightly positive for general levies and slightly negative
for capital levies. The TOT estimates show a similar pattern but with larger magni-
tudes that are more precisely estimated. For residential values in tens of thousands
of dollars, the ITT estimates are positive by imprecisely estimated for both types of
levy, but the TOT estimates for capital levies are increasingly negative over time.
These effects are summarized in Table 3.9. The TOT estimates suggest that
passing a capital levy decreases residential values by 9.7 percent or 11.4 percent12
in the 6.5 years following the election. For the 6.5 years after passing a general
levy property values increase by 3.1 percent or 5.1 percent. Dividing by 6.5, these
12This is based on the estimate in tens of thousands of dollars because −2,18619,268 ≈ −0.114.
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estimates suggest that passing a capital levy decreases property values between 1.5
and 1.75 percent annually and passing a general purpose levy increases property
values by 0.48 to 0.79 percent. The only estimate that is statistically significant
is for log residential values after a capital levy, but these suggest that passing a
capital levy decreases property values while passing a general purpose levy increases
property values.
3.5.5 Student Outcomes
Finally, we explore the effect of levy passage on student outcomes in terms of the
district performance index, value added, and the fraction of students meeting annual
yearly progress standards. Figure 3.16 shows the average of these student outcomes
by vote share the year before and three years after a capital or general levy election.
These estimates do not show a clear pattern. Figure 3.17 shows the DRD estimates
and again there is not much of a pattern. The summary estimates in Table 3.10
show that none of the estimates are statistically different from zero. For capital
levies we can rule out a change in the performance index of more than 0.055 standard
deviations or more than 0.063 standard deviations for general levies. These estimates
are not precise enough to rule out meaningful positive or negative achievement effects.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the effect of increased resources for traditional public
schools on several district-level outcomes. Passing a capital levy increases capital
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outlays and passing a general purpose levy increases instructional, support service,
and capital spending. Both types of levy improve the ability of districts to re-
tain students who would have otherwise attended digital charter schools but had no
meaningful impact on students lost to brick-and-mortar charter schools. Specifically,
passing a capital levy decreases the fraction of potential students who attend digital
charters each year by 20 percent and general levies decrease the fraction by 12.5
percent. We find no evidence that either type of levy has an effect on test scores,
although the estimates are imprecise and we cannot rule out meaningful positive or
negative effects. We also find some important heterogeneity between the effects of
capital and general levies. General purpose levies increase the number of students
in the district, but the number of teachers increases proportionately more so that
the student-teacher ratio decreases. The estimates for capital levies are less precise,
but shows an opposite effect where the number of students and teacher both decline
and the student teacher ratio increases. Possibly due to this differential investment,
home values increase after general levies but decrease after capital levies.
There are several limitations to the current study that can be improved upon by
future research. First, we are unable to say precisely why competition with digital
charters is more affected than with brick-and-mortar charters. It may be that digital
charters are available to all students in the state, while competition from brick-and-
mortar charters is more limited to schools in the same local geographic area. We lack
to statistical power to explore the heterogeneity between areas based on the level of
competition with brick-and-mortar charters, but additional years of data may allow
future work to tease these out. Second, the outcome data available for test scores and
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housing values is not ideal. The residential values we use are district-level aggregates
from the Department of Taxation and reflect assessed value rather than the sale
price of homes. Thus, we are unable to distinguish between the value of individual
homes or the total number of homes included in the aggregate estimate. To better
measure the impact on capitalization, we would need additional information that
more closely reflect changes in the average market value of property in the district.
The district-level achievement measures we use such as the performance index are
not ideal for capturing small changes in student outcomes and whether there are
important subgroups of students that benefit. More detailed achievement data is
needed to more confidently determine whether increased spending from passing levies
affects student achievement.
We document a relatively large effect of increased resources on retaining students
from going to digital charters, but this average effect likely masks important hetero-
geneity. Future work should explore the type of district that sees the largest benefit
from increased spending and the composition of students that remain at a TPS that
otherwise would have gone to an online charter school. Student-level data, partic-
ularly those with the ability to track students between schools, would be ideal for
these analyses.
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3.7 Figures & Tables
Table 3.1: Data Sources
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Number of Teachers Employed 1987-2011
School Building
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Payments to charter schools 1989-2011
Notes: NCES=National Center for Education Statistics. FRPL=Free/Reduced-price
lunch. FRPL eligible student enrollment is unavailable in 2007.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Ohio School Property Tax Levy Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Levies General Purpose Levies
Year Number of Avg. Amount Fraction Number of Avg. Amount FractionMeasures per Pupil Approved Measures per Pupil Approved
1996 126 807 0.46 98 221 0.60
1997 194 647 0.56 176 120 0.66
1998 197 778 0.51 161 163 0.66
1999 217 629 0.65 163 157 0.66
2000 197 1,259 0.69 184 247 0.76
2001 146 1,184 0.63 154 197 0.68
2002 151 2,216 0.57 171 197 0.63
2003 154 1,629 0.51 211 243 0.57
2004 153 1,038 0.55 336 259 0.46
2005 132 1,320 0.55 284 245 0.55
2006 130 1,073 0.61 207 303 0.52
2007 143 988 0.52 190 289 0.56
2008 141 1,755 0.59 202 338 0.57
2009 97 1,165 0.58 206 309 0.64
2010 97 1,557 0.57 254 311 0.54
2011 78 1,003 0.58 220 300 0.54
2012 77 1,361 0.66 194 331 0.60
Notes: Capital levies include bond debt issued as well as levies for permanent im-
provements or facilities. General purpose levies are for current expenses, emergency
requirements, and to avoid an operating deficit.
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Table 3.3: District Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Year Before Pass Year Before Fail Pass-Fail
A. Per-Pupil Expenditures
Capital 1,206 1,203 971 233
(2,868) (2,385) (1,819) (0.000)
Instructional 5,124 5,158 5,218 -60
(1,747) ( 869) (1,635) (0.119)
Support Services 3,225 3,260 3,251 9
(2,809) ( 812) (1,645) (0.819)
Total 10,355 10,422 10,240 182
(6,335) (3,208) (4,097) (0.087)
N 12,842 2,129 3,049
B. Fraction of Students Transferring
Digital Charters 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Brick-and-Mortar Charters 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.001
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.245)
Any Charter 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.002
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.078)
N 7,345 1,429 1,800
C. Student and Teacher Counts
# Students 2,893 3,067 3,012 55
(4,893) (4,117) (4,515) (0.655)
# Teachers 760 466 503 -37
(2,144) (1,062) (1,495) (0.326)
N 16,515 2,146 3,060
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) are means with standard deviations in parentheses. Column
(4) shows the difference between columns (2) and (3) with a p-value for the difference
in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: Levy Purpose Categories
Notes: AOD = Avoid an Operating Deficit, Co = Construction, F = Facilities, PI
= Permanent Improvements, Cu = Current Expenditures, E = Emergency. Combi-
nations not shown include Co + Cu (2), Co + F + Cu (1), Co + PI + Cu (31), Co
+ PI + F + Cu (11), Cu + AOD (3), Cu + E (2), E + AOD (1), F + Cu (2), PI +
AOD (1), PI + Cu (46), and PI + F (30).
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Figure 3.2: Density of Vote Share for Capital and General Purpose Levy Elections
Notes: Sample includes all elections in Ohio school districts from 1996 to 2012. Vote
shares are censored at 30 and 70.
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Figure 3.3: Likelihood of Passing an Additional Levy After Levy Passage
A. After General Levy is Passed
B. After Capital Levy is Passed
Notes: Coefficients are plotted from a regression with year and district fixed effects
and standard errors clustered at the district level with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.4: Likelihood of Passing an Additional Levy After Levy Failure
A. After General Levy is Defeated
B. After Capital Levy is Defeated
Notes: Coefficients are plotted from a regression with year and district fixed effects
and standard errors clustered at the district level with 95 percent confidence intervals.
135
Figure 3.5: Levy Amounts by Vote Share
Notes: Levy amounts are based on the stated amount of the capital project or the
proposed millage rate times the taxable value of property in that year. Vote shares
are censored at 20 and 80.
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Figure 3.6: McCrary Tests for Capital and General Purpose Levy Elections
A. Capital Levies B. General Purpose Levies
Table 3.4: McCrary Density Test Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Levy Purpose Election Month Levy Length
Capital General Aug Nov Feb Mar/May CPT 5 Years 8 Years
θˆ -0.051 -0.021 -0.045 -0.138 -0.043 0.195 -0.086 -0.062 -0.055 0.009
(0.065) (0.094) (0.081) (0.183) (0.093) (0.301) (0.095) (0.131) (0.097) (0.193)
N 18,832 2,525 3,627 476 3,144 235 2,401 1,120 3,125 427
Notes: Estimates for the discontinuity in the density of vote shares at the 50 percent
threshold (θˆ) are shown with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Balance of Pre-election Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year before Change from
election t− 1 t− 2 to t− 1
Capital General Capital General
A. District Outcomes
Fraction Black Students 0.008 0.008 0.001+ 0.001+
(0.010) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001)
Fraction FRL Students 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
% AYP Indicators Met -0.013 -0.013 -0.003 -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
B. Finance Outcomes
Total Expenditures (in thousands) 3,658 3,658 556 556
(3,050) (3,050) (436) (436)
Capital Outlays (in thousands) 483 483 -48 -48
(499) (499) (321) (321)
Instructional (in thousands) 2,053 2,053 76 76
(1462) (1,462) (134) (134)
Total Property Value (in thousands) 45167 45167 1,807 1,807
(37444) (37444) (2,354) (2,354)
C. Charter Outcomes
Fraction of Any Charter Transfers (× 100) -0.289 -0.289 -0.012 -0.012
(0.218) (0.218) (0.072) (0.072)
Fraction of Digital Charter Transfers (× 100) -0.031 -0.031 -0.014 -0.014
(0.081) (0.081) (0.040) (0.040)
Fraction of B&M Charter Transfers (× 100) -0.259 -0.259 0.053 0.053
(0.194) (0.194) (0.075) (0.075)
Notes: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are presented in each cell for
the effect of passing either a capital or general purpose levy on the given outcome
during the year before for vote passed. Columns (1) and (2) present results on t− 1
levels, while Columns (3) and (4) present results on t−2 to t−1 changes in outcomes.
This setup follows after Table III in Cellini et al. (2010). + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01
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Figure 3.7: Fraction of Students Lost to Digital Charters by Vote Share Before and
After Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure 3.8: Spending, by Vote Share, Before and After Election
A. Capital Spending Per Pupil
B. Instructional Spending Per Pupil
Notes: Graphs show spending per pupil for capital levies (left panels) and gen-
eral purpose levies (right panels), by vote share in the focal election. Elections are
grouped into bins of 2 percentage points. Averages control for year effects and are
normalized to the first bin to the left of the 50% threshold.
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Figure 3.9: Dynamic Effect of Levy Passage on Spending
A. Capital Spending Per Pupil
B. Instructional Spending Per Pupil
Notes: Graph shows the “intent-to-treat” and “recursive treatment-on-the-treated”
effects and 95 percent confidence intervals of each relative year after levy passage on
the capital spending per pupil in panel A and instruction spending per pupil in panel
B. The specifications are outlined in equations 3.1 and 3.2. Corresponding regression
output is provided in Table C.5.
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Table 3.6: Total Effect of Levy Passage on Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Capital Levies General Levies
Total Capital Inst. Support Total Capital Inst. Support
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 2,101+ 1,393 -19 189 2,067∗ 1,232 548∗∗ 406∗
(1,182) (1,051) (184) (163) (1,047) (872) (188) (175)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 4,013∗∗ 3,668∗∗ -47 -85 4,535∗∗ 3,553∗∗ 766∗∗ 232∗
(772) (700) (122) (106) (804) (709) (122) (107)
Dep. Var. Mean 10,658 1,466 5,183 3,201 10,904 1,149 5,412 3,434
N 20,714 20,714 20,714 20,714 28,123 28,123 28,123 28,123
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Figure 3.10: Students Lost to Charter Schools, by Vote Share, Before and After
Election
A. Fraction of Students Lost to Digital Charters
B. Fraction of Students Lost to Brick-and-Mortar Charters
Notes: Graphs show the fraction of students lost to charter schools for capital levies
(left panels) and general purpose levies (right panels), by vote share in the focal
election. Elections are grouped into bins of 2 percentage points. Averages control for
year effects and are normalized to the first bin to the left of the 50% threshold.
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Figure 3.11: Effect of Levy Passage on Fraction of Students Lost to Charter Schools
A. Digital Charters
B. Brick-and-Mortar Charters
Notes: Graph shows the “intent-to-treat” and “recursive treatment-on-the-treated”
estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of each lag of levy passage on the frac-
tion of students lost to charter schools. The specifications are outlined in equations
3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Corresponding regression output is provided in Table C.6.
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Table 3.7: Total Effect of Levy Passage on Fraction of Students Lost to Charter
Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Levies General Levies
Digital Brick and Mortar Digital Brick and Mortar
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed -0.007 0.005 -0.005 0.0004
(0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed -0.013∗∗ 0.006 -0.010∗∗ -0.003
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.010
N 15,168 15,168 22,381 22,381
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Figure 3.12: Student and Teacher Counts, by Vote Share, Before and After Election
A. Student Counts
B. Teacher Counts
Notes: Graphs show student and teacher counts for capital levy (left panels) and
general purpose levy (right panels) referenda, by vote share in the focal election.
Elections are grouped into bins of 2 percentage points. Averages control for year
effects and are normalized to the first bin to the left of the 50% threshold.
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Figure 3.13: Student and Teacher Counts
A. Number of Students
B. Number of Teachers
C. Student-Teacher Ratio
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Table 3.8: Total Effect of Passing Levies on Teacher and Student Counts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Levies General Levies
# of # of Students # of # of Students
Students Teachers Teachers Students Teachers Teachers
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed -272 -22 2.32 475+ 62∗ -1.19+
(370) (26) (2.78) (274) (31) (0.64)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed -176 -10 1.68 403+ 51∗ -1.74∗∗
(192) (10) (1.48) (215) (22) (0.47)
Dep. Var. Mean 2,699 156 17.69 3,226 188 17.52
N 20,848 20,848 20,828 28,280 28,280 28,275
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Figure 3.14: House Prices, by Vote Share, Before and After Election
A. Log Residential Home Prices
B. Residential Home Prices ($10,000s)
Notes: Graphs show residential home prices for capital levy (left panels) and general
purpose levy (right panels) referenda, by vote share in the focal election. Elections
are grouped into bins of 2 percentage points. Averages control for year effects and
are normalized to the first bin to the left of the 50% threshold.
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Figure 3.15: Effect of Levy Passage on Residential Values
A. Log Residential Home Values
B. Residential Home Values ($10,000)
Notes: Graph shows the “intent-to-treat” and “recursive treatment-on-the-treated”
estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of each lag of levy passage on residential
values in real 2011 dollars per pupil. The specifications are outlined in equations 3.1
and 3.2, respectively. Corresponding regression output is provided in Table C.9.
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Table 3.9: Total Effect of Levy Passage on Residential Values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Levies General Levies
$10,000 Log $10,000 Log
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 3,016 -0.069 3,113 0.032
(4,090) (0.045) (3,514) (0.036)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed -2,186 -0.097∗∗ 1,724 0.031
(2,013) (0.032) (1,903) (0.029)
Dep. Var. Mean 26,189 18.84 33,613 19.12
N 19,268 19,268 25,163 25,163
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Figure 3.16: Student Outcomes, by Vote Share, Before and After Election
A. Performance Index
B. Value Added
C. Fraction Meeting AYP
Notes: Graphs show student outcomes for capital levy (left) and general purpose
levy (right) referenda, by vote share in the focal election. Elections are grouped into
bins of 2 percentage points. Averages control for year effects and are normalized to
the first bin to the left of the 50% threshold.
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Figure 3.17: District Student Outcomes
A. Performance Index
B. Value Added
C. Fraction Meeting AYP
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Table 3.10: Average Effect of Passing Levies on Student Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Levies General Levies
Performance Value AYP Performance Value AYP
Index Added Met Index Added Met
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 0.006 -0.333 -0.163 0.009 0.225 -0.092
(0.019) (0.940) (0.213) (0.014) (0.641) (0.203)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed -0.058 -0.435 0.127 0.170 -0.304 0.145
(0.154) (0.537) (0.146) (0.122) (0.486) (0.126)
Dep. Var. Mean -0.08 1.10 0.33 0.05 1.08 0.36
N 15,520 7,795 17,537 21,852 13,772 23,623
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
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Figure A.1: Example of District Consolidation - Minnesota
Notes: Boundaries shown for 2 school districts (Brewster and Round Lake) in Min-
nesota, which consolidated into a single school district (Brewster-Round Lake) in
2014.
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Figure A.2: Example of Overlapping/Nested Districts - New Jersey
Notes: Boundaries for 4 school districts in New Jersey are shown. Bellmawr, Run-
nemede, and Gloucester are K-8 districts and Black Horse is a regional 9-12 district.
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Figure A.3: First-stage effect of simulated revenue ($1,000 per pupil) on total expen-
diture ($1,000 per pupil) in graduation rate samples – individual year
lags
8th Grade Cohort Sample 9th Grade Cohort Sample
10th Grade Cohort Sample 11th Grade Cohort Sample
Notes: Figure A.3 presents point estimates, 95% confidence intervals, and F statistics
in brackets, from individual regressions of lagged per-pupil total expenditures on log
simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-missing graduation rates.
Models also include controls for district property wealth, median household income,
fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education,
fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Corresponding
estimates are presented in Table A.8.
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Figure A.4: First-stage effect of simulated revenue ($1,000 per pupil) on total expen-
diture ($1,000 per pupil) for SEDA test score samples – individual year
lags
4th Grade Math Sample 4th Grade Reading Sample
8th Grade Math Sample 8th Grade Reading Sample
Notes: Figure A.4 presents point estimates, 95% confidence intervals, and F statistics
in brackets, from individual regressions of lagged per-pupil total expenditures on log
simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-missing graduation rates.
Models also include controls for district property wealth, median household income,
fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education,
fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Corresponding
estimates are presented in Table A.9.
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Figure A.5: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on graduation
rates
8th Grade Cohort 9th Grade Cohort
10th Grade Cohort 11th Grade Cohort
Notes: Figure A.5 presents 2SLS estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect
of per-pupil spending instrumented with log simulated revenue. Numbers in brackets
are first-stage F statistics. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. Corresponding estimates are presented in Table A.11.
160
Figure A.6: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on SEDA test
scores
4th Grade Math 4th Grade Reading
8th Grade Math 8th Grade Reading
Notes: Figure A.6 presents 2SLS estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect
of per-pupil spending instrumented with log simulated revenue. Numbers in brackets
are first-stage F statistics. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. Corresponding estimates are presented in Table A.13.
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Table A.1: States with Tax and Expenditure Limits
State Description
Arkansas Income limited to 5% for homesteads and 10% for non-homesteads
California Increase in assessed value limited to min{0.02, CPI}
Illinois 29 of 102 counties opted into the PTELL program by 1999. This
limits the increase in property tax revenue to min{0.05, CPI}
Indiana The maximum levy is the maximum levy from the previous year ad-
justed by the assessed value growth quotient (AVGQ)
Iowa Increase in property values limited to 3% annually
Maryland 10% limit in annual increase in property values with a 3-year phase
in for all increases
Massachusetts Annual increase in property tax revenue limited to 2.5%
Michigan Annual increase in property values limited to min{0.05, CPI}
Nebraska Annual increase in spending limited by an amount determined by the
legislature
Nevada Annual increase in property tax revenue limited to 6%
New Jersey Annual increase in spending limited to min{0.03, CPI}
New Mexico Annual increase in property values limited to 3%
Ohio Tax rates automatically adjust as assessments increase to keep rev-
enue generated from a tax levy fixed. 3-year phase in of value increases
Oklahoma Annual increase in property values limited to 5%
Oregon Annual increase in property values limited to 3%
Texas Annual increase in property values limited to 10%
Washington Annual increase in revenue limited to 6% above the highest level in
the last three years
West Virginia Annual increase in revenue limited to 1% per year (tax rates decreased
if assessments raise more than 1%)
Wisconsin Annual increase in revenue per pupil cannot exceed $208.88 in 1998-
1999, and adjusted for inflation in future years
States with no dynamic limits (as of FY1999): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Col-
orado. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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Table A.2: School Finance Formula Type for Each State
District Power Combination/

















































Total 40 3 5
Notes: Adapted from Verstegen and Jordan (2009). Not included: Hawaii and North
Carolina. Hawaii’s single school district is fully funded by the state. North Carolina
uses a flat grant system.
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Table A.3: State Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balanced Panel School Districts
Raw SEDA Test SEDA Test CCD Cohort
States Districts All Scores Score Gaps Graduation Rate
Arkansas 245 238 237 49 234
Connecticut 167 138 135 27 106
Florida 67 67 67 57 67
Georgia 180 180 178 131 177
Idaho 115 112 84 2 97
Illinois 871 848 667 87 425
Iowa 364 319 283 16 273
Kansas 297 284 207 16 236
Kentucky 174 173 164 25 165
Massachusetts 408 235 225 29 210
Minnesota 337 329 289 32 290
Mississippi 149 79 79 58 79
Nevada 17 17 15 2 16
New Hampshire 162 120 89 0 68
New Jersey 573 339 321 89 211
New Mexico 89 89 66 6 78
New York 725 668 618 89 592
North Carolina 115 115 115 84 115
North Dakota 192 176 54 2 104
Ohio 612 608 602 76 573
Oklahoma 539 513 322 21 357
Oregon 195 194 138 10 161
Texas 1,031 1,025 804 187 866
Washington 295 295 211 34 229
Total 7,919 7,161 5,970 1,129 5,729
Notes: The number of districts per state in my sample are shown. The first column
reports the raw number of traditional public school districts reported in the CCD
and column (2) is the number of districts in my balanced panel. Columns (3) through
(5) are the number of districts with nonmissing values in the balanced panel for the
variables indicated.
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Table A.4: First stage estimates of log simulated revenue on log spending for grad-
uation rate samples – individual year lags
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. 8th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Sim. Rev. 0.142∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.033 -0.003 0.056
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.036) (0.048) (0.062) (0.072)
F 25.83 24.38 25.62 18.66 16.23 4.76 0.48 0.00 0.60
Districts 2,724 2,724 2,722 2,721 2,720 2,716 2,708 2,688 2,668
N 17,467 17,467 17,275 16,967 15,677 14,640 13,203 11,510 9,147
B. 9th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Sim. Rev. 0.132∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.078+ 0.051 0.092
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.034) (0.044) (0.054) (0.063)
F 29.38 34.72 32.45 37.35 27.23 7.22 3.12 0.89 2.12
Districts 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,821 2,816
N 22,342 22,130 21,751 20,108 18,643 16,918 14,885 12,683 10,011
C. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Sim. Rev. 0.144∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.067 0.058 0.110+
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.042) (0.055) (0.065)
F 42.80 37.50 31.22 28.26 13.42 4.46 2.52 1.11 2.88
Districts 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,822 2,817
N 23,457 23,082 21,468 19,863 18,063 16,449 14,593 12,633 9,969
D. 11th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Sim. Rev. 0.135∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.058 0.062 0.081 0.109
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) (0.038) (0.047) (0.057) (0.068)
F 42.18 36.31 33.95 26.41 6.08 2.40 1.72 2.02 2.58
Districts 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,820 2,815 2,815 2,813 2,812 2,798
N 22,227 20,606 19,049 17,194 15,357 14,431 13,327 12,089 9,540
Notes: This table reports the results of individual first stage regressions of log total
expenditures on log simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-
missing graduation rates. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: First stage estimates of log simulated revenue on log spending for test
score samples – individual year lags
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. SEDA 4th Grade Math Scores
Log Sim. Rev. 0.072∗ 0.047+ 0.021 0.074∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.201∗∗
(0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
F 4.58 2.71 0.37 5.85 31.96 62.49 106.94 90.21 44.03
Districts 5,780 5,780 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781
N 26,501 26,492 26,495 26,496 26,500 26,502 26,502 26,501 26,502
B. SEDA 4th Grade Reading Scores
Log Sim. Rev. 0.077∗ 0.049+ 0.022 0.074∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.201∗∗
(0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
F 5.34 2.86 0.41 5.89 34.34 64.14 106.22 91.05 44.14
Districts 5,778 5,778 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779
N 26,511 26,502 26,505 26,506 26,510 26,512 26,512 26,511 26,512
C. SEDA 8th Grade Math Scores
Log Sim. Rev. 0.053 0.031 0.037 0.049+ 0.107∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.161∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032)
F 2.65 1.20 1.19 3.17 20.39 28.63 52.43 46.60 17.64
Districts 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788
N 24,741 24,732 24,734 24,736 24,740 24,742 24,741 24,740 24,741
D. SEDA 8th Grade Reading Scores
Log Sim. Rev. 0.076∗ 0.050+ 0.035 0.070∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.033) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030)
F 5.35 2.95 1.06 5.29 31.87 61.05 104.56 92.39 45.53
Districts 5,801 5,801 5,801 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802
N 26,599 26,590 26,592 26,594 26,598 26,600 26,600 26,599 26,600
Notes: This table reports the results of individual first stage regressions of log total
expenditures on log simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-
missing test scores. Models also include controls for district property wealth, median
household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction
special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects,
and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level: *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on graduation rates
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. 8th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Spending 0.452∗∗ 0.414∗∗ 0.107 0.046 -0.134 0.001 -0.193 -0.318 -0.337
(0.121) (0.122) (0.071) (0.078) (0.104) (0.151) (0.250) (0.465) (0.397)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79
First-stage F 64.53 58.36 66.70 62.14 52.19 24.83 8.05 1.74 2.89
Districts 2,676 2,676 2,675 2,669 2,660 2,656 2,636 2,608 2,535
N 17,419 17,419 17,228 16,915 15,617 14,580 13,131 11,430 9,014
B. 9th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Spending 0.327∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.082 0.057 -0.014 -0.054 -0.284+ -0.475 -0.473
(0.098) (0.090) (0.066) (0.073) (0.092) (0.129) (0.172) (0.297) (0.300)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
First-stage F 76.00 80.54 77.34 80.42 60.09 25.46 12.85 4.46 5.09
Districts 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,818 2,815 2,808 2,802 2,758
N 22,340 22,128 21,749 20,106 18,636 16,908 14,868 12,664 9,953
C. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Spending 0.223∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.077 0.103 0.098 0.143 -0.121 -0.389 -0.201
(0.064) (0.064) (0.060) (0.078) (0.122) (0.158) (0.196) (0.261) (0.202)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81
First-stage F 109.75 93.67 73.56 65.35 40.78 19.81 11.11 4.80 6.35
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,822 2,822 2,818 2,804 2,773
N 23,456 23,081 21,467 19,862 18,060 16,446 14,586 12,615 9,925
D. 11th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Log Spending 0.147∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.064 0.112 0.091 0.102 -0.099 -0.411+ -0.360
(0.054) (0.062) (0.056) (0.080) (0.146) (0.178) (0.209) (0.229) (0.239)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86
First-stage F 119.16 90.27 75.76 61.81 26.19 13.51 8.77 6.33 5.77
Districts 2,820 2,819 2,815 2,810 2,803 2,794 2,786 2,773 2,722
N 22,224 20,602 19,041 17,184 15,345 14,410 13,300 12,050 9,464
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of graduation rates on lagged log total expenditures instrumented with lagged log
simulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth, median
household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction
special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects,
and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level: *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on SEDA test scores
No Lag 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 4 Lags 5 Lags 6 Lags 7 Lags 8 Lags
A. 4th Grade Math
Log Spending -2.474 -1.003 5.189 0.851 -2.474 0.910∗ 0.631∗ 0.690∗ 0.803
(1.786) (1.770) (10.711) (1.331) (1.786) (0.404) (0.315) (0.331) (0.459)
First-stage F 6.91 4.94 0.36 6.15 6.91 64.22 108.80 91.49 45.09
Districts 5,663 5,662 5,662 5,663 5,663 5,664 5,664 5,664 5,664
N 26,384 26,374 26,376 26,378 26,384 26,385 26,385 26,384 26,385
B. 4th Grade Reading
Log Spending -1.054 -2.209 6.814 1.139 -1.054 0.849∗ 0.899∗∗ 0.900∗∗ 0.641
(1.362) (1.832) (12.045) (1.321) (1.362) (0.377) (0.291) (0.301) (0.408)
First-stage F 7.87 5.14 0.40 6.20 7.87 65.90 108.09 92.34 45.22
Districts 5,660 5,659 5,659 5,660 5,660 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661
N 26,393 26,383 26,385 26,387 26,393 26,394 26,394 26,393 26,394
C. 8th Grade Math
Log Spending -0.222 1.832 3.956 4.795 -0.222 1.846∗∗ 0.993∗∗ 0.691 0.023
(1.737) (2.307) (4.747) (3.074) (1.737) (0.656) (0.418) (0.370) (0.540)
First-stage F 4.73 3.02 1.17 3.49 4.73 30.22 54.02 47.59 18.41
Districts 5,642 5,641 5,641 5,642 5,642 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643
N 24,596 24,586 24,588 24,590 24,596 24,597 24,596 24,595 24,596
D. 8th Grade Reading
Log Spending 0.854 1.502 -1.588 0.424 0.854 0.502 0.490 0.506 0.236
(1.353) (1.726) (3.297) (1.168) (1.353) (0.350) (0.260) (0.270) (0.381)
First-stage F 7.88 5.23 1.05 5.58 7.88 62.78 106.41 93.67 46.63
Districts 5,673 5,672 5,672 5,673 5,673 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674
N 26,471 26,461 26,463 26,465 26,471 26,472 26,472 26,471 26,472
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of test scores on lagged log total expenditures instrumented with lagged log sim-
ulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth, median
household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction
special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district fixed ef-
fects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district
level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.8: First stage estimates of simulated revenue ($1,000 per pupil) on total
expenditure ($1,000 per pupil) for graduation rate samples – individual
year lags
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. 8th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 3.053∗∗ 2.768∗∗ 2.694∗∗ 2.099∗∗ 2.052∗∗ 0.905 0.289 -0.299 1.556
(0.464) (0.508) (0.524) (0.533) (0.530) (0.592) (0.730) (0.954) (1.137)
F 43.20 29.67 26.47 15.49 14.98 2.34 0.16 0.10 1.87
Districts 2,724 2,724 2,722 2,721 2,720 2,716 2,708 2,688 2,668
N 17,467 17,467 17,275 16,967 15,677 14,640 13,203 11,510 9,147
B. 9th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 3.025∗∗ 2.687∗∗ 2.350∗∗ 2.139∗∗ 1.667∗∗ 0.476 0.658 0.896 1.537
(0.468) (0.442) (0.428) (0.435) (0.468) (0.559) (0.695) (0.898) (1.016)
F 41.78 36.94 30.21 24.19 12.71 0.72 0.90 1.00 2.29
Districts 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,821 2,816
N 22,342 22,130 21,751 20,108 18,643 16,918 14,885 12,683 10,011
C. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 3.198∗∗ 2.753∗∗ 2.318∗∗ 1.853∗∗ 0.956∗ 0.400 0.834 1.000 2.055∗
(0.426) (0.419) (0.443) (0.456) (0.475) (0.541) (0.656) (0.901) (1.016)
F 56.48 43.13 27.39 16.52 4.06 0.55 1.62 1.23 4.09
Districts 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,822 2,817
N 23,457 23,082 21,468 19,863 18,063 16,449 14,593 12,633 9,969
D. 11th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 3.224∗∗ 2.704∗∗ 2.346∗∗ 1.876∗∗ 1.000+ 0.456 0.857 1.430 2.181∗
(0.413) (0.423) (0.431) (0.491) (0.542) (0.650) (0.755) (0.915) (1.082)
F 60.97 40.83 29.66 14.62 3.40 0.49 1.29 2.44 4.06
Districts 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,820 2,815 2,815 2,813 2,812 2,798
N 22,227 20,606 19,049 17,194 15,357 14,431 13,327 12,089 9,540
Notes: This table reports the results of individual first stage regressions of per-pupil
total expenditures on log simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with non-
missing graduation rates. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: First stage estimates of simulated revenue ($1,000 per pupil) on total
expenditure ($1,000 per pupil) for test score samples – individual year
lags
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. SEDA 4th Grade Math Scores
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 1.053+ 0.561 -0.157 1.010+ 1.830∗∗ 1.877∗∗ 2.235∗∗ 1.977∗∗ 0.970∗
(0.552) (0.549) (0.609) (0.597) (0.494) (0.444) (0.404) (0.480) (0.480)
F 3.65 1.04 0.07 2.86 13.73 17.91 30.57 16.94 4.08
Districts 5,780 5,780 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781 5,781
N 26,501 26,501 26,502 26,503 26,504 26,505 26,506 26,506 26,506
B. SEDA 4th Grade Reading Scores
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 1.190∗ 0.575 -0.125 1.053+ 2.001∗∗ 1.970∗∗ 2.245∗∗ 2.020∗∗ 0.964∗
(0.531) (0.548) (0.610) (0.596) (0.489) (0.441) (0.406) (0.473) (0.479)
F 5.01 1.10 0.04 3.12 16.74 19.95 30.64 18.20 4.05
Districts 5,778 5,778 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779 5,779
N 26,511 26,511 26,512 26,513 26,514 26,515 26,516 26,516 26,516
C. SEDA 8th Grade Math Scores
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 0.776 0.675 0.768 0.797 1.372∗∗ 0.912∗ 1.567∗∗ 1.832∗∗ 0.900+
(0.526) (0.574) (0.640) (0.640) (0.493) (0.431) (0.435) (0.550) (0.526)
F 2.18 1.38 1.44 1.55 7.76 4.48 12.95 11.11 2.93
Districts 5,787 5,787 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788 5,788
N 24,741 24,741 24,742 24,743 24,744 24,745 24,745 24,745 24,745
D. SEDA 8th Grade Reading Scores
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 1.129∗ 0.672 0.236 1.048+ 1.906∗∗ 1.827∗∗ 2.182∗∗ 1.985∗∗ 0.996∗
(0.520) (0.564) (0.605) (0.596) (0.474) (0.423) (0.405) (0.479) (0.476)
F 4.70 1.42 0.15 3.10 16.18 18.68 29.09 17.15 4.38
Districts 5,801 5,801 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802 5,802
N 26,599 26,599 26,600 26,601 26,602 26,603 26,604 26,604 26,604
Notes: This table reports the results of individual first stage regressions of per-pupil
total expenditures on log simulated revenue with the same lag for samples with
non-missing test scores. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: First stage estimates in $1,000 per pupil
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 year 1-4 years 1-8 years 5-8 years
A. 8th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 0.010∗∗ 0.008+ 0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
F 5.87 3.43 0.90 0.26
Districts 2,885 2,881 2,820 2,821
N 18,610 16,570 9,552 9,553
B. 9th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 0.008∗ 0.009∗ 0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
F 5.23 4.64 1.12 0.05
Districts 2,988 2,988 2,977 2,978
N 23,567 19,655 10,468 10,470
C. 10th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.002 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
F 5.80 4.54 0.26 0.41
Districts 2,988 2,987 2,979 2,980
N 24,538 19,082 10,440 10,442
D. 11th Grade Graduation Cohort Sample
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 0.008∗∗ 0.007+ 0.002 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
F 5.80 2.72 0.44 0.75
Districts 2,986 2,978 2,960 2,961
N 22,005 16,337 10,004 10,006
E. SEDA Test Score Sample
Per-pupil Sim. Rev. 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
F 0.00 0.48 0.61 0.02
Districts 5,951 5,951 5,951 5,952
N 25,534 25,534 25,534 25,538
Notes: This table reports the results of first stage regressions of total expenditures
on simulated revenue averaged over various previous years. Column (1) is the current
and previous year, column (2) is the current through past 4 years, column (3) is the
past 8 years, and column (4) is from 5 to 8 years prior to the measured outcome.
Models also include controls for property wealth, median household income, frac-
tion black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: + p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on graduation
rates
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. 8th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.008 0.004 -0.011 0.000 -0.021 -0.048 -0.018
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.028) (0.102) (0.021)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79
First-stage F 74.03 49.48 47.42 36.19 35.20 11.19 3.25 0.33 3.98
Districts 2,676 2,676 2,675 2,669 2,660 2,656 2,636 2,608 2,535
N 17,419 17,419 17,228 16,915 15,617 14,580 13,131 11,430 9,014
B. 9th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.031 -0.036 -0.033
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
First-stage F 71.94 61.67 52.80 44.33 27.11 5.46 4.43 2.89 4.17
Districts 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,818 2,815 2,808 2,802 2,758
N 22,340 22,128 21,749 20,106 18,636 16,908 14,868 12,664 9,953
C. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.005 0.009 0.011 0.018 -0.011 -0.029 -0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81
First-stage F 99.92 74.71 47.84 32.36 13.71 4.97 5.70 3.26 6.63
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,822 2,822 2,818 2,804 2,773
N 23,456 23,081 21,467 19,862 18,060 16,446 14,586 12,615 9,925
D. 11th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.009∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.012 -0.009 -0.029∗ -0.022
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86
First-stage F 110.92 70.80 50.31 28.89 11.32 3.51 4.48 5.03 6.43
Districts 2,820 2,819 2,815 2,810 2,803 2,794 2,786 2,773 2,722
N 22,224 20,602 19,041 17,184 15,345 14,410 13,300 12,050 9,464
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of graduation rates on individually lagged per-pupil total expenditures instrumented
with individually lagged log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for dis-
trict property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who are black,
fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced
price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
172
Table A.12: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on graduation
rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
8th Grade Cohort 9th Grade Cohort 10th Grade Cohort 11th Grade Cohort
1 year 1-4 years 1 year 1-4 years 1 year 1-4 years 1 year 1-4 years
Spending ($1,000s per pupil) 0.028∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.85
First-stage F 70.42 85.94 72.96 79.86 83.60 67.40 80.64 55.29
Districts 2,676 2,660 2,823 2,817 2,824 2,821 2,819 2,802
N 17,419 15,616 22,128 18,633 23,081 18,058 20,602 15,342
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of graduation rates on lagged per-pupil total expenditures instrumented with lagged
log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.13: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on test scores
τ = 0 τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4 τ = 5 τ = 6 τ = 7 τ = 8
A. SEDA 4th Grade Math Scores
Spending ($1,000s PP) -0.176 -0.081 -0.675 0.064 0.073 0.096∗ 0.065+ 0.093+ 0.164
(0.133) (0.148) (2.695) (0.103) (0.050) (0.047) (0.035) (0.050) (0.122)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
First-stage F 5.09 2.13 0.07 2.98 13.89 18.29 31.05 17.20 4.29
Districts 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,664 5,664 5,664 5,664 5,664 5,664
N 26,384 26,384 26,384 26,386 26,387 26,388 26,389 26,389 26,389
B. SEDA 4th Grade Reading Scores
Spending ($1,000s PP) -0.071 -0.182 -1.179 0.083 0.115∗ 0.087∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.132
(0.092) (0.170) (5.704) (0.101) (0.050) (0.042) (0.034) (0.047) (0.105)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
First-stage F 6.75 2.21 0.04 3.24 16.92 20.35 31.12 18.48 4.26
Districts 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661 5,661
N 26,393 26,393 26,393 26,395 26,396 26,397 26,398 26,398 26,398
C. SEDA 8th Grade Math Scores
Spending ($1,000s PP) -0.016 0.100 0.190 0.297 0.158∗ 0.251+ 0.102∗ 0.079+ 0.003
(0.125) (0.125) (0.219) (0.255) (0.076) (0.135) (0.049) (0.048) (0.079)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
First-stage F 3.49 2.63 1.44 1.65 7.90 4.73 13.30 11.33 3.12
Districts 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643 5,643
N 24,596 24,596 24,596 24,598 24,599 24,600 24,600 24,600 24,600
D. SEDA 8th Grade Reading Scores
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.060 0.122 -0.245 0.026 0.060 0.053 0.052+ 0.069+ 0.047
(0.095) (0.141) (0.761) (0.079) (0.037) (0.038) (0.029) (0.041) (0.081)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
First-stage F 6.40 2.60 0.15 3.22 16.35 19.08 29.56 17.41 4.60
Districts 5,673 5,673 5,673 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674
N 26,471 26,471 26,471 26,473 26,474 26,475 26,476 26,476 26,476
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of SEDA test scores on individually lagged per-pupil total expenditures instrumented
with individually lagged log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for dis-
trict property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who are black,
fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced
price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on test scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4th Grade 8th Grade
Math Reading Math Reading
A. SEDA Test Scores
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.091∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.057+
(0.042) (0.038) (0.052) (0.034
First-stage F 46.12 49.28 21.80 45.64
Districts 5,664 5,661 5,643 5,674
N 26,388 26,397 24,600 26,475
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of SEDA test scores on lagged per-pupil total expenditures instrumented with lagged
log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.15: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending on instructional ex-
penditure sub-categories – Graduation Rate sample, one-year lag
A. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instructional Teacher Salaries Instructional
Salaries Regular Special Vocational Other Benefits
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.277∗∗ 0.559∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.030) (0.063) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014)
Dep. Var. Mean 3.92 1.49 0.29 0.05 0.07 1.174
Baseline Fraction 0.32 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.094
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081
B. SEDA Test Score Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instructional Teacher Salaries Instructional
Salaries Regular Special Vocational Other Benefits
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.415∗∗ 0.941∗∗ 0.206∗∗ -0.028∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.086) (0.202) (0.046) (0.007) (0.011) (0.034)
Dep. Var. Mean 3.88 1.69 0.32 0.05 0.07 1.155
Baseline Fraction 0.34 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.117
First-stage F 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of per-pupil instructional expenditure sub-categories on lagged per-pupil total ex-
penditures instrumented with lagged log simulated revenue. Models also include
controls for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students
who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free
or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.16: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on support ser-
vice expenditure sub-categories
A. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pupil Staff General School Operations &
Support Support Admin. Admin. Maintenance Transportation Other
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.058∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.49 0.38 0.24 0.49 0.87 0.426 0.246
Baseline Fraction 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.034 0.020
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081
B. SEDA Test Score Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pupil Staff General School Operations &
Support Support Admin. Admin. Maintenance Transportation Other
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.074∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.46 0.36 0.30 0.48 0.87 0.444 0.234
Baseline Fraction 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.041 0.024
First-stage F 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of per-pupil support service expenditure sub-categories on lagged per-pupil total
expenditures instrumented with lagged log simulated revenue. Models also include
controls for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students
who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free
or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.17: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on capital ex-
penditure sub-categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Graduate Rates SEDA Test Scores
New Instructional Other Nonspecified New Instructional Other Nonspecified
Construction Land Equipment Equipment Equipment Construction Land Equipment Equipment Equipment
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.234∗∗ 0.012 0.006∗ 0.004 0.0000 0.251∗∗ -0.024 0.013∗∗ -0.006 0.0016
(0.049) (0.015) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.087) (0.031) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.79 0.063 0.057 0.13 0.011 0.79 0.056 0.058 0.13 0.011
Baseline Fraction 0.05 0.004 0.005 0.01 0.001 0.05 0.004 0.005 0.01 0.001
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of per-pupil capital expenditure sub-categories on lagged per-pupil total expendi-
tures instrumented with lagged log simulated revenue. Models also include controls
for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who are
black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or re-
duced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.18: Two-stage least squares estimates of per-pupil spending on other current
expenditure sub-categories
A. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food Enterprise Other Community Adult Other Non-
Services Operations Elem/Sec Services Education Elem/Sec
Spending ($1,000s PP) 0.012∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.042∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.35 0.021 0.0026 0.031 0.017 0.010
Baseline Fraction 0.03 0.002 0.0002 0.003 0.001 0.001
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081
B. SEDA Test Score Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food Enterprise Other Community Adult Other Non-
Services Operations Elem/Sec Services Education Elem/Sec
Spending ($1,000s PP) -0.019∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002 0.003 -0.005+ 0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.34 0.025 0.0028 0.029 0.015 0.005
Baseline Fraction 0.03 0.002 0.0001 0.002 0.001 0.001
First-stage F 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42 21.42
Districts 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527 5,527
N 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006 24,006
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of per-pupil other current expenditure sub-categories on lagged per-pupil total ex-
penditures instrumented with lagged log simulated revenue. Models also include
controls for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students
who are black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free
or reduced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.19: Two-stage least squares estimates of spending on teacher counts
A. 10th Grade Cohort Graduation Rate Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Teacher Total Library District School Student
Teachers Aides Counselors Specialists Admin. Admin. Support
Spending ($1,000s PP) -15.715∗∗ -2.259 -1.334∗∗ -0.054 -0.152 -2.033∗∗ -1.223
(6.687) (1.718) (0.509) (0.103) (0.223) (0.776) (1.284)
Dep. Var. Mean 337.38 70.186 11.6710 6.304 6.519 18.041 21.469
Baseline Fraction 28.29 6.01 0.99 0.54 0.56 1.56 1.84
First-stage F 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60 83.60
Districts 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824
N 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081 23,081
B. SEDA Test Score Sample
Notes: This table reports results from individual two-stage least squares regressions
of teacher counts on lagged per-pupil total expenditures instrumented with lagged
log simulated revenue. Models also include controls for district property wealth,
median household income, fraction of students who are black, fraction Hispanic,
fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or reduced price lunch, district
fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Table A.20: Two-stage least squares estimates of log spending, other specifications
A. National Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
10th Grade Graduation Rate Test Scores: 5 to 8 Year Lag
1-Year Lag G4 Math G4 Reading G8 Math G4 Reading
Log Spending 0.250∗∗ -4.973 -4.117 -11.836 -1.552
(0.077) (9.799) (8.195) (34.710) (5.915)
F 65.85 0.45 0.48 0.14 0.50
Districts 5,447 5,662 5,659 5,640 5,671
N 35,442 26,372 26,381 24,582 26,458
B. No Combined Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
10th Grade Graduation Rate Test Scores: 5 to 8 Year Lag
1-Year Lag G4 Math G4 Reading G8 Math G4 Reading
Log Spending 0.270∗∗ 0.636+ 0.706∗ 1.002∗∗ 0.593∗
(0.080) (0.345) (0.309) (0.411) (0.281)
F 76.60 176.59 178.50 95.19 173.59
Districts 2,628 5,224 5,221 5,197 5,229
N 21,444 24,428 24,437 22,647 24,475
C. No Combined Districts + No Sample Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
10th Grade Graduation Rate Test Scores: 5 to 8 Year Lag
1-Year Lag G4 Math G4 Reading G8 Math G4 Reading
Log Spending 0.290∗∗ 0.475 0.253 0.005 0.085
(0.085) (0.301) (0.240) (0.479) (0.220)
F 72.38 132.47 138.79 45.83 142.72
Districts 2,655 5,470 5,474 5,431 5,471
N 21,829 29,881 30,086 26,770 29,556
Notes: This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions of gradua-
tion rates and test scores on average lagged log total expenditures instrumented with
log simulated revenue, averaged over the same years. Models also include controls
for district property wealth, median household income, fraction of students who are
black, fraction Hispanic, fraction special education, fraction eligible for free or re-
duced price lunch, district fixed effects, and state-by-year fixed effects. All covariates
are interacted with an indicator equal to 1 if the fraction of students in the district
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch is in the top quartile for their state. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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A.2 Online Appendix - State Administrative Data
This section outlines the data sources for property values from each state.
A.2.1 Arkansas
Tables with assessed valuation, tax rate, and taxes levied by class of property for
counties, cities, and school districts are available from the Arkansas Assessment
Coordination Department.1 School district-level values are available from 1995-2010,
but they have not compiled school district-level values since 2010. The assessment
rate for real property in Arkansas is 0.2, so my measure of market values is the
assessed value multiplied by 5.
A.2.2 Connecticut
The Connecticut Office of Policy and Management (OPM) publishes excel sheets of
the grand list by town on their website. The description from the website reads:
“The Office of Policy and Management annually develops the full-value estimate
of all taxable property within the 169 towns and cities. A ratio of assessment to
market value is calculated from real estate sales occurring within each town and city.
A separate ratio and full-value estimate is listed for four property types: residential,
apartment, commercial/industrial/public utility and vacant land.” Thus, the net
grand list is the value determined by the assessors and the net equalized grant list
corrects any inconsistencies in the assessment process to arrive at their best estimate
1http://www.arkansas.gov/acd/statewide_values_rates_assessed_values.html
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of the market value in that town or city. The net equalized grand list subtracts out
exemptions, so the full market value is the gross equalized grand list. This is readily
available in the Total Grand List files, which are available for 1995-2012 because they
also report the equalized value of exemptions. I only require the accurate levels of
property values in the base year, so I use the 2013 and 2014 data to calculate the
state-level changes in property wealth from the net equalized grand list to supplement
the information from the gross equalized grand list in prior years.
The towns and cities perfectly map into school district boundaries, with each
school district covering a set of towns and cities. Thus, I aggregate the city-level file
from the OPM to the school district level. Real property must be reevaluated once
every decade, and at that time, it is assessed at 70% of fair market value (FMV).
Personal property is also assessed at 70% of FMV, but this FMV is adjusted annually.
Property values are limited to changes of 5% between any two years.
A.2.3 Florida
The Florida Department of Revenue provides property tax data going back several
decades (historical data is available on their website: ftp://sdrftp03.dor.state.
fl.us/DataBooks). The data is part of the “Florida Ad Valorem Valuations and Tax
Data” series. Table 4 reports “just values” (their term for full market values) for real,
personal, and centrally assessed property combined. I use these just values as the
total property wealth in the county. School districts are coterminous with counties
so the county-level information is matched directly to school districts.
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A.2.4 Georgia
The Local Government Services Division of the Georgia Department of Revenue is
charged with ensuring that property taxes are assessed uniformly and administered
properly by each of the county tax officials. They provide a digest of property tax
values on their website.2 These digests include values for each class of property for
each county and independent school district.
A.2.5 Idaho
The Idaho State Department of Education has a report in their archives3 about
school district property taxes back to 1999. These reports include the market value
of property by school district, tax rates by purpose by school district, taxes levied by
purpose by school district. I match this market value of property directly to school
districts.
A.2.6 Illinois
The Illinois Department of Revenue publishes a report called “Illinois Property Tax
Statistics”, which is available on their website4 back to 1976. This report includes
the total equalized assessed value for each taxing district in Table 28. I apply the
inverse of the assessment rate to the assessed value to retrieve the total market value





school districts, which are then matched to the school district information from the
CCD.
A.2.7 Iowa
The Iowa Department of Management has information about school property taxes
back to 2003 on their website.5 The data includes net valuations by school dis-
trict (2001-2016), tax rates by purpose by school district (2001-2016), total levies
by school district (2003-2016), instructional support levies by school district (2003-
2016), physical plant and equipment levies by school district (2003-2016), tax rates
and revenue by county (2002-2016).
A.2.8 Kansas
The Kansas Department of Revenue produces an annual statistical report, which it
makes available on its website back to 2004. These reports include a summary report
of assessed property values by school district, compiled by the Division of Property
Valuation. These reports are available from 2001 to 2015, but the information re-
ported is from the previous year so corresponds to values from 2000-2014. Kansas
has three separate assessment rates for five classes of property. Residential property
is assessed at 11.5 percent of market value. Commercial real estate, motor vehicles,
and agricultural property are each assessed at 30 percent of market value. Com-
mercial equipment and machinery is assessed at 20 percent of market value. The
5http://www.dom.state.ia.us/local/schools/archive.html
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majority of property assessed is real property so I use the residential assessment rate
to convert the assessed values into approximate market values.
A.2.9 Kentucky
The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet releases state-level statistics on property tax rev-
enues annually. The Kentucky Department of Revenue Office of Property Valuation
has an archive of tax rates of each county by purpose (including education) and class,
and tax rates for each school district by class on their website6 back to 1999. On
the individual county information pages there is valuation information by county for
the whole state from 2005-2015, which was supplemented with years 1999-2004 by
contacting the department directly.
A.2.10 Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Department of Revenue publishes an annual report available on
their website7 back to 2003. This report includes statewide summaries of revenues
collected. The Division of Local Services has oversight of property taxation and mu-
nicipal finance. Their website8 also has a Municipal Databank with taxable values by
municipality (back to 1981), assessed values by class by municipality (back to 1981),







(back to 1986), and tax rate by class by municipality (back to 1981).
A.2.11 Minnesota
Each year, the Department of Revenue reports to the Legislature on property tax
values and assessment practices in Minnesota. Posted on their website9, these reports
analyze market trends, the effects of property tax laws and changes to them, and how
property values are assessed throughout the state. These reports were mandated by
the Legislature in 2001, and the first one was issued in 2003. These reports have
county by county market values by class and the last decade of changes to market
value compared to the statewide average.
A.2.12 Mississippi
The Mississippi State Tax Commission was restructured in 2010 to become the De-
partment of Revenue. The DOR presents an annual report of financial and statis-
tical data pertaining to tax collections in the state of Mississippi for the fiscal year
(July–June). The Department of Archives and History has electronic (PDF) reports
from 2003. These reports include the assessment of property by class by county (back




The Nevada Department of Taxation publishes an annual report available on their
website10 back to 2005 (state archive11 has reports back to 1998). These reports
include assessed value after exemptions by county (taxable value). There is an addi-
tional report on Property Tax Rates available on the website12 back to 1971. These
reports include assessed values and total property tax rates by taxing unit, combined
property tax rates by component by taxing unit (taxing units include counties, mu-
nicipalities, and school districts).
A.2.14 New Hampshire
The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration is statutorily required
to issue an Annual Report, which is available on their website13 back to 2002.
A.2.15 New Jersey
The State of New Jersey Department of Community Affairs has data available on
its website14 for 1998-2015. The property tax tables include taxable value, taxes
levied by purpose, and tax rates by purpose all by municipality. The Property Value
Classification tables include additional valuation details including residential values









The New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department releases “Property Tax Facts”,
which are available on their website15 back to 2004 (Economic and Statistical Infor-
mation/Property Tax Reports). These fact sheets include residential taxable values
and obligations by county (Table 1), property taxes by purpose by county (Table 4).
A.2.17 New York
The overall full-value tax rates are available by county on their website . The New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance has several annually published
reports regarding property taxes on their website.16 One of these reports is titled
“Exemptions from Real Property Taxation in New York State” and includes detailed
exemption data by county and municipality (back to 2000) including total equalized
value (Table B1).
Useful data is also available at data.ny.gov, including real property tax levy
data (back to 2004).
A.2.18 North Carolina
The North Carolina Department of Revenue makes several tables of statistics avail-
able on their website . These reports include effective tax rates for counties and





(back to 2003-2004 here ), property valuations by real, personal, and public service
by county (back to 1998-1999 here ). The North Carolina Department of State Trea-
surer also has reports on their website . These include assessed valuation, tax rate,
assessment ratio, effective tax rate by county and municipality back to 2000.
A.2.19 North Dakota
The North Dakota Office of State Tax Commissioner produces several major publi-
cations available on their website . These include the State and Local Taxes Guide
(biennially back to 1998) with general property taxes levied by county. Another
report titled Property Valuations and Property Taxes Levied in North Dakota/The
Property tax Statistical Report includes taxable valuation by class by county (Table
1), general and special property taxes levied by county by political subdivision (Ta-
ble 3 – includes school districts), property taxes levied by tax code by county (Table
4), taxes levied on classes of property by county (Table 5), and millage rates by tax
code by county (Table 7).
North Dakota has a 9 percent assessment rate on property. I use this to convert
the assessed values reported in the financial facts document to approximate market
values.
A.2.20 Ohio
The Ohio Department of Taxation makes data available on their website . These
data include taxable property values, taxes levied, and tax rates by school district
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(SD1, back to 1986); millage rates by school district (DTE27, back to 1994); assessed
value and taxes levied by county (PD 30, back to 1987); and taxable value of real
property by class by county (PD31, back to 1985).
A.2.21 Oklahoma
Oklahoma uses a range of assessment rates for multiple classes of property. The
assessment rate for real property varies between 11 percent and 13.5 percent. Per-
sonal property is assessed between 10 and 15 percent of market value. Public service
property is assessed at a fixed rate of 22.85 percent. I do not have information on
which assessment rate is used in each district. Thus, I use the lower bound of the
ranges of assessment rates when converting assessed values into approximate market
values.
A.2.22 Oregon
The Oregon Department of Revenue publishes an annual report titled Oregon Prop-
erty Tax Statistics, which is available on their website back to FY 1997-1998. These
reports include market and assessed value, taxes levied, and average tax rate by
county (all property, Table A.2); market value and assessed value by type (real, per-
sonal, etc.) by county (Table A.4); assessed value by class by county (Table B.4);
tax rates by type of taxing district by city (Table H); and tax rates by type of tax
by taxing district (including school districts, Appendix A).
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A.2.23 Texas
The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts Property Tax Division publishes an An-
nual Property Tax Report, which is available on their website back to 2003. These
reports have several tables of information including appraised values by category by
appraisal district (Appendix A); appraised values by category, millage rates, and
taxes levied by school district (Appendix B, I somehow have Appendix B for 2002
as well); appraised values by category, millage rates by purpose and associated taxes
levied by county (Appendix C). The key data comes from the School District Self-
Reports.
A.2.24 Washington
The Washington State Department of Revenue releases an annual Tax Statistics
report, which is archived on their website back to 1997. These are available as full
pdf reports back to 2006 and excel files of the tables are available from 2001-2015.
There is also a Property Tax Statistical Report available here back to 1998, with a
table of taxable value and levies due by school district (Part 3/Appendix C).
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A.3 Online Appendix - School Finance Formulas
This section outlines the school finance formulas for each state in my sample and
summarizes them as the tax price and wealth price as of 1999. It is helpful to establish
some notation used throughout this section. Here I will call `dt the district markup,
which is a multiplicative factor that encompasses statewide assessment ratios and
district-specific factors that determines the amount of revenue given property wealth
and the tax rate (e.g. fraction of homes receiving a homestead exemption, rates of
delinquent property tax payments, etc.) such that τ dt × `dtW dt = Ldt (τ dt ×W dt ).
A.3.1 Arkansas
Arkansas has a foundation program, which is distributed as State Equalization Fund-
ing per Student (SEFPS) and Additional Base Funding (ABF) (Ark. Stat. Ann.
§6-20-303). Every school district must tax itself 25 mills for Maintenance and Op-
eration and half the revenue from each additional mill above 25 is captured by the
state.
State Equalization Funding per Student (SEFPS) for each district is calculated
by subtracting each district’s local revenue per student (LRPS) from the basic local




− 0.98×(0.025×`dtW dt )+0.75×Misc.dt
ADMdt
,
where W st is the aggregate property assessment for the state, Misc.st is the aggregate
miscellaneous and other funds from state sources, and ADM st is the aggregate average
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daily membership for the state, and corresponding variables with a d superscript are
the same measures but at the district level.
Additional Base Funding (ABF) combines revenue sources on an ADM basis and
brings all school districts up to a minimum level of revenue per ADM. The revenues
included in the calculation of ABF are: Total Local M&O Revenue Available, State
Equalization Funding, General Facilities Funding, Student Growth Funding, and
Revenue Loss Funding. These revenue sources are totaled and divided by the ADM
of the district. Once the total state and local revenue per ADM is calculated, all
of the school districts are ranked from most revenue per ADM to the least revenue
per ADM. The revenue per ADM for the school district at the 95th percentile is
multiplied by 80% to arrive at the Minimum State and Local Revenue per ADM
(MSLR). Any school district whose revenue per ADM is less than the MSLR receives
ABF in the amount per ADM equal to the difference between the district’s revenue








× `dtW dt + Misc.dt
ADMdt
+ SEFPSdt
where here Misc.dt includes General Facilities Funding, Student Growth Funding, and
Revenue Loss Funding. The Minimum State and Local Revenue per ADM is














for all d ∈ D. Using these defini-
tions, the Additional Base Funding is







For my revenue functions, I omit miscellaneous revenues since they are unrelated
to property wealth and so will not effect the wealth price. Thus, local revenue is
Ldt =

τ dt × `dtW dt , if τ dt < 0.025
(0.5(τ dt − 0.025) + 0.025)× `dtW dt , if τ dt ≥ 0.025
state revenue is
Sdt = (ABF dt + SEFPSdt )× ADMdt
and total revenue is
Rdt = (0.5(τ dt − 0.025) + 0.025)× `dtW dt + (ABF dt + SEFPSdt )× ADMdt
The wealth price is then given by
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.025)× `dt
























School districts in Connecticut are financed by their townships instead of being in-
dependent taxing authorities. Thus, their finance system is quite simple. The state
determines how much money per weighted student the district should get, then de-
cides how much they will pay and how much needs to be covered by the town.
Townships set a single millage rate for all their local revenue, including for school
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districts, so it’s impossible to tell the effect of marginally increasing property tax
rates. Connecticut’s Education Cost Sharing (ECS) is a foundation-based equaliza-
tion formula that distributes aid based on the extent to which local town wealth falls
short of a statutorily set State Guaranteed Wealth Level (SGWL).
The unit of allocation of the ECS is “need students” Student counts are weighted
as follows to arrive at total need students. The resident student count of each town
(ADM) is the number of children educated at the expense of the town in public
schools or in other placements prescribed and paid for by the town. A full-time
equivalent count (FTE) is added to the resident student count if a district operates
either a system-wide calendar in excess of 180 days (the legal minimum) or a free
summer school program or both. Additional weights include 25% for students in
families eligible for TANF, 10% for students with limited English proficiency (LEP),
and 25% for students at remedial education levels (Remedial). Need students can
then be defined as
NSdt = ADMdt + FTEdt + 0.25× TANF dt + 0.1× LEP dt + 0.25×Remedialdt .
Local fiscal capacity is determined by town wealth per student. The ECS defi-
nition of town wealth begins with each town’s Equalized Net Grand List (ENGL).
ENGL per pupil is then adjusted based on the average ratio of each town’s per capita
income (PCI) and median household income (MHI) to the highest town’s PCI and













AdjW dt is then divided by need students and by populations and the average of these
196
two is the town’s unit value of equalized taxable property wealth. Equalized wealth
is given by the average of adjusted wealth divided by need students and adjusted












Each town’s equalized wealth is compared to 1.55 times the median town’s wealth,
which is called the state guaranteed wealth level (SGWL). Specifically,
SGWLt = 1.55×mediani∈D{EW it }
A town’s ability to pay is reflected by its wealth as a fraction of the SGWL. Towns
with local resources equal to or above the SGWL receive a base aid percentage of
zero. All others receive the difference between 100% and the percentage they are able
to fund based on the fraction described above. This percentage is then multiplied
times the town’s total foundation which is the product of the foundation and the





The foundation for 1998-99 is set by statute at $5,775 per need student. This
makes the local revenue function
Ldt = `dt τ dtW dt










and total revenue is








The wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt

















and the tax price is unclear because there is no separate tax rate for education.
A.3.3 Florida
The Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP) is a highly-modified foundation
plan laid out in Florida Statute §236.081. Funds are distributed based on weighted
full time equivalents (WFTE) multiplied by the foundation amount (called the base
student allocation or BSA) and the District Cost Differential (DCD). A number of
other funds are included such as the Declining Enrollment Supplement, the Spar-
sity Supplement, Discretionary Tax Equalization, the Safe Schools Allocation, the
Remediation Reduction Incentive, the Dropout Prevention Incentive, the Disparity
Compression Adjustment, and the Hold Harmless Adjustment. Only the Sparsity
Supplement and Discretionary Tax Equalization interact with W dt so I omit the
other items.
The foundation tax rate is called Required Local Effort Millage (RLE Millagedt )
and is set at 6.509 mills, then adjusted by an equalization factor for each district.
This equalization factor is based on the relative amount of property wealth in the
district compared to the rest of the state.
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WFTE is calculated using the program cost factors outlined in Table A.21. Using
these cost factors WFTE is
WFTEdt = 1.057× FTEk−3t + FTE4−8t + 1.138× FTE9−12 + 1.201× ESOLt
+ 1.240× V OCt + 1.341× SL1t + 2.072× SL2t + 3.287× SL3t
+ 4.101× SL4t + 6.860× SL5t
Table A.21: Florida Pupil Weights
Group Weight
Basic Programs
Kindergarten and Grades 1, 2, and 3 1.057
Grades 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 1.000
Grades 9, 10, 11, and 12 1.138
Programs for At-Risk Students
Dropout Prevention and Teenage Parent 1.399
Educational Alternatives, Grades 9–12 1.138
Intensive English/ESOL 1.201
Exceptional Student Programs
Support Level 1 1.341
Support Level 2 2.072
Support Level 3 3.287
Support Level 4 4.101
Support Level 5 6.860
Vocational Education, Grades 6–12 1.240
The district cost differential (DCD) adjusts the foundation level based on an
average of the previous three years of the Florida Price Level Index (FPLI) as follows:
DCDdt = 0.008×
FPLIdt + FPLIdt−1 + FPLIdt−2
3 + 0.2.
In 1998-99, DCDdt ranged from .9103 to 1.0751.
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Districts may levy up to 0.76 mills above the foundation tax rate (0.51 mills of
discretionary current operation millage and 0.25 under the discretionary tax equal-
ization program). The Discretionary Tax Equalization (DTE) portion of the funding
formula provides the difference between $50 per WFTEdt and what the district gen-
erates with the last 0.25 mills. Thus, DTE is given by
DTEdt = max
{
0, 50×WFTEdt − .00025× `dtW dt
}
.
Districts with fewer than three high schools, an unweighted FTE of 20,000 or








7,308, are eligible for the Sparsity Supplement (SSdt ). If the district’s maximum
discretionary levy (revenue generated by applying the maximum discretionary mil-
lage rate to the taxable value in the district) is above the state average, then SSdt
is reduced by the amount by it exceeds the state average multiplied by FTEdt . This
gives


















In 1998-1999 the base student allocation (foundation level) was set at $3,214.20.
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is







and total revenue is











































and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.4 Georgia
The Quality Basic Education Act (QBE) program is a foundation program with
a guaranteed yield equalization component established in GA. CODE §20-2-160.
The foundation level was set at $2,038.74 per weighted student. The local share is
determined by the foundation tax rate of 5 mills or the equivalent amount of revenue.
Funds are assigned based on weighted full time equivalent (wFTE) pupils, which are
calculated by applying the weights from Table A.22 to student counts.17 Using these
weights gives
wFTEdt = 1.3286× FTEKt + 1.2432× FTE1−3t + 1.0197× FTE4−5t + 1.0242× FTE6−8t + FTE9−12t .
There are also additional program weights for students attending programs for which
I do not have data, so I leave them out of my calculations.
In addition to foundation aid, the state provides guaranteed yield funding (GY )
which equalizes up to 3.25 mills that are levied above the required five mills. The
equalization is based on the difference between what the local district generates by
17These weights were put in place in 1995-1996 and I am unable to find a record of them being
changed before 1998-1999. Even if they were changed, the changes are likely to be minor.
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Table A.22: Georgia Pupil Weights
Program Weight
Kindergarten program 1.3286
Primary grades program (1-3) 1.2432
Upper elementary grades program (4-5) 1.0197
Middle grades program (6-8) 1.0242
High school general education program (9-12) 1.000
High school non-vocational laboratory program (9-12) 1.2428
Vocational laboratory program (9-12) 1.3557




levying the 3.25 mills and what is generated by the local district at the 90th percentile
in property wealth per pupil (W 90, including the district markup)


















Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is





W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and τ dt > 8.251000
(τ dt − 0.005)×
(
W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000
0 if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t
,
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and total revenue is





W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and τ dt > 8.251000
(τ dt − 0.005)×
(
W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000
0 if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t .





(τ dt − 0.00825)× `dt if `dtW dt < W 90t and τ dt > 8.251000
0 if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000(
τ dt − 0.005
)
× `dt if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t












W 90t − `dtW dt
)
if `dtW dt < W 90t and 51000 ≤ τ dt ≤ 8.251000
`dtW
d
t if `dtW dt ≥ W 90t .
A.3.5 Idaho
The Idaho Public School Foundation Program (PSFP) assures each district an equal
dollar amount per “support unit” made up of state and local funds. Support units
are a weighted student count that is intended to measure the number of teachers
required to teach the population of students in the district. The distribution factor
is the amount guaranteed per support unit and was $20,758.63 in 1998-1999. The
local share is the amount of property tax revenue generated by 3 mills.
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Support units are determined by counts of students in kindergarten, elemen-
tary, secondary, “exceptional” education, and alternative schools. I lack data on
exceptional education and alternative school counts so I omit those counts from my
calculations. The divisors for converting student counts into support units are given
in Table A.23. Using these values gives
Support Unitsdt = min{UKt , ADAKt ×DKt }
+ min{U1−6t , ADA1−6t ×D1−6t }
+ min{U7−12t , ADA7−12t ×D7−12t }
where Djt is the divisor for group j and U jt are the maximum units allowed, as given
in the table.
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $20, 758.63× Support Unitsdt − 0.003× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $20, 758.63× Support Unitsdt + (τ dt − 0.003)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.003)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
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Table A.23: Idaho Support Unit Weights
ADA Attendance Divisor Maximum Units Allowed
K Support Units
41 or more 40 1 or more as computed
31 to 40.99 - 1
26 to 30.99 - 0.85
21 to 25.99 - 0.75
16 to 20.99 - 0.6
8 to 15.99 - 0.5
1 to 7.99 - count as elementary
Elementary Support Units
300 or more 23 (Grades 4, 5, 6) 15
20 (Grades 1, 2, 3)
160 to 299.99 20 8.4
110 to 159.99 19 6.8
71.1 to 109.99 16 4.7
51.7 to 71.0 15 4.0
33.6 to 51.6 13 2.8
16.6 to 33.5 12 1.4
1.0 to 16.5 N/A 1.0
Secondary Support Units
750 or more 18.5 47
400 to 749.99 16 28
300 to 399.99 14.5 22
200 to 299.99 13.5 17
100 to 199.99 12 9
99.99 or fewer
Grades 7-12 - 8
Grades 9-12 - 6
Grades 7-9 - 1 per 14 ADA
Grades 7-8 - 1 per 16 ADA
A.3.6 Illinois
General State Aid (Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/18-8.05) is distributed under one of
three formulas: Foundation, Alternate Method, and Flat Grant. The formula that
applies to a given school district is determined by its property wealth. The state aid
formula compares the district equalized assessed value (EAV) per pupil to a “state
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guaranteed wealth per pupil.” The state guaranteed level (GL) also varies by the
type of school district. For 1998-1999 the state guaranteed wealth per ADA pupil
was:
• $188,478 for elementary districts
• $361,250 for secondary districts
• $144,500 for unit (k-12) districts
Districts qualify for one of three formulas determined by EAV per pupil as follows:







WG2 0.93×GL < `dtW dt
ADAdt
< 1.75×GL Alternate
WG3 1.75×GL < `dtW dt
ADAdt
Flat Grant
The foundation level in 1998-1999 was $4,225 per pupil. The local share is revenue
generated by the foundation tax rate, which depends on the type of school district.
The foundation tax rate is 2.3 mills for elementary districts, 1.2 mills for secondary
districts, and 3 mills for unit districts. The alternative plan also uses the foundation
level and local share as defined in the foundation plan, but under the following
formula:











The flat grant formula only depends on student counts as follows:
218× ADAdt .
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Local revenue is given by




$4, 225× ADAdt − (I{e} × 0.023 + I{s} × 0.012 + I{u} × 0.03)× `dtW dt if WG1











$218× ADAdt if WG3
,
where I{e} indicates elementary district, I{s} indicates secondary district, I{u} indi-




$4, 225× ADAdt + (τ dt − (I{e} × 0.023 + I{s} × 0.012 + I{u} × 0.03))× `dtW dt if WG1










+ τ dt × `dtW dt if WG2
$218× ADAdt + τ dt × `dtW dt if WG3
.





(τ dt − (I{e} × 0.023 + I{s} × 0.012 + I{u} × 0.03))× `dt if WG1
(τ dt − (I{e} × 0.023 + I{s} × 0.012 + I{u} × 0.03)× 0.020.82)× `dt if WG2
τ dt × `dt if WG3
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.7 Iowa
Iowa has a foundation plan with an additional discretionary tier with state matching
defined in statute as the School Foundation Program (1999 Code of Iowa Ch. 257).
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The foundation tax rate is 5.4 mills. Spending is dictated by the district cost per
pupil (DCPP) and state cost per pupil (SCPP). The foundation level is 87.5 percent
of the state cost per pupil, which increases by a predetermined rate each year. The
district cost per pupil is a district-specific measure that also grows at the same rate
per year. Districts are also guaranteed $300 per student in state aid, regardless of
their local share dictated by the foundation tax rate.
Funds are dispersed based on weighted enrollment, which is a weighted sum of
students in various programs and categories. The data for counts of students in these
programs is not available historically so I use a measure of total enrollment.
Under the second tier, districts may increase their budgets by up to 10% through
an “instructional support” levy. The instructional support levy is a percentage equal-
izing plan with the state participation at 25% for an average wealth district. Second
tier funding is thus given by
Second Tierdt =














Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = max{300× ADMdt , 0.875× SCPPt × ADMdt − 0.0054× `dtW dt + Second Tierdt },
and total revenue is
Rdt = max{300× ADMdt , 0.875× SCPPt × ADMdt + Second Tierdt + (τ dt − 0.0054)× `dtW dt }.
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< τ dt .
A.3.8 Kansas
Kansas has a foundation program that includes weights for certain programs and
low enrollments as well as a discretionary tier called the local option budget (LOB)
(K.S.A. §72-64, 1998). There are also additional categorical funds that I do not
include in my calculations. Funds are distributed based on full time equivalent
(FTE) student counts. The 1998-1999 foundation level was $3,720 per weighted FTE.
Student counts are adjusted by various factors to create Weighted FTE (wFTE). The
only factor for which data is available is students eligible for free or reduced price
lunch, which get an additional weight of 0.08, thus I define wFTE as
wFTEdt = FTEdt + 0.08× FTEFRPLt .
Local effort is determined by the revenue from the foundation tax rate of 20 mills
and other revenues.
The local option budget is comprised of funds raised above 20 mill foundation
tax rate and state matching funds based on assessed values per pupil. LOB can be
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P75(`dtW dt /FTEdt )
)
× LOBdt
where P75(`dtW dt /FTEdt ) is the 75th percentile of assessed value per pupil across
districts in the state.
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $3, 720× wFTEdt − 0.02× `dtW dt + State Sharedt ×max{0, τ dt − 0.02} × `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $3, 720×wFTEdt +(τ dt −0.02)×`dtW dt +State Sharedt×max{0, τ dt −0.02}×`dtW dt .












P75(`dtW dt /FTEdt )
)
× (τ dt − 0.02)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt











The Support Education Excellence in Kentucky (SEEK) funding program is a mod-
ified foundation program that includes an additional equalization component. The
foundation tax rate is 3 mills and the foundation level is $2,839 per pupil in weighted
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average daily attendance from the previous year.18 The equalization component al-
lows districts to generate additional revenue up to 15% of the foundation guarantee.
Local effort is equalized at 150% of the state-wide average of assessed property value
per pupil. The final tier allows districts to generate up to 30% above the combination
of foundation guarantee and equalized funds and is not equalized.
Funding is based on the prior year (t−1) number of students in weighted average
daily attendance (wADAdt ). Using the weights in Table A.24 gives
wADAdt = ADAdt−1 + 0.15× ADMFRPLt−1 + 2.35× ADMSeveret−1 + 1.17× ADMModeratet−1
+ 0.24× ADMSpeecht−1 + ADMHHt−1 .
Table A.24: Kentucky Pupil Weighted Factors
Group Notation Weight
At-Risk (FRPL-Eligible) ADMFRPLt 0.15
Severe Handicap ADMSeveret 2.35
Moderate Handicap ADMModeratet 1.17
Speech Therapy ADMSpeecht 0.24
Home & Hospital ADMHHt 1.00
State equalizing funds are given by
Tier 1dt = wADAdt
×




































18$2,839 in 1998-99 amounts to $3,979.09 in 2013 dollars.
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Local revenue is given by
τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $3, 979.09× wADAdt + Tier 1dt − 0.003× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $3, 979.09× wADAdt + Tier 1dt + (τ dt − 0.003)× `dtW dt .


















































































Massachusetts has a foundation program referred to as Chapter 70 state aid, which
was created by the Education Reform Act of 1993. The foundation amount for 1998-
1999 was set at $6,442 per pupil. A complicated formula with over 35 variables
determines how this foundation amount should be adjusted based on student char-
acteristics and the amount of required local contribution. For now, I assign the same
foundation level for each district and assign a foundation tax rate of 9.4 mills.
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Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $6, 442× ADMdt − 0.0094× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $6, 442× ADMdt + (τ dt − 0.0094)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.0094)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.11 Minnesota
Minnesota has a foundation program, known as the General Education Revenue
program (Minnesota Statue 126C)19. Funds are allocated based on pupil units, which
is a measure of weighted student counts. This weighted student count is
wADMdt = 0.53× ADMKt + 1.06× ADM1−6t + 1.3× ADM7−12t + ADMD
where ADMKt is the number of kindergarten students without an IEP, ADM1−6t is
the number of students in 1st through 6th grade, ADM7−12t is the number of students
19Full statutes are available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=126C&year=1998.
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in 7th through 12th grade, and ADMDt is the number of pre-k and kindergarten
students with a disability.
The majority of formula-based revenue is assigned through Basic Revenue, which
is
Basic Revenuedt = $3, 530× wADMdt .
The remaining components of general education revenue are either categorical grants
or based solely on student counts in particular programs. Because basic revenue ac-
counts for about 77.7% of formula-based revenue, I estimate total General Education
Revenue by dividing basic revenue by 0.777. The foundation tax rate for 1998-1999
was 0.369. If a district raises more local revenue than what is guaranteed by general
education revenue, then the general education tax rate is reduced to the rate that
generates exactly the guarantee. Districts can raise more than the foundation level
and receive state funds to guarantee $9,039 per weighted pupil on the first $315 per
weighted pupil above the foundation level.
Local revenue is given by





0.777 − 0.369× `dtW dt + (τ dt − 0.369)×max
{
0, 9039− `dtW dt
wADMdt
}
if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt ≤ 315× wADMdt
$3,530×wADMdt
0.777 − 0.369× `dtW dt if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt > 315× wADMdt












0, 9039− `dtW dt
wADMdt
})




t − 0.369)× `dtW dt if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt > 315× wADMdt
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if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt ≤ 315× wADMdt
(τ dt − 0.369)× `dt if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt > 315× wADMdt










0, 9039− `dtW dt
wADMdt
})
if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt ≤ 315× wADMdt
`dtW
d
t if (τ dt − 0.369)× `dtW dt > 315× wADMdt
.
A.3.12 Mississippi
State aid to school districts in Mississippi is described by the Mississippi Adequate
Education Program (Miss. Stat. §37-151-7) operates like a guaranteed yield plan.
The Base Student Cost (BSC) is calculated based on the funding of schools with an
adequate proficiency rating as a baseline. In 1998-1999, the BSC was $2,787. The
guaranteed funding for each district, known as the Adequate Education Program
Cost (AEPC), is
AEPCdt = BSCt × (ADMdt + 0.05× Free-Lunchdt ) + Add-onsdt
where Free-Lunchdt is the number of students participating in the Free Lunch Pro-
gram and Add-onsdt is the sum of 8 categorical grants for transportation, voca-
tional/technical education, special education, gifted education, alternative school
programs, extended school year programs, university-based programs, and bus drive
training programs. To participate in the MAEP and receive state aid, districts must
provide revenue from levying 28 mills of local property tax or 27 percent of the
AEPCdt , whichever is less.
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The add-on grants are unrelated to district wealth and tax rates, so I do not
include them in my formulas. Local revenue is
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $2, 787× (ADMdt + 0.05× Free-Lunchdt )−min
{
0.028× `dtW dt , 0.27× $2, 787× ADMdt
}
,
and total revenue is
Rdt = τ dt × `dtW dt + $2, 787× (ADMdt + 0.05× Free-Lunchdt )−min
{
0.028× `dtW dt , 0.27× $2, 787× ADMdt
}
.
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.028)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.13 Nevada
The Nevada Plan is a minimum foundation program that provides guaranteed fund-
ing per weighted pupil (NEV. REV. STATE. § 387.121). The amount of the guar-
antee, called the basic support guarantee, is adjusted for each district based on a
number of factors. The average basic support guarantee was $3,802 in 1999-2000 (the
earliest year available). State financial aid to school districts equals the difference
between school district basic support guarantee and local available funds produced
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by mandatory taxes. Nevada has a 2.25% local sales tax that funds about half of
the total guarantee. I treat this as additional state revenue transferred to districts.
The local share of property tax accounts for less than 10 percent of the guarantee,
but districts raise twice as much money as that local share as part of the mandatory
0.0075 levy.
The state also provides a set amount of special education funding each year. For
example, in 1998-1999, 2,088 units were funded by the Legislature at $28,248 per
unit for a total appropriation of $58,981,824. These per-unit funds are not enough
to cover the full cost of the special education program unit and there may be more
units in the state than the total appropriation. Districts are required to have one
special education program unit per 16 students with an IEP.
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = 0.0075× `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $3, 802×
(
0.6× ADMkt + ADM1−12t
)
+ $28, 248× IEP
d
t





and total revenue is
Rdt = $3, 802×
(
0.6× ADMkt + ADM1−12t
)
+ $28, 248× IEP
d
t









and the tax price does not apply in this situation because districts are not allowed
to increase their tax rate.
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A.3.14 New Hampshire
The New Hampshire legislature adopted a new school funding formula, called the
Adequate Education Funding Plan (AEFP), for the 1999-2000 school year in response
to court challenges to their current system, which primarily relied on local funding
for education. The AEFP provides $4,220 per pupil in funding, about half of which
is generated by a 6.6 mill statewide property tax. Funds are assigned based on the
weighted number of pupils, such that












FRPLdt if 0.24 <
FRPLdt
ADMdt
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $4, 220× wADMdt − 0.066× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $4, 220× wADMdt + (τ dt − 0.066)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.066)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
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A.3.15 New Jersey
The school finance plan in New Jersey as of 1998-1999 was established by the “Com-
prehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996,” (CEIFA) (N.J.
STAT. ANN. §18a: 1–1 et seq. CEIFA). Due to a New Jersey Supreme Court de-
cision, Abbott v. Burke 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990), CEIFA requires the state make
funding in 28 low-income, urban school districts equivalent to spending the most af-
fluent districts. CEIFA is a minimum foundation grant program with 24 additional
aid programs.
The foundation amount per pupil is called the T&E (Thorough & Efficient)
amount and the total foundation budget is called the T&E budget. The T&E budget
is the level of spending determined by the state to be necessary to support a qual-
ity education. The T&E budget is a district’s weighted enrollment times the T&E
amount. That is,
T&E Budgetdt = Weighted Pupilsdt × T&E Amountt
Each year the T&E amount is increased by an amount equal to the annual percentage
increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). For the 1998-1999 school year, the
T&E amount is $6,899. There is an additional “T&E flexible amount,” which give a
range around the T&E amount that is also considered acceptable. The T&E flexible
amount was $336 for 1997-1998, so adjusted by the CPI makes it 336∗(1+.0220859) ≈
343.42 for 1998-1999.
Using the numbers from Table A.25, we get
Weighted Pupilsdt = 0.5× ADMkt + ADM1−5t + 1.12× ADM6−8t + 1.2× ADM9−12t
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Table A.25: Per Pupil Weighting Factors
Weight T&E Amount T&E Range
Kindergarten .50 $3,450 $3,278-$3,623
Elementary School 1.0 $6,899 $6,544-$7,244
Middle School 1.12 $7,727 $7,341-$8,113
High School 1.2 $8,279 $7,865-$8,693
The local share is determined by three factors: (a) the total amount of aid to be
allocated through the CCSA formula statewide; (b) the district’s income; and, (3)
the district’s property wealth. Specifically,
Local Sharedt = T&E Budgetdt ×
(
WRTt ×W dt + IRTt × Idt
2
)











which was 0.04546684 in 2008-2009.
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = Weighted Pupilsdt × T&E Amountt × (1−WRTt × `tW dt ),
and total revenue is
Rdt = τ dt × `dtW dt + Weighted Pupilsdt × T&E Amountt × (1−WRTt × `tW dt ).
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Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= `dt (τ dt −WRTt × T&E Amountt)
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.16 New Mexico
School funding in New Mexico is a foundation plan determined by the New Mexico
Public School Finance Act of 1974. Funds are distributed based on weighted student
counts called program units. Total program units are given by
Total Program Unitsdt = 1.44× FTEkt + 1.2× FTE1t + 1.18× FTE2−3t
+ 1.045× FTE4−6t + 1.25× FTE7−12t
+ SpecEddt +Bilingualdt .
There is not enough data available to calculate the SpecEddt and Bilingualdt portions
separately, so I omit them in my simulated funding.
The foundation level in 1998-1999 was $2,344.09 per weighted student. The
required minimum local levy is 0.5 mills.
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $2, 344.09× Total Program Unitsdt − 0.0005× `dtW dt ,
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Figure A.7: New Mexico Funding Formula
Source: U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics
(2001)
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and total revenue is
Rdt = $2, 344.09× Total Program Unitsdt + (τ dt − 0.0005)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.0005)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.17 New York
State aid for education in New York is distributed as Basic Operating Aid (BOA),
Extraordinary Needs Aid, Growth Aid, Tax Effort Aid, Tax Equalization Aid, and
Transition Adjustment (N.Y. CODE §3602 (12)). BOA accounts for about half of
state funding and most funds are equalized.
Funds are assigned based on weighted pupils, called Total Aidable Pupil Units
(TAPU). The weights depend on the number of students in certain grades and pro-
grams as described in Table A.26. Data is unavailable for summer school and dual
enrollment, so I calculate TAPU as
TAPUdt = 0.5× ADMk−halfdayt + ADMk−6t + 1.25× ADM7−12t + 0.25× ADM IEPt




TAPUdt × 400 if Aid Per Pupildt ≤ 400
TAPUdt × Aid Per Pupildt if Aid Per Pupildt > 400
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Table A.26: Pupil Weights for Calculating TAPU
Grade Weight
1/2 Day K 0.50
Full Day K-6 (excluding Special Education) 1.00
Full Day K-6 Special Education 1.25
7-12 (excluding Special Education) 1.25
7-12 Special Education 1.50
Summer School 0.12
Dual Enrollment fraction of day inpublic school programs
Aid Per Pupildt is the result of applying a number of district-level adjustment factors
to the basic foundation level, called the Approved Operating Expenses (AOE) which
are established by the legislature each year. Specifically,






0.9, 1.37− (1.23− CWRdt )
}
if CWRdt < 0.627
1.00− (0.64× CWRdt ) if 0.627 ≤ CWRdt < 0.8
0.80− (0.39× CWRdt ) if 0.8 ≤ CWRdt < 1.706
max
{
0.0, 0.51− (0.22× CWRdt )
}














CWR is the Combined Wealth Ratio and adjusts for the district’s property wealth
and aggregate income.20



















There are other grants for state aid but most do not vary with property wealth and
are irrelevant for the variation in my instrument. An exception is Tax Equalization














Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = BOAdt + Tax Equalizationdt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = τ dt × `dtW dt +BOAdt + Tax Equalizationdt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.0195)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.18 North Carolina
School funding in North Carolina is unique among the states. The state provides
a level of funds to each district based on weighted student counts, which they use
to determine the cost of the number of teachers needed to teach those students.
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Districts can choose to levy additional property taxes to increase spending, but are
under no obligation to do so and local levies have no impact on state aid.
The state funds PSAT testing in the amount of 2.69 for each 8th and 9th grade
student; instructional materials, supplies, instructional equipment, and testing sup-
port at $40.29 per student; and textbooks at the rate of $46.77 per student. The
Table A.27: Number of Students per Alloted Teacher







base teacher allotment is a weighted number of students based on the weights in















Each county is given one additional teacher allotment for a math/science/computer
teacher regardless of student counts. School districts are also allotted one position
per 200.10 ADM for instructional support. Teacher assistants are allotted at $749.64
per ADM in grades K-3. One principal is allowed per school and assistant principals
are allowed as 1 month per 76.12 ADM.
The total salary allocation for each district is the number of teachers times the
salary allocated to each type of teacher. Base teacher pay is $38,065 plus $3,307 in
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benefits, instructional support positions receive $45,973 including benefits, principals
receive $46,940, and assistant principals receive $46,125. This gives a total salary
allocation of
Salariesdt = 41, 372× (Teacher Allotmentdt + 1) + 45, 973×
ADMdt
200.1





There are two additional grants to cover retirement and social security benefits that
is an additional 11.07% of the salary allocation, or Additional Benefitsdt = 0.1107×
Salariesdt .
Combining the above information gives local revenue as
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $2.69× ADM8−9t + $40.29× ADMdt + $46.77× ADMdt + $749.64× ADMk−3t + 1.1107× Salariesdt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = τ dt × `dtW dt + $2.69× ADM8−9t + $87.06× ADMdt + $749.64× ADMk−3t + 1.1107× Salariesdt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= τ dt `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
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A.3.19 North Dakota
North Dakota has an equalized foundation formula (N.D. CENT. CODE §15-40.1),
which is distributed based on weighted student counts, called weighted pupil units
(WPU). In 1998-1999, the foundation level was $2,032 per WPU and the foundation
tax levy was 32 mills. There is no recapture provision so state aid is the maximum
of the formula calculation and zero.
Table A.28: Weights for Calculating Weighted Pupil Units
Category





Approved preschool 1.010 1.2924
Kindergarten (all districts) 0.500 0.5720
Rural elementary (1-8) 1.280 1.3198
Grades 1-6 (<100 ADM) 1.090 1.2012
Grades 1-6 (100-999) 0.905 0.9477
Grades 1-6 (1,000+) 0.950 0.9706
Grades 7-8 (all districts) 1.010 0.9832
Grades 9-12 (<75 ADM) 1.625 1.4905
Grades 9-12 (75-149) 1.335 1.1981
Grades 9-12 (150-549) 1.240 1.0917
Grades 9-12 (550+) 1.140 1.0473
Source: U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics
(2001)
Applying the student weights described in Table A.28 gives
WPUdt = 1.2924× ADMpkt + 0.572× ADMkt
+ (I<100 × 1.2012 + I100 to 999 × 0.9477 + I≥1000 × 0.9706)× ADM1−6t
+ 0.9832× ADM7−8t
+ (I<75 × 1.4905 + I75 to 149 × 1.1981 + I150 to 549 × 1.0917 + I>550 × 1.0473)× ADM9−12t
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Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $2.302×WPUdt − 0.032× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $2.302×WPUdt + (τ dt − 0.032)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= τ dtW dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.20 Ohio
The main school funding program in Ohio is called the School Foundation Fund-
ing Program (Ohio Revised Code §3317) and provides a foundation level funded by
state and local revenue, and additional categorical grants from the state to school
districts. The foundation amount was $3,851 in 1998-1999, which is further ad-
justed by a Cost of Doing Business (CODB) factor that captures regional differences
in the cost of living. The foundation tax rate is 23 mills. Foundation funds are
distributed based on weighted student counts with the following weights: 0.5 for
kindergarten; 1.0 for grades 1-12; 0.25 for vocational education pupils who receive
services from other educational units; and three major categories of special education
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weighting: The mildest category gives an additional .22 weighting, the next category
gets an additional 3.01 weighting, and the most severe category gets an additional
3.01 weighting but allows for the additional state aid to subsidize more expensive
individual educational program costs. I do not have counts of vocational education
pupils or the severity of conditions for students with an IEP in the data so I do
not include the vocational education weighting and assign each student with an IEP
the minimum weight of 0.22. Using these weighting factors gives a weighted average
daily membership (wADM) of
wADMdt = 0.5× ADMkt + ADM1−12t + 0.22× ADM IEPt .
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $3, 851× CODBdt × wADMdt − 0.023× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $3, 851× CODBdt × wADMdt + (τ dt − 0.023)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.023)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
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A.3.21 Oklahoma
Oklahoma has a two-tiered funding program with a foundation amount as well as a
guaranteed yield portion. The foundation tax rate is established in the Oklahoma
State Constitution to be 15 mills (Oklahoma Constitution Article X §9(c)). Districts
also have a responsibility for 75% of the revenue collected by a countywide tax of 4
mills I use 18 mills as the foundation tax rate, although the additional 3 mills from the
countywide tax will be weighted based on the fraction of county property wealth that
is in the school district, which I will not be capturing. The base foundation amount
was set at $1,239 per weighted pupil. Weights for calculating weighted average daily
Table A.29: Oklahoma Pupil Weights
Group Weight
Half-day early childhood programs 0.7
Full-day early childhood programs 1.3
Kindergarten 1.3
First and second grade 1.351
Third grade 1.051
Fourth through sixth grade 1.0
Seventh through twelfth grade 1.2
Out-of-home placement 1.5
Source: Oklahoma Statute Title 70 §18-201.1
membership are given in Table A.29. Data for half-day early childhood programs
and out-of-home placements are unavailable so I calculate weighted students as
wADMdt = 1.3ADMkt + 1.351ADM1−2t + 1.051ADM3t + ADM4−6t + 1.2ADM7−12t .
The second tier of state aid is a guaranteed yield program called Salary Incentive
Aid. As of 1998-1999, the state guaranteed districts $59.93 per weighted student for
231
every mill levied above the 18 mill minimum requirement. There is a constitutional
cap of a maximum of 20 mills above the minimum requirement. The Salary Incentive
Aid can thus be written as
Salary Incentive Aiddt = max{0, 59.93× wADMdt − (τ dt − 0.018)× `dtW dt }
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = $1, 239× wADMdt − 0.018× `dtW dt + Salary Incentive Aiddt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = $1, 239× wADMdt + (τ dt − 0.018)× `dtW dt + Salary Incentive Aiddt .


































Oregon uses a foundation program called the State School Fund (OR Rev. Stat.
Ch. 327). In 1998-1999, the foundation level was $4,500 per weighted pupil and the
232
foundation tax rate was 5 mills. The foundation amount is adjusted by the relative
experience level of teachers in the district, compared to the rest of the state. The
earliest information available for teacher experience is for the 2005-2006 school year
and I assign these values for each year. Specifically the foundation level for each
district is
Foundationdt = $4, 500 + 25× Teacher Experience Adjustmentdt
where
Teacher Experience Adjustmentdt = Teacher Experiencedt − Teacher Experiencest .
Each pupil receives a weight of 1 and students receive additional weights: 1 for each
student in special education; 0.5 for student with English as a second language; 0.2
for students attending a union high school district; -0.1 for students in an elemen-
tary school district; and 0.25 for students in poverty, students in foster homes, and
students in state facilities. Data is only available for the number of students in each
grade, in special education, or eligible for free/reduced-price lunch. Thus, leaving
out the weights based on unavailable information, weighted pupils are given by
wADMdt = ADMdt + ADM
SpecEd
t + 0.25ADMFRPLt .
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = Foundationdt × wADMdt − 0.005× `dtW dt ,
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and total revenue is
Rdt = Foundationdt × wADMdt + (τ dt − 0.005)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.005)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
A.3.23 Texas
School funding in Texas is given by a two-tiered scheme called the Foundation School
Program (Texas Education Code §42). The first tier is a foundation program with a
8.6 mill foundation tax rate and a base foundation level of $2,396. The second tier
guaranteed $21 in revenue per weighted pupil per 0.1 mills from 8.6 to 15 mills.
The base foundation level is adjusted by several district-specific measures that
account for differences in the cost of living and costs associated with educating stu-
dents in small or rural school districts. The basic allotment (BAdt ) was $2,396 in
1998-1999. The adjusted basic allotment (ABAdt ) takes into account the Cost of
Education Index (CEIdt ) as follows:
ABAdt = $2, 396× (((CEIdt − 1)× 0.71) + 1).
The small district adjustment (SDAdt ) applies to districts with fewer than 1,600
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students and is given by
SDAdt =

(1 + (1600− ADMdt )× 0.00025)× ABAdt if Square Milesdt < 300
(1 + (1600− ADMdt )× 0.0004)× ABAdt if Square Milesdt > 300.
The mid-sized district adjustment (MDAdt ) applies to districts with fewer than 5,000
students and is given by
MDAdt = (1 + (5000− ADMdt )× 0.000025)× ABAdt .
The adjusted allotment (AAdt ) is then defined as the maximum of the adjusted basic
allotment, small district adjustment, and mid-sized district adjustment.
Table A.30 gives the weights used for each program. The non-special education
elements can be summarized as
Foundationdt = AAdt × (ADMdt + 1.35× ADMCATEt + 0.12× ADMGTt
+ 0.1× (ADMESLt + ADMPEGt ) + 0.2× ADMCEt + 2.41× ADMPt )
and the special education elements as
SpecEddt = (5× (ADMC0t +×ADMC1t )
+ 3× (ADMC2t + ADMC41,C42t + ADMSMMt )
+ 2.7× ADMC91−C98t + 2.3× ADMC8t + 2.8× ADMC30t
+ 1.7× ADMNPCt + 4× ADMC81−C89t )× AAdt .
There are two additional categorical grants for New Instructional Facilities, given by
NIF dt = $250×ADMNIFt , and Transportation, given by T dt . Total Tier I funding is
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then given by
Tier Idt = Foundationdt + SpecEddt +NIF dt + T dt .
Table A.30: Tier I Program Weights
Program Weight
Regular Block Grant (RBG) 1.00
Career & Technology Allotment (CATE) 1.35
Gifted & Talented Allotment (GT) 0.12
Bilingual/ESL Allotment (ESL) 0.1
Public Education Grant (PEG) 0.1
Compensatory Education Allotment (CE) 0.2
Self-contained, Pregnant (P) 2.41
Special Education
Homebound (Code 01) 5
Hospital Class (Code 02) 3
Speech Therapy (Code 00) 5
Resource Room (Codes 41 & 42) 3
Self-Contained Severe/Moderate/Mild (SMM) 3
Off-Home Campus (Code 91-98) 2.7
Vocational Adjustment Class (Code 08) 2.3
State Schools (Code 30) 2.8
Non-Pubic Contracts (NPC) 1.7
Residential Care and Treatment (Codes 81-89) 4
Source: U.S. Department of Education Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics (2001)
Tier 2 funding provides a guaranteed return to each unit of property tax regardless
of district property wealth. The guaranteed return is based on Weighted Average
Daily Attendance (WADAdt ), which is given by
WADAdt =
Tier 1dt − T dt − 0.5(ABAdt − $2, 396)
$2, 396 .
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Specifically, districts are guaranteed revenue as if they had $210,000 per WADAdt in
property wealth on any millage between 8.6 and 15. Additionally, if the district has
more than $280,000 per WADAdt in property wealth, then the state recaptures the




min{0.015, τ dt − 0.0086} ×
(
$210, 000− `dtW dt
WADAdt
)
, if W dt ≤ 1`dt $210, 000×WADA
d
t
min{0.015, τ dt − 0.0086} ×
(
$280, 000− `dtW dt
WADAdt
)




Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = Tier 1dt + Tier 2dt − 0.0086× `dtW dt ,
and total revenue is
Rdt = Tier 1dt + Tier 2dt + (τ dt − 0.0086)× `dtW dt .
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d
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`dt
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1
`dt
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t ≤ 1`dt $210, 000×WADA
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Washington state provides full funding for basic education (Washington Revised
Code §§28A.150 and 28A.510). Funds are assigned based on the number of teach-
ers deemed necessary to provide education for the particular makeup of the school
district. The makeup of the school district is determined by the full-time equivalent
(FTE) counts of students in different grades and programs. There are a number
of different allocations for types of teachers based on weighted enrollment and an
allocation per teacher unit.
The number of basic education certificated instructional staff formula units (CIS-
FUs) generated per 1,000 FTE students depends on grade level and program. For
the grade 4-12 regular education program, districts get 1 staff unit per 21.74 stu-
dents. For grades K-3, districts get funding based on their actual staff to student
ratio, with a maximum of 1 staff unit per 18.42 students (for simplicity, I assign all
districts the maximum). School districts get 1 staff per 19.5 students in secondary
vocational programs and 1 staff units per 18.2 FTE students enrolled in skill center
programs.
238
















These three formula unit measures are then multiplied by a factor that takes into
account the salary for each teacher unit. This requires data on the education level
and tenure of all teachers in the data, which I do not have access to for 1999. Instead,
I use the average salary for teachers in Washington in 1999, which is $54,231.43 in
2013 dollars (38,693 in 1999 dollars). Thus, the salary support for the basic education
program would be
Salariesdt = $54, 231.43× (CISFUdt + CASFUdt + CSFUdt )
Data is unavailable for the number of students in secondary vocational programs
and skill center programs. However, I know that, in 1999, combined spending on
vocational education and skill center programs was 7.8 percent of basic education,
so I add 7.8 percent of my calculation of basic education funding. In fact, there
are several other categories (special education, transportation, food services, etc.)
that I do not have data to calculate for each district, but I know all these programs
(including the 7.8 in vocational/skills) are 54.1 percent the size of basic education,
so I add this into the calculation to get in the right ballpark.
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In addition to salary support, the state provides:
1. $5,646.98 ($4,029 in 1999 dollars) per certificated and classified staff unit for
insurance,
2. $11,286.94 ($8,053 in 1999 dollars) per basic education certificated staff unit
for non-employee related costs (e.g., books, supplies, heat);
3. $27,716.29 ($19,775 in 1999 dollars) per secondary vocational staff formula unit
for non-employee related costs,
4. $21,505.88 ($15,344 in 1999 dollars) per skills center certificated staff formula
unit for non-employee related costs; and
5. $511.97 ($365.28 in 1999 dollars) per certificated instructional staff formula
unit for substitute teachers.
Items 3 and 4 will be accounted for in the additional 54.1 percent of basic aid. The
other categories for insurance benefits, non-employee related costs, and substitute
teachers will be
Insurancedt = $5, 646.98× (CISFUdt + CASFUdt + CSFUdt )
Non-Employee Costsdt = $11, 286.94× (CISFUdt + CASFUdt )
Subsitutesdt = $511.97× CISFUdt
Local revenue is given by
Ldt = τ dt × `dtW dt ,
state revenue is
Sdt = 1.541× (Salariesdt + Insurancedt + Non-Employee Costsdt + Subsitutesdt )− 0.01× `dtW dt ,
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and total revenue is
Rdt = 1.541× (Salariesdt + Insurancedt + Non-Employee Costsdt + Subsitutesdt ) + (τ dt − 0.01)× `dtW dt .
Thus, the wealth price is
∂Rdt
∂W dt
= (τ dt − 0.01)× `dt
and the tax price is
∂Rdt
∂τ dt
= `dtW dt .
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APPENDIX B
THE INTERGENERATIONAL IMPACT OF CIGARETTE TAXES
ON SMOKING INITIATION – APPENDIX
Table B.1: Discrete-time Hazard Model of Smoking Initiation, Alternative Start Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age=6 Age=7 Age=8 Age=9 Age=10
A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood 0.322∗∗ 0.360∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.543∗∗
(0.064) (0.068) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.082 1.078 1.062 1.061 1.058
(0.058) (0.056) (0.053) (0.056) (0.058)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood -0.169∗∗ -0.160∗∗ -0.125∗∗ -0.122∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.046 0.050 0.054 0.059 0.064
Individuals 7,907 8,102 8,228 8,151 8,059
Observations 105,230 97,377 89,289 81,071 72,943
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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A. Exponentiated Coefficients (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood 0.498∗∗ 0.492∗∗
(0.080) (0.082)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.062 1.068
(0.053) (0.055)
B. Marginal Effects
Cigarette Tax in Childhood -0.125∗∗ -0.158∗∗ -0.132∗∗
(0.020) (0.037) (0.035)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.015 0.015 0.016
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Individuals 8,228 8,228 8,228
Observations 89,289 89,289 89,289
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects in columns (1)-(3) are calculated using
the delta method. Exponentiated coefficients for column (1) are hazard ratios and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.4: Discrete-time Hazard Model of Smoking Initiation with Alternative Spec-
ifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-Time Birth State at Tax at
Trends State Age 8 Birth
A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) 0.391∗∗ 0.487∗∗ 0.447∗∗ 0.626∗∗
(0.078) (0.082) (0.085) (0.112)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.247∗∗ 1.058∗∗ 1.110∗∗ 1.066∗∗
(0.089) (0.052) (0.052) (0.047)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) -0.152∗∗ -0.128∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.094∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.062∗∗ 0.015 0.027∗∗ 0.016
(0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054
Individuals 8228 8,228 8,228 7,605
Observations 89289 85,313 85,313 82,815
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include controls for sex, race, parent education, and family
income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of initiation is the age
at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that age. Standard errors
for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. Each model includes
age fixed effects, column (1) includes state-specific linear time trends while columns
(2)-(4) include state and year fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) assume immobility
in childhood where column (2) assigns the state of birth to ages 0 to 7 while column
(3) assigns the state at age 8 to ages 0 to 7. Column (4) uses the tax in the year and
state of birth as the tax during childhood instead of an average across the childhood
years.
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Table B.5: Summary Statistics Without Sample Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mother Mother Born Born
Full Ever Never Before 1985
Sample Smoked Smoked 1985 or After
A. Individual Level
Initiated in Sample 0.59 0.66 0.50 0.74 0.49
Left Sample Without Initiating 0.41 0.34 0.50 0.26 0.51
Average Cigarette Tax ($): Birth to Age 7 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.35 0.50
Hispanic 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.21
Black 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.28
Other Race (Including White) 0.46 0.50 0.40 0.37 0.51
Male 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.51
Mother’s Age at Birth 25.76 25.38 26.39 20.41 29.23
Birth Order 2.03 2.06 2.01 1.61 2.31
Mother Ever Smoked 0.56 1.00 0.00 0.61 0.53
Parent Education: Less Than High School 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05
Parent Education: High School 0.29 0.33 0.24 0.37 0.24
Parent Education: Some College 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.49
Parent Education: BA or More 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.10 0.22
Family Income: 1st Quartile 0.30 0.35 0.22 0.39 0.23
Family Income: 2nd Quartile 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.24
Family Income: 3rd Quartile 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.22 0.29
Family Income: 4th Quartile 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.10 0.24
Individuals 8,228 4,642 3,537 3,239 4,983
B. Individual-Age Level
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.39 0.67
Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.007
Observations 89,289 47,330 41,910 33,189 56,050
Notes: Means of each variable are reported. Data from the NLSCYA. Years of
analysis range from 1984 to 2014. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars.
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A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) 0.630∗∗ 0.566∗∗ 0.734
(0.113) (0.109) (0.169)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.007 0.998 1.037
(0.053) (0.054) (0.088)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) -0.093∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.067
(0.028) (0.027) (0.042)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.002 -0.001 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.022)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.010 0.012 0.006
Individuals 8,228 4,642 3,537
Observations 89,289 47,330 41,910
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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Table B.7: Discrete-time Hazard Model of Smoking Initiation, Unweighted Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever Never No Born Born in
Full Moved Moved Older Older Before 1985
Sample States States Sibling Sibling 1985 or After
A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) 0.630∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.743 0.760 0.504∗∗ 0.546∗∗ 0.808
(0.113) (0.132) (0.198) (0.171) (0.122) (0.221) (0.192)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.007 1.015 1.002 0.965 1.085 1.202 1.027
(0.053) (0.066) (0.073) (0.049) (0.098) (0.160) (0.070)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) -0.093∗∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.064 -0.060 -0.124∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.048
(0.028) (0.033) (0.049) (0.043) (0.031) (0.055) (0.048)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.009 0.021 0.051 0.007
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.024) (0.040) (0.018)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.007
Individuals 8,228 3,599 4,560 4,935 3,289 3,239 4,983
Observations 89,289 39,136 50,084 52,545 36,701 33,189 56,050
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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Table B.8: Summary Statistics, In and Out of the Estimation Sample
(1) (2)
In Sample Out of Sample
A. Individual Level
Initiated in Sample 0.58 0.65
Left Sample Without Initiating 0.42 0.35
Average Cigarette Tax ($): Birth to Age 7 0.45 0.45
Hispanic 0.08 0.07
Black 0.17 0.13
Other Race (Including White) 0.75 0.80
Male 0.51 0.53
Mother’s Age at Birth 26.48 25.35
Birth Order 1.95 1.81
Mother Ever Smoked 0.59 0.58
Parent Education: Less Than High School 0.03 0.09
Parent Education: High School 0.27 0.32
Parent Education: Some College 0.49 0.43
Parent Education: BA or More 0.21 0.17
Family Income: 1st Quartile 0.18 0.25
Family Income: 2nd Quartile 0.23 0.27
Family Income: 3rd Quartile 0.32 0.25
Family Income: 4th Quartile 0.27 0.23
Individuals 8,228 3,278
B. Individual-Age Level
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 0.87 1.01
Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.054 0.016
Observations 89,289 17,387
Notes: Means of each variable are reported. Data from the NLSCYA and weighted
using NLSY79 weights for the mothers of those in our sample. Years of analysis
range from 1984 to 2014. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars.
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Figure B.1: Hazard Comparison for Several Failure Cutoffs
A. Hazard Rate
B. Fraction Initiated Smoking
Notes: Failure is defined as whether the fraction of reports of age first started smoking
are above a certain cutoff. A cutoff of 0 corresponds to using the minimum age
reported to define initiation and a cutoff of 1 corresponds to using the maximum age
reported.
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Table B.9: Discrete-time Hazard Model of Smoking Initiation with Alternative Fail-
ure Cutoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff Cutoff No
at 0 at 0.25 at 0.5 at 0.75 at 1 Discrepancy
A. Hazard Ratio (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood 0.462∗∗ 0.465∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 0.525∗∗ 0.530∗∗ 0.501∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.080) (0.087) (0.089) (0.098)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.056 1.056 1.062 1.064 1.061 1.087
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.061)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood -0.134∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.125∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.022
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.047
Individuals 8,123 8,143 8,228 8,237 8,237 7,256
Observations 86,707 86,910 89,289 89,939 89,973 83,048
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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Table B.10: Discrete-time Hazard Model of Smoking Initiation, Only Those Ob-
served Until Age 25
(1)
Full Sample
A. Hazard Ratios (H0 : eβ = 1)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) 0.511∗∗
(0.141)
Current Cigarette Tax 1.076
(0.101)
B. Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood (Birth to Age 7) -0.122∗∗
(0.035)
Current Cigarette Tax 0.019
(0.025)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.066
Individuals 5,545
Observations 60,441
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. All models include state, age, and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, parent education, mother’s age at birth, birth order, mother smoking
history, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars. The age of
initiation is the age at least half of retrospective reports indicate smoking by that
age. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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Marginal Effects (H0 : (eβ − 1)× 0.25 = 0)
Cigarette Tax in Childhood -0.125∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.109∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.031)
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 0.015 0.006 0.035
(0.013) (0.015) (0.026)
Mother’s Age at Birth -0.007∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Birth Order 0.025∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Mother Ever Smoked 0.114∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.050∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Black -0.111∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.093∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017)
Hispanic -0.042∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019)
Income, 2nd Quartile -0.006 0.002 -0.028
(0.015) (0.025) (0.023)
Income, 3rd Quartile -0.053∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
Income, 4th Quartile -0.068∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.022)
Parent Education: High School -0.013 -0.025 0.040
(0.020) (0.027) (0.048)
Parent Education: Some College -0.014 -0.023 0.044
(0.019) (0.026) (0.044)
Parent Education: BA or More -0.048∗∗ -0.052∗ -0.013
(0.018) (0.027) (0.036)
Mean Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.054 0.065 0.041
Individuals 8,228 4,642 3,537
Observations 89,289 47,330 41,910
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Table B.12: Summary Statistics for Additional Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Never No Born Born in
Moved Moved Older Older Before 1985
States States Sibling Sibling 1985 or After
A. Individual Level
Initiated in Sample 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.62 0.76 0.49
Left Sample Without Initiating 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.24 0.51
Average Cigarette Tax ($): Birth to Age 7 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.35 0.51
Hispanic 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.07
Black 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.14
Other Race (Including White) 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.78 0.67 0.79
Male 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.51
Mother’s Age at Birth 26.50 26.59 28.06 24.28 20.85 29.50
Birth Order 1.94 1.96 2.63 1.00 1.55 2.16
Mother Ever Smoked 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.65 0.55
Parent Education: Less Than High School 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02
Parent Education: High School 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.36 0.22
Parent Education: Some College 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.50
Parent Education: BA or More 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.26
Family Income: 1st Quartile 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.14
Family Income: 2nd Quartile 0.26 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.20
Family Income: 3rd Quartile 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.34
Family Income: 4th Quartile 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.33
Individuals 3,599 4,560 4,935 3,289 3,239 4,983
B. Individual-Age Level
Current Cigarette Tax ($) 0.83 0.91 0.95 0.78 0.51 1.05
Smoking Initiation Hazard 0.055 0.054 0.053 0.056 0.077 0.044
Observations 39,136 50,084 52,545 36,701 33,189 56,050
Notes: Means of each variable are reported. Data from the NLSCYA and weighted
using NLSY79 weights for the mothers of those in our sample. Years of analysis
range from 1984 to 2014. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars.
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Table B.13: First Stage Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Adult and Older Sibling Smok-
ing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male+Female Elasticity
A. Adults (NLSY79)
P(Current Smoker) 0.006 -0.011+ -0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.320 0.290 0.304
N 26,793 28,497 55,290
Number of Cigarettes -0.274 -0.647∗∗ -0.464∗∗ -0.042∗
(0.320) (0.192) (0.192) (0.018)
Dep. Var. Mean 13.285 11.679 12.492 2.175
N 7,205 7,040 14,245 14,245
B. Siblings (NLSCYA)
P(Current Smoker) -0.012 -0.024∗∗ -0.017∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.28 0.21 0.24
N 15,762 16,818 32,580
Number of Cigarettes 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.027
(0.355) (0.343) (0.211) (0.032)
Dep. Var. Mean 8.94 7.99 8.52 1.74
N 4,251 3,358 7,609 7,609
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.01,
*p < 0.05, +p < 0.1. All models include state and year fixed effects as well as controls
for sex, race, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars.
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Table B.14: First Stage Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Adult and Older Sibling Smok-
ing – State-Time Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male+Female Elasticity
A. Adults (NLSY79)
P(Current Smoker) 0.012 -0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.320 0.290 0.304
N 26,793 28,497 55,290
Number of Cigarettes -4.603∗∗ -4.188∗∗ -4.407∗∗ -0.575∗∗
(0.920) (0.830) (0.866) (0.111)
Dep. Var. Mean 13.29 11.68 12.49 2.18
N 7,205 7,040 14,245 14,245
B. Siblings (NLSCYA)
P(Current Smoker) -0.018 -0.039∗∗ -0.028∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.281 0.207 0.243
N 15,762 16,818 32,580
Number of Cigarettes -0.15 -0.40 -0.23 -0.060+
(0.343) (0.384) (0.217) (0.036)
Dep. Var. Mean 8.94 7.99 8.52 1.74
N 4,251 3,358 7,609 7,609
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis: **p < 0.01,
*p < 0.05, +p < 0.1. All models include state-specific linear time trends as well as
controls for sex, race, and family income. Cigarette taxes are in real 2014 dollars.
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APPENDIX C
TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT RESOURCES AND
CHARTER SCHOOL COMPETITION – APPENDIX
Figure C.1: Spending, by Vote Share, Before and After Election
Support Service Spending Per Pupil
Notes: Graphs show spending per pupil for capital levies (left panels) and gen-
eral purpose levies (right panels), by vote share in the focal election. Elections are
grouped into bins of 2 percentage points. Averages control for year effects and are
normalized to the first bin to the left of the 50% threshold.
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Table C.1: Average Effect of Passing Levies on Value Added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Capital Levies General Levies
4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed -1.674 2.614 -0.363 0.617 -2.260 -1.959 0.201 -1.483 2.162 -0.905
(2.106) (2.098) (2.072) (1.786) (1.923) (1.518) (1.690) (1.520) (1.460) (1.263)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 0.631 1.633 -0.252 -0.692 -2.288∗ -2.209∗ -0.630 -2.075∗ 1.055 0.131
(1.556) (1.328) (1.297) (1.100) (1.100) (1.097) (1.141) (1.047) (0.881) (0.820)
Dep. Var. Mean 2.85 2.67 2.82 2.38 2.24 2.67 2.49 2.75 2.22 2.09
N 9,207 7,782 7,786 7,795 7,795 15,652 13,748 13,765 13,772 13,772
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
Table C.2: Average Effect of Passing Levies on Value Added in Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Capital Levies General Levies
4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed -1.180 2.488 3.239 8.808∗∗ -3.985 -1.782 1.377 -2.024 3.433 0.553
(2.903) (2.962) (2.951) (3.374) (2.797) (2.104) (2.405) (2.088) (2.434) (1.919)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 1.916 2.624 0.233 0.228 -1.096 -3.199∗ 0.137 -2.785∗ 0.608 0.433
(2.206) (1.918) (1.701) (1.952) (1.654) (1.381) (1.436) (1.366) (1.632) (1.279)
Dep. Var. Mean 4.15 3.54 3.31 3.73 3.36 3.87 3.27 3.17 3.52 3.11
N 9,207 7,782 7,786 7,795 7,795 15,652 13,748 13,765 13,772 13,772
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Table C.3: Average Effect of Passing Levies on Value Added in Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Capital Levies General Levies
4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed -2.001 1.808 -2.311 -0.802 -0.323 0.791 -0.729 -1.302 0.364 -1.268
(2.030) (2.349) (2.171) (2.197) (1.990) (1.252) (1.408) (1.419) (1.482) (1.519)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed -1.155 1.650 -0.972 -0.016 -1.123 -0.013 -1.295 -2.062+ 1.196 -1.433
(1.194) (1.416) (1.301) (1.259) (1.159) (0.837) (1.075) (1.082) (1.021) (1.041)
Dep. Var. Mean 2.56 3.11 3.46 2.97 2.43 2.46 2.89 3.38 2.78 2.33
N 9,214 7,787 7,786 7,795 7,795 15,657 13,750 13,765 13,772 13,772
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Table C.4: Average Effect of Passing Levies on Fraction of Students Lost to Charter
Schools – First Election of Each Cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Levies General Levies
Digital Brick and Mortar Digital Brick and Mortar
A. ITT Estimates
$1,000 PP Levy Passed -0.011 0.005 -0.008 -0.015
(0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
$1,000 PP Levy Passed -0.015∗∗ 0.004 -0.011∗∗ -0.010
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.010
N 12,288 12,288 16,424 16,424
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions are reported with standard errors in paren-
thesis: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Spending is in real thousands of dollars
per pupil.
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Figure C.2: Log of Capital Spending by Vote Share Before and After Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.3: Log of Instructional Expenditure by Vote Share Before and After Elec-
tions
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
262
Figure C.4: Log of Support Service Expenditure by Vote Share Before and After
Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.5: Fraction of Students Lost to Any Charter by Vote Share Before and
After Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.6: Fraction of Students Lost to Charters by Vote Share Before and After
Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.7: Residential Property Values by Vote Share Before and After Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.8: Log Residential Property Values by Vote Share Before and After Elec-
tions
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.9: District Performance Index Before and After Elections
a. Capital Levy Election
b. General Levy Election
Figure C.10: District Value Added Before and After Elections
a. Capital Levy Election
b. General Levy Election
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Figure C.11: Fraction Making AYP Across Vote Share Before and After Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
Figure C.12: Student-Teacher Ratio Before and After Elections
a. Capital Levy Election
b. General Levy Election
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Figure C.13: Total Number of Students Before and After Elections
a. Capital Levy Election
b. General Levy Election
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Figure C.14: Fraction of Black Students Across Vote Share Before and After Elec-
tions
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Figure C.15: Fraction of FRPL Eligible Students Across Vote Share Before and After
Elections
A. Capital Levy Election
B. General Levy Election
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Table C.5: Dynamic Effect of Levy Passage on Per-pupil Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Levies General Levies
Capital Instructional Capital Instructional
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 42.24∗∗ 1.21 231.82 103.56∗
(16.32) (7.45) (176.78) (50.74)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 262.28∗∗ 0.88 226.71 154.21∗∗
(73.18) (6.21) (166.56) (52.75)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 410.21∗∗ -0.77 79.85 119.07∗∗
(69.50) (8.99) (167.68) (41.12)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 172.54∗∗ 10.91 31.05 84.18∗
(47.10) (13.61) (162.13) (41.75)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 4.71 -0.31 18.17 81.57
(29.59) (6.18) (183.20) (53.35)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago -8.22 4.10 -170.52 139.89
(21.48) (14.06) (266.75) (110.57)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 0.58 1.63 365.04∗ 106.38∗
(10.91) (13.87) (161.37) (43.54)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 52.41∗∗ 0.69 388.91∗∗ 140.91∗∗
(15.92) (7.23) (123.85) (37.45)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 275.06∗∗ 1.53 484.89∗∗ 208.14∗∗
(70.70) (5.96) (113.12) (32.35)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 450.69∗∗ -0.83 481.04∗∗ 173.64∗∗
(66.98) (8.77) (113.05) (28.59)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 203.90∗∗ 11.46 607.66∗∗ 152.79∗∗
(41.55) (13.10) (118.13) (30.56)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 18.31 0.40 588.46∗∗ 143.50∗∗
(23.08) (5.90) (141.96) (38.53)
N 20,714 20,714 28,123 28,123
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Table C.6: Dynamic Effect of Levy Passage on Students Lost to Charter Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Levies General Levies
Digital Brick and Mortar Digital Brick and Mortar
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago -0.000 0.000 -0.002∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago -0.000+ 0.000 -0.002∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
N 15,168 15,168 22,381 22,381
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Table C.7: Dynamic Effect of Levy Passage on Student Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Levies General Levies
Performance Value AYP Performance Value AYP
Index Added Met Index Added Met
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.029 0.027
(0.000) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.081) (0.031)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 0.004+ -0.088 0.030
(0.000) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.096) (0.032)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago -0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(0.000) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.104) (0.038)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.089 0.018
(0.000) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.131) (0.041)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.136 -0.012
(0.000) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.132) (0.044)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.119 0.034
(0.000) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.152) (0.051)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 0.004 0.009 0.001 0.017 -0.124 0.029
(0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019) (0.087) (0.029)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago -0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.028∗ 0.012 0.009
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.058) (0.022)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.026 -0.088 0.021
(0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.016) (0.071) (0.022)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.035+ -0.052 0.029
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.019) (0.077) (0.026)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.029 -0.050 0.051+
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.022) (0.092) (0.029)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 0.002 -0.010 0.002 0.020 -0.045 0.052+
(0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.022) (0.100) (0.030)
N 15,520 7,795 17,537 21,852 13,772 23,623
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Table C.8: Dynamic Effect of Levy Passage on Student and Teacher Counts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Levies General Levies
S/T # of # of S/T # of # of
Ratio Students Teachers Ratio Students Teachers
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 0.005 -4.205∗ -2.071 -0.171+ 0.170 5.348
(0.008) (1.930) (2.526) (0.094) (22.262) (25.920)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago -0.001 -3.494 -3.598 -0.159+ 22.330 7.011
(0.011) (2.510) (2.957) (0.094) (28.692) (30.024)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 0.005 -3.919 -5.712+ -0.275∗ 39.775 -76.519
(0.010) (3.490) (3.398) (0.138) (37.372) (56.678)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 0.009 -4.352 -5.724 -0.222 29.953 -83.338
(0.012) (4.317) (3.559) (0.140) (46.397) (63.047)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 0.021 -3.320 -6.496+ -0.084 42.546 -88.779
(0.016) (5.430) (3.754) (0.129) (55.145) (66.718)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 0.008 -4.610 -6.294 -0.162 40.410 -94.050
(0.014) (6.722) (3.972) (0.168) (64.404) (72.118)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago -0.014 -9.748∗∗ 0.255 -0.184+ -56.800∗ -18.629
(0.012) (3.758) (2.910) (0.098) (24.421) (23.132)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 0.005 -4.320∗ -1.728 -0.243∗∗ 3.757 2.675
(0.008) (1.955) (2.374) (0.072) (16.178) (11.167)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago -0.001 -3.382 -2.167 -0.278∗∗ 36.095 18.972
(0.010) (2.572) (2.450) (0.072) (24.671) (16.142)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 0.002 -4.343 -3.728 -0.300∗∗ 57.770+ -30.149
(0.010) (3.629) (2.584) (0.095) (30.467) (35.401)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 0.007 -5.195 -3.786 -0.318∗∗ 57.233 -33.963
(0.011) (4.533) (2.753) (0.105) (39.641) (38.960)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 0.026+ -4.751 -4.434 -0.152 66.697 -37.100
(0.016) (5.691) (2.925) (0.107) (44.369) (41.547)
N 20,828 20,848 20,848 28,275 28,280 28,280
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Table C.9: Dynamic Effect of Levy Passage on Residential Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Levies General Levies
$10,000 Log Per Pupil $10,000 Log Per Pupil
A. ITT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago 32.820 -0.000 -265.773 768.099∗∗ 0.002 1018.761
(20.735) (0.000) (396.204) (260.239) (0.003) (1276.882)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 102.762∗ -0.000 240.443 628.936∗ 0.002 1052.707
(44.834) (0.000) (153.325) (290.204) (0.006) (2156.253)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 120.868∗ 0.000 -189.214 643.947 0.001 -1.1e+03
(56.034) (0.001) (332.641) (429.415) (0.006) (1509.354)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 150.416∗ 0.000 501.337 1197.804∗ -0.002 -1.5e+03
(67.021) (0.001) (321.239) (607.593) (0.008) (1558.064)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 209.774∗ 0.001 1514.502 736.428 -0.000 -1.3e+03
(87.066) (0.001) (1403.965) (688.854) (0.009) (1933.565)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 189.955∗ 0.001 1042.974 870.491 0.000 659.049
(81.374) (0.001) (927.657) (746.166) (0.011) (3001.572)
B. Recursive TOT Estimates
Levy Passed 1 Year Ago -5.369 -0.001∗ -429.888 382.880+ -0.003 2858.342∗∗
(37.874) (0.001) (631.075) (220.570) (0.003) (983.035)
Levy Passed 2 Years Ago 21.582 -0.000+ -306.109 609.151∗ 0.001 788.623
(19.365) (0.000) (393.408) (236.224) (0.002) (892.106)
Levy Passed 3 Years Ago 78.152+ -0.000 160.652 597.297∗ 0.002 297.340
(42.874) (0.000) (144.673) (244.935) (0.004) (1420.386)
Levy Passed 4 Years Ago 90.096+ -0.000 -286.376 528.649+ 0.002 -1.3e+03
(52.029) (0.001) (340.948) (312.799) (0.004) (1006.006)
Levy Passed 5 Years Ago 119.384+ -0.000 389.950 934.248∗ 0.003 -1.6e+03
(64.047) (0.001) (308.073) (429.360) (0.005) (1051.770)
Levy Passed 6 Years Ago 157.154+ 0.000 1332.901 558.997 0.002 -1.9e+03
(82.508) (0.001) (1355.016) (487.147) (0.006) (1284.913)
N 19,268 19,268 19,268 25,163 25,163 25,163
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